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 ABSTRACT  
Researchers have highlighted the need for landscape scale management for biodiversity and 
other services such as recreation and pollination. Ecological networks have been proposed as 
a tool to deliver multifunctional services. Despite public policy interest, implementation of 
this tool is difficult because, as other public goods, ecological networks require land 
managers to be paid; in addition the creation of the spatial configuration of the network 
requires land managers’ cooperation across holdings.  
This thesis presents a methodological framework to test an economic incentive called ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’ to stimulate cooperation. It also analyses existing cases of cooperation 
and the potential of adaptive co-management (ACM) to develop ecological networks. The 
research carried out in the Dee catchment, North-East Scotland, suggests the existence of 
processes that echo ACM, however this ACM-potential is hampered by the lack of local 
ecological knowledge, power-sharing and evaluation cycles. Attitudes to conservation 
suggested the identification of three clusters of land managers based on land tenure: estates, 
tenants and smallholding owners. Cooperation was more frequently found within each group 
than across groups. 
The methodological framework proved to be innovative and informative for the design of the 
‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ which could stimulate cooperation for ecological networks such 
as field margins for pollination. But if a robust network is needed then the bonus has to be 
accompanied by coordination through third parties and/or spatial targeting of the incentive to 
achieve a specific desired network-pattern. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The UK has seen a dramatic transformation take place in the way the countryside is 
seeing and experienced. The way land is used has changed, and there has been a shift from 
the traditional model of land use, which focused solely on food production, to a more 
multifaceted approach which takes into account biodiversity conservation, recreation, 
provision of food, housing, issues associated with climate change and many other services. 
In rural areas, conservation measures associated with agriculture have acquired an increasing 
importance in the face of both national and international environmental commitments for the 
provision of biodiversity and the mitigation of climate change.  
 
This change has led to the problematic identification of the countryside as a provider 
of ‘services’, such as food and timber production, biodiversity conservation, water supply for 
agriculture and human needs, recreation, and mitigation of climate change through carbon 
storage. This perception of the countryside is troubling as, even if we agree with the idea in 
principle, we are forced to acknowledge that the countryside is a limited resource, and that 
the delivery of these demands, which are not fixed but change over time, is difficult. From 
both an ecological science and a policy/land management standpoint, strategies that are 
directed at the level of the single holding are insufficient for the provision of biodiversity 
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and climate change mitigation. In order to ensure the delivery of multifunctional services, it 
may be necessary to adopt a landscape scale approach.   
This research assesses the potential for cooperation and coordination to influence 
land managers’ decisions and change land use patterns at the landscape scale. It aims to 
develop a methodological framework which can be used to inform the design of public 
policy tools to incentivise the development of cooperation. Such cooperation is essential to 
the provision of biodiversity at the landscape scale. This research utilises a combined 
approach; it employs research methods from the social sciences, namely qualitative data 
from interviews with land managers, with experimental economics to test the potential of 
economic incentives to promote cooperation amongst land managers for landscape scale 
conservation. While this thesis does address a multi-disciplinary audience and engages with 
literature on landscape and conservation ecology, it mainly addresses an applied social 
science and environmental economics audience with a view to inform public policy. 
 
Both the literature on environmental sciences and current policy directives propose 
the implementation of ecological networks as a means of addressing biodiversity 
conservation (e.g. Lawton et al., 2010; Jongman and Pungetti, 2004,). This introductory 
chapter will first discuss the following key terms from both the policy and academic 
perspective: delivery of multifunctional services; conservation, biodiversity; landscape scale; 
ecological networks; cooperation and collaboration; payment for environmental services.  
The concepts presented and discussed in this chapter will form the foundation for the ideas 
presented in the wider dissertation. Following this preliminary discussion, the research aims 
and objectives of this study will be presented.  
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In this research, I used the implementation of ecological networks for biodiversity 
conservation to frame my investigation on cooperation and collaboration at the landscape 
scale and to examine the design of economic incentives for landscape scale applications.  
The interdisciplinary nature of this study has necessitated that the layout of this 
dissertation depart from the classic format; rather than presenting a separate theoretical and 
methodological chapter at the beginning of the text, each chapter contains its own literature 
review and methodology relevant to the specific issues addressed. Given the combination of 
different theoretical and methodological approaches explored in this study, such an iterative 
approach seemed the most appropriate structure. Thus, the structure of this dissertation is as 
follows: chapter 2 outlines the study area; chapter 3 and 4 address the question cooperation 
and collaboration for landscape scale conservation first from the point of view of ‘Adaptive 
Co-management’ (ACM) and then from that of land managers’ attitudes and decision 
making using mainly qualitative sociological data while in chapter 5 I use experimental 
economics to analyse land managers’ decisions in a hypothetical scenario of an economic 
incentive for coordination to establish ecological networks. 
At the same time, while each chapter addresses these complementary approaches, the 
introductory theoretical section in each chapter establishes the link between chapters and 
highlights the overall argument of the thesis. Given this approach, this general introduction 
acts as a foundation for the dissertation as a whole.  
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1.1 MULTIFUNCTIONAL COUNTRYSIDE: CAN WE DEMAND EVERYTHING?  
The countryside is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as ‘land not in towns, cities 
or industrial areas, which is either used for farming or left in its natural condition’.1 The 
Cambridge Dictionary goes on to give the following examples for the meaning of the word 
‘countryside’:  
‘The countryside around there is lovely; The mansion is set in 90 acres of 
beautiful, unspoilt countryside; Every summer thousands of people flock to 
the countryside’ (Cambridge Dictionary Online). 
This definition incorporates a number of ideas which, although conflicting, appear in 
both policy and academic discussions regarding the shaping and treatment of the 
countryside, past, present and future. The definition of the countryside quoted above reflects 
the dichotomy between cities and rural areas; this division between cities and countryside 
was particularly popular in the mid-twentieth century. In the mid-twentieth century, the role 
of the countryside was essentially seen as supplying food and fibres to cities. In the UK the 
development of the countryside was framed by the Town and Country Act of 1947, the 
Agricultural Act of 1947 and the Forestry Acts of 1947 and 1949. As in many other 
countries, the main objective attributed to rural areas of the UK was an ‘increased production 
through efficiency and stability in agricultural operations’ (Johnson, 1948: 178). Rural areas 
were synonymous with agriculture and Curry suggests, ‘planning legislation [was] […] 
remarkably successful at resisting development in the countryside’ (Curry, 1993: 7).  
Legislation in the period was a response to a high demand for food and fibers due to the 
constant growth of cities: the already high demand was exacerbated after the Second World                                                         1 Cambridge Dictionary Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/countryside [Accessed on 01/12/2012].  
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War. Scholars (Ilbery and Bowler, 1998) often refer to this period as the ‘productivism’ era; 
this term describes the way intensive agricultural production was carried out alongside 
policies of subsidization, price guarantees and protectionism. Other characteristics of these 
production systems were the destruction of natural habitats and species loss. Biodiversity 
declined sharply during this period (Tilzey, 2000).  
The dichotomy between cities and rural areas left the latter associated with a 
romantic idea of nature. This notion is reproduced in the definitions of the countryside given 
by the Cambridge Dictionary: ‘[…] left in its natural condition’ 2; ‘[…] beautiful, unspoilt 
countryside’. As Curry (1993:7) underlines, the ‘countryside has remained an idyllic image 
for most people’. This idyllic image has played an important role in the conception of 
‘conservation’, as I shall present in section 1.3. 
The examples given in the Cambridge Dictionary reflects yet another idea of the 
countryside: the transition from the dichotomy between country and urban areas to the 
current situation, where there is an absence of clear boundaries between urban and rural 
areas. Moreover, the examples incorporate the idea that land use has diversified away from 
solely agricultural production to a more multifaceted land-use model. Counterurbanisation 
and the increase of rural populations, due to people from urban areas moving to the 
countryside without participating in the agricultural economy, have provoked an increasing 
demand for more diverse benefits from the countryside (such as leisure activities, a healthy 
environment, habitats for biodiversity, landscape aesthetics, amenity etc.). These changes in 
the countryside and the shift from the production of commodity to non-commodity outputs 
provoked an academic discussion in the 1980s and 1990s; this discussion focused on 
                                                        2 It is unclear if this idea of areas left in their natural condition refers to the undeveloped areas as such or to a romantic idea 
of ‘nature’. In any case, in Europe researchers do not talk anymore about ‘natural areas’ as these do not exist anymore but 
refer to ‘semi-natural’ areas/habitats.   
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whether these processes constituted a ‘post-productivist’ era (Mather et al., 2006; Marsden, 
1995; Wilson and Wilson, 1997; Halfacree, 1997; Symes, 1992). However,  ‘post-
productivism’ has been a contested concept (Wilson, 2001; Evans et al., 2002). It has been 
used as a generic term to describe processes of extensification, dispersion and diversification 
in agriculture and countryside land use (Evans et al., 2002). However, for some the 
conceptualization of ‘productivism vs post-productivism’ is too simplistic and cannot 
explain the dynamics occurring in the countryside (Bjørkhaug and Richards, 2004).  
To overcome the controversy associated with post-productivism, authors and policy 
makers have adopted the term ‘multifunctionality’ to refer to changes occurring in 
agriculture and rural societies. This term is not without its own problems: some authors have 
questioned whether ‘multifunctionality’ is fundamentally different from post-productivism 
(Bjørkhaug and Richards, 2004), while others attempt to legitimate both terms by arguing 
that post-productivism is a transitional step between productivism and multifunctional 
agriculture (Wilson, 2001).  
I adopt the term ‘multifunctionality’ as my research is not concerned with how to 
describe changes in the landscape, but rather with how different products and services are 
delivered from the countryside. In this sense, this term aptly describes the situation in the 
study area of the Dee Catchment (see chapter 2). The notion of multifunctionality is also 
consistent with my choice of category, which focuses on land managers (as opposed to the 
generic category of ‘farmers’ found in many studies on Agri-environmental Schemes). 
According to Wilson (2001), ‘multifunctionality’ refers to the diversity, non-linearity 
and spatial heterogeneity which takes place in agriculture and rural society and encompasses 
productivism and post-productivism. Within this multifunctionalist approach, the production 
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of commodities is as important as other non-commodity products, such as biodiversity and 
other use values. Potter and Burney (2002), refer to multifunctional agriculture as producing 
food but also sustaining rural landscapes, protecting biodiversity, generating employment 
and contributing to the viability of rural areas. 
In Europe, Pillar I and II of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have been 
reformed (2003) to achieve multifunctional land use by shifting from pure commodity 
production to increasingly joint production. The term ‘multifunctionality’, however, has 
been used more often in reference to the multiple outputs that an economic activity can have; 
therefore, it contributes to several societal objectives at once (Vejre et al., 2006). These other 
outputs or functions are often called externalities, secondary outputs, coupled outputs, public 
goods (or ‘bads’) or services (Vejre et al., 2006).  
One reason why multifunctionality has been successful in policy environments is the 
joint production characteristic, which allows the continuation of payments of economic 
incentives under the ‘Green Box’ of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). ‘Green Box’ is 
the terminology used in WTO to identify subsidies that are permitted under the agricultural 
agreements. Direct payments to support traditional markets and products were considerably 
changed to subsidies that are identified as non-trade distorting i.e. in tune with the so-called 
‘Green Box compliant’ schemes.3   
 
There has been extensive academic debate surrounding the idea of putting monetary 
values to non-commodity products, such as biodiversity. Some academics argue that a                                                         
3 ‘Other schemes are part of the ‘Amber Box’ which are forbidden subsidies and the ‘Blue Box’ for subsidies that are tied to 
programmes that cap production.  
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commodification of ‘nature’ has taken place, and that multifunctionality is another step in 
this process towards the liberalization of agriculture (Yliskyla-Peuralahti, 2003; Heynen and 
Robbins, 2005; McCarthy, 2005). Others authors address the methodology of how to allocate 
monetary value to non-commodity products and how to internalize externalities (Wiggering 
et al., 2006 in Mader et al., 2007: 2). There is a general assumption that people demand non-
commodity products and services from the countryside; however, more research is needed in 
order to better understand what people demand and how they value it (in monetary values or 
not).  
Despite these critiques, the concept of multifunctionality has been adopted by policy 
makers and subsidies are currently paid in accordance with this idea. Multifunctional land 
use helps to merge economic, social and environmental foci, by emphasising the rule that 
economic action is accompanied by ecological utility: commodity outputs (e.g. yields) are 
paid for on the market, but non-commodity outputs (e.g. landscape aesthetics) are public 
goods with no markets (Wiggering et al., 2006 in Mader et al., 2007: 2).  
Land use is the key activity in determining the performance of landscapes with 
respect to socio-economic functions such as land-based production. Moreover, land use 
determines the degree of integration between socio-economic functions and environmental 
functions, including natural resource protection (Wiggering et al., 2006 in Mader et al., 
2007). According to Selman (2012), multifunctional landscapes are more resilient and will 
cope better with changes.   
Multifunctionality depends on land use patterns, landscape systems and how they are 
managed at different scales and times. Countries around the globe are gradually developing 
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their own public policies, with the aim of achieving multifunctional land uses that go beyond 
multifunctional agriculture.   
In the context of this study, ‘The Land Use Strategy Scotland’ is a key document. 
Published in 2011, this text is a response to the Climate Change (Scotland) Act of 2009 and 
constitutes a policy-umbrella under which multifunctional land use is to be achieved. It sets 
three national objectives, related to the economy, environment and communities, 
establishing the desired outcomes for land use and the multiple functions and benefits land 
use can deliver (Land Use Strategy, 2011).  
Land use is influenced, but not directly decided, by government policy.  Indeed, land 
use represents a mirror of land managers’ decision making. These decisions are based on 
economic, environmental, social and political variables. Top-down public policy, property 
rights and bottom-up social and cultural variables are embedded in specific environmental 
conditions. These conditions offer a finite number of options from which land managers 
must choose when making their decisions.  Conversely, in the context of fragmented 
property rights and multifunctional land use, specific environmental outcomes are dependent 
on land managers’ decisions: this is the case whether these outcomes are demanded by 
society and requested by government or not.  
A scale mismatch also complicates the issue of policy intervention. While 
multifunctional countryside and land uses are defined at large scales, land managers’ 
decision-making takes place at the field or farm scale. Conservation and biodiversity are 
processes which require much larger units than those corresponding to the field scale. 
However, this begs the question, what is the scale to be taken to address these issues? In the 
next section, I discuss this subject and present the scale approach taken in this research.  
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1.2 LANDSCAPE & SCALE: THE IMAGINARY BOUNDARIES.  
Spatial patterns and place are the key concepts of geography (Gregory, 1994). The 
relevance of human techniques in shaping the landscape can only be addressed in the context 
of a specific place (Spedding, 1994; Simmons, 1994). Spatial and temporal scales are at the 
core of physical geography; moreover, most authors would suggest that they are also key to 
human geography. Boundaries of scales, time and landscapes do not exist per se but are 
constructed. Where these boundaries are set depends on the subject studied and the 
approaches taken. The setting of boundaries is also dependant on the fact that each discipline 
has a different perspective of these concepts and different idea of where boundaries should 
be set. At this point it is necessary to present a short summary of some of the extensive 
academic discussion surrounding the about the concept of ‘scale’ and ‘landscape’. These 
concepts will be presented from the perspective of both social sciences and ecology.  
 
  Regarding the concept of ‘scale’, Gibson et al. (2000), argue that all scientific 
work has to include, implicitly or explicitly, a ‘scale’. These authors defined ‘scale’ as ‘the 
spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used by scientists to measure and 
study objects and processes’ (Gibson et al., 2000: 219). Since scientists investigate and 
explain patterns, the scale used is an inevitable step in the definition of the subject of study. 
The scale taken in research will define the patterns observed. This seems an obvious 
statement for some sciences; however, researchers in ecology and natural sciences are more 
familiar with issues of ‘scale’ than those working in the social sciences. The study of 
ecology addresses a number of hierarchical ecological processes; in particular, landscape 
ecology focuses on ecological processes and spatial patterns (in their spatial and temporal 
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dimensions). Scale is fundamental to ecological studies as smaller ecological systems are 
generally nested within larger ecological systems, and so on. The study of particular 
individuals, populations and species, for instance, is never isolated from the interaction they 
share with the habitats they occupy or the other species they have contact with (as the food 
chain demonstrates). In ecology, scale has two main dimensions: the ‘grain’ which refers to 
the resolution of observations, and the ‘extent’ which refers to the total area or time under 
study (Cumming et al., 2006). In contrast, in the social sciences the conception and 
awareness of ‘scale’ is less clear, especially within certain disciplines such as anthropology. 
However, within the social sciences, physical geographers, economists and political 
scientists are more aware of issues pertaining to scale. According to Marston et al. (2005), 
human geography should not take a ‘scale’ approach as there is no consistent theory or 
consensus on how to define scale within the discipline. Moreover, Marston suggests that the 
justification for using the concept of scale is theoretically weak (Marston et al., 2005). 
However, other authors argue that in the social sciences the concept of scale refers to social 
structures: the relationship of individuals to organisations and social institutions such as 
policies and cultural norms (Cumming et al., 2006). According to Cumming et al. (2006), the 
disparity between these different interpretations, understandings and organisations of ‘scale’ 
creates a scale mismatch between the scale of management and the scale of the ecological 
processes being managed. Gibson et al. (2000), call for more focus on establishing a 
common understanding and a clearer definition of ‘scale’ across disciplines, especially in the 
light of global environmental change, where research between natural and social scientists is 
essential.  
Socio-ecological systems represent one approach that unites social and ecological 
sciences for the study of natural resources management. The issue of scale is central to such 
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an approach (management is conceived across scales and across levels). Because the natural 
component unquestionably is affected by the scale of observation, even in the absence of 
agreement in social sciences, it was necessary to define a scale for the present study.   
In this research scale and landscape are central concepts. I adopted the definition 
given by Gibson et al. (2000), mentioned above. Therefore, for the purposes of this research, 
‘scale’ should be understood in a very pragmatic way. The Catchment scale here as the unit 
that allowed me to measure and study processes.  
 
The concept of ‘landscape’ has been understood and used in different ways: as land 
or a portion of the physical environment, as a territory, as a scenic view and, of course, as an 
artistic reproduction of said view. The common usage of the word in English tends to 
conflate these different meanings. In the academic usage, ‘landscape’ is treated as an 
analytical concept and definitions vary hugely, even within one single discipline. As Michael 
Jones suggests in his review of the concepts and approaches used in landscape research, 
there is an ‘elusive reality of landscape’ and the nature of landscape as an academic concept 
is ‘chaotic’ (Jones, 1991: 229). Whole volumes have been written, and are still being 
published, about landscape in geography, history of art, archeology, anthropology and even 
philosophy (for instance, Daniels and Cosgrove, 1988; Tilley, 1994; Berque, 1995; Hirsch 
and O’Hanlon, 1995; Schama, 1995; Adams, 1996; Tilley 2008; Roger, 1997; Arnasson et 
al., 2012, to mention but a few). Therefore, I do not pretend to encompass this vast literature 
in my research, but only wish to draw out some of the main positions and debates 
surrounding the use of the concept of landscape and to clarify my own usage of the word.  
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 The various conceptual positions on landscape oscillate in a wide spectrum, from 
landscape as the physical environment of a determined area to landscape as a cultural image 
more or less associated with a specific place. It is this inherent duality of landscape which 
prompted Carl Sauer, one of the main contributors to the development of North American 
geography, to propose the concept of ‘cultural landscape’, as distinguished from ‘physical 
landscape’, as the cultural reading of transformations to the physical environment (see 
discussion in Olwig, 1996). Thus, Sauer’s notion of ‘cultural landscape’ reflects how 
landscape is understood by art historians (the scenic view of landscape paintings and their 
aesthetics, see Cosgrove and Daniels, 1988 or Roger, 1997, for instance) and some cultural 
anthropologists. For instance, in the discussion on landscape in the field of French social 
sciences, cultural geographer Augustin Berque (1995) and social anthropologist Philippe 
Descola (2005) coincide in their insistence that it is a tautology to speak of a ‘cultural 
landscape’. They suggest that landscape is cultural by definition and that using the words 
‘environment’ or ‘milieu’ would be more accurate than the notion of a ‘physical’ landscape). 
However, most geographers and social anthropologists would agree that the productivity of 
landscape as a concept for the social sciences is that it encompasses the relationship between 
a specific physical environment and social and cultural experiences thereof, and how both 
the environment contributes to shape these experiences and likewise how cultural models 
contribute to transform and shape an environment into a particular ecological-historical 
construct resulting of these interactions between nature and society. 
 In a seminal introductory chapter, Hirsch (1995:4) revived the debate on 
landscape within anthropology by proposing a definition which has gathered some consensus 
within the discipline: landscape as an analytical concept refers to the tension between 
foreground, the actual environment as it is observed, experienced and known through 
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practice, and background, that is both the cultural readings of and the idealized projections 
onto that environment (e.g. the Western projections of the Judeo-Christian iconography of 
the biblical Garden of Eden onto the idea of sublime ‘nature’ unspoiled by mankind).  
 Similarly, in human geography there has been a critique of the privilged 
understanding of landscape as a scenic view; this approach is rooted in the Western artistic 
tradition of landscape aesthetics. For instance, Olwig (1996) reminds us that the etymology 
of landscape in Northern European languages pre-dates the later Renaissance impact of 
landscape painting aesthetics on how we use the word today. In its Germanic roots, lanskap, 
lanschap etc., the term ‘landscape’ was used to refer to a traditional communal territory and 
its meaning encompassed both the land and the community that inhabited and controlled this 
specific territory. Olwig invites us to reassert what he calls the ‘substantive meaning’ of 
landscape as a political entity. Other authors in archeology and anthropology call for a 
phenomenological approach to landscape (e.g. Tilley, 2008; Ingold, 2000). This latter 
position identifies landscape as simply the environment as it is experienced by people in 
their movements and practices through and in that environment. 
 What is to be retained from these debates is that, from a social science 
perspective, landscape is the result of interactions between nature and society; as such, the 
identification of landscapes in specific areas is the result of historical and socio-cultural 
processes. This is why the aesthetic, economic and cultural values of landscapes can be so 
violently contested between different societies or sub-groups (of class, ethnicity, user groups 
etc.) within one given society. The example of the controversy surrounding windfarms 
provides an appropriate example of this issue (see Van der Horst and Lozada-Ellison, 2010). 
From a social and cultural perspective, landscape boundaries must be clearly identified on 
paper and by legislation. Without such identification, landscapes are not clearly defined units 
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but are rather the expression of subjective perceptions and judgments surrounding specific 
places and environments. The numerous issues surrounding the term ‘landscape’ mean that 
there is no clearly defined generic ‘landscape scale’ from a social point of view.  
 Selman (2006), defined landscape as a holistic entity where natural and human 
processes merge and economic, social and ecological objectives can be balanced. Selman 
(2012) also argues that social, cultural and ecological dimensions of the landscape have been 
disconnected and that there is a need to reestablish a connection which will allow 
multifunctional and resilient landscapes. Landscape reconnections draw from different 
disciplines to understand cultural, social, ecological, urban landscapes (Selman, 2012). 
These arguments suggest that although there are no specific boundaries at the landscape 
scale, there are processes that must be understood when addressing connectivity between 
different landscapes. However, the difficulty associated with such an approach return us the 
fundamental question posed earlier: what landscape scale and what scale should be adopted 
for this research?  
 
 This lack of clear boundaries for the concept of ‘landscape’ from a social science 
point of view converges with the use of the term ‘landscape’ in ecology. As in social 
science, in ecology the definitions of ‘landscape’ and ‘landscape scale’ are widely and 
subjectively defined. There are no clear boundaries as this depends on the ecosystems and/or 
species studied or the approach taken. As such, landscape ecology tries to study landscape 
not only from a cultural or human point of view but also from the point of view of other 
species. 
 
  
 16 
Landscape ecology is a complex discipline because it studies interactions in ‘space’ 
and ‘time’ and neither of these dimensions has clear limits. Sharov (1996) gives the 
following definition of the sub-discipline: ‘landscape ecology studies regional large-scale 
ecosystems with the aid of computer-based geographic information systems’.4 Within 
landscape ecology, landscape can also be defined as, 
 ‘the interacting mosaic of elements (e.g. ecosystems) relevant to some phenomena 
under consideration (at any scale). Landscape is an area of land (at any scale) containing an 
interesting pattern that affects and is affected by ecological processes of interest. It involves 
the study of these patterns, the interaction among the elements of these patterns, and how 
these patterns and interactions change over time. It involves the application of these 
principles in the formulation and solving of real-world problems’.5 
 
Landscape ecology includes the study of spatial patterns observed in the 
environment; it describes the effect of the pattern and the associated ecological processes. 
When passing from ‘landscape ecology’ to ‘landscape’ the definition becomes even wider, 
as I have discussed. These differences in the understanding of the term ‘landscape’ have 
created confusion (Antrop, 2001) and limited the advantageous outcomes that different 
disciplines could deliver working together.   
 
One last remark must be made on the use of landscape in the policy arena. Landscape 
has progressively been construct as a policy category with an aim to designing particular 
funding streams for the protection of designated areas. This has been formalised at a 
European level in the Florence Convention, also known as the European Landscape 
                                                        4 (http://www.ento.vt.edu/~sharov/PopEcol/lec1/whatis.html) 5 (http://www.umass.edu/landeco/about/landeco.pdf) 
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convention signed in 2000.6 At a European and national level, policies derived from the 
Landscape Convention are mainly applied to protected areas, scenic areas and various 
special denominations in specific areas selected for nature conservation (as well as cultural 
or historical heritage areas or features). In Scotland this is most directly illustrated by the 
‘national scenic areas’ (as is the case of the Cairngorm Mountains in the upper reaches of the 
Dee Catchment) as selected and monitored by the public body Scottish Natural Heritage 
(SNH). However, outside these specific protected areas, there are practically no landscape-
specific policy measures in place: this is particularly the case for policies regarding 
agriculture. Indeed, as I will show later, landscape-specific measures are absent from Agri-
environmental Schemes, which are translated into national policy from the European 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Because these Agri-environmental Schemes are 
increasingly framed by conservation objectives, the lack of a landscape dimension often 
appears inconsistent with the objectives of the schemes, as present ecological understanding 
indicates. 
 
Having acknowledged the difficulties with setting objective boundaries, in this study 
I take the ecological approach to defining a landscape scale, that of an ecosystemic unit 
chosen for the specific purposes of the research. Given the discussion about landscape, I 
decided to take a catchment area as the foundation to define ‘boundaries’ to my study area. 
Although the catchment is particularly important to the study of hydrological processes, I 
decided to use this catchment because it defines a coherent ecological unit (beyond the water 
system as such) which is relevant for diverse conservation purposes. Also, as I show in                                                         6 The Convention’s definition of landscape is a very general one: “Landscape” means an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors’, European Landscape Convention – Article 1. Definitions, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/176.htm consulted 4 March 2013. 
  
 18 
chapter 2, the Dee catchment is a highly connoted cultural landscape known as ‘Royal 
Deeside’, which makes this a coherent landscape scale both from both an ecological and 
social point of view. 
As I shall address in the following section, for conservation the questions of scale 
and boundaries are central issues. As Adams (2004: 6-8) discusses with the example of the 
Parc National des Volcans in Rwanda, the definition of boundaries for protected areas is a 
complex political process: conservation has very little ‘naturalness’ to it and is very much a 
political process. The idea of ‘conservation’ has a long history, as does the way science and 
policy are used and applied. The following section answers a number of questions, 
including, what is conservation? At what scale should conservation take place? How is 
conservation defined by ecological science?  
 
1.3 CONSERVATION AND BIODIVERSITY: REVERSING EXTINCTION? 
From a historical and social science point of view, the concept of conservation has a 
very specific cultural history which is rooted in Western ideas about nature. Indeed, well 
before the emergence of scientific ecology as a unified academic discipline, the conservation 
movement of the mid to late nineteenth century attempted to create the world’s first nature 
reserves in North America. Moreover, this movement formed the basis for Western 
environmentalism.  
Theorists such as Henry Thoreau and John Muir posited the idea of a ‘sublime 
nature’ which North America was in danger of losing. They positioned this idea on the 
political agenda and highlighted the need for governmental protection of specific areas of 
wilderness. The creation of the world’s first national nature park in Yellowstone (1872) 
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represented a translation from the map to the terrain of the idea of ‘nature’ as untouched 
wilderness thought of as entirely separate of humans’ influence, let alone civilisation7. As 
they were increasingly encroached upon and threatened, it was considered necessary to set 
these ‘natural’ areas aside from direct use including by expelling the remaining indigenous 
population and removing them to federal reservations.  
Conservation policy was thus borne out of the conceptual separation between nature 
and society or nature and culture characteristic of Western thought, as anthropologists would 
emphasise (Ingold, 2000; Descola, 2005, for instance). This approach allowed some form of 
protection to be given to distinct isolated islands of what was considered ‘wilderness’; 
however, it also enabled unchecked exploitation and possibly the destruction of the 
environment and its resources in the rest of the nation’s territory (Adams 1996).  
In Europe, the institution of national parks has been more recent due to a number of 
historical and cultural reasons. Moreover, the idea of an opposition between nature as 
‘wilderness’ and culture/civilisation has been less stark, in part because there were only few 
areas of “unspoilt” nature in Europe and due to the consideration of such ‘unspoilt nature’ as 
‘wasteland’ in pre-romantic times. However, despite this, initial conservation policies in 
Europe followed a similar ideological paradigm of mapping, zoning and segregating areas. 
This approach dedicated some areas to economic development and others to the preservation 
of nature or specific landscapes.  
In the UK, discussions and attempts to create conservation areas began in the early 
twentieth century and were finally transcribed into policy in the National Parks and Access 
to the Countryside Act of 1949, which permitted the creation of conservation areas. Since                                                         
7 Anthropologists would underline that this denied the historicity of America’s First Nations and their subtle yet very real 
alteration of local ecosystems and landscapes (Selmi and Hirtzel, 2007: 10-11). 
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then, various statutory documents have been produced that protect different features of the 
countryside. Two of the most important documents of this type are the Countryside Act of 
1968, which enables the provision of grants to land managers to protect areas outside the 
National Parks, and the Wildlife and Countryside Act of 1981, which considers issues 
related to access and recreation. In parallel to these statutory documents and the 
corresponding increase in protected areas, the twentieth century saw the creation of 
numerous charities and organisations with active members supporting conservation activities 
in the countryside (Adams, 1996). However, despite the increasing number of supporters 
aiming to protect the countryside, rural habitats were rapidly deteriorating. ‘Conservation’ 
represented a common currency that governmental institutions organizations and charities 
used to exchange ideas, rather than a set of actions that permitted the protection of the 
countryside. As suggested earlier, changes in agricultural production towards mechanisation 
and intensification in the ‘productivist’ era, played a major role in natural habitat decline and 
consequent species loss. Land use is a key human activity which alters ecosystems. 
Estimates of the expansion of cropland and pasture over the twentieth century range from 
70% to 80% (Klein Goldewijk, 2001). In addition to agriculture there were other factors, 
notably mineral extraction, that contributed to biodiversity loss and had an impact on even 
the new, protected areas of landscape, such as the Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI) 
(Adams, 1996).   
A new shift in the way ‘conservation’ was considered occurred in the 1990s. First, 
‘biodiversity conservation’ and ‘biodiversity loss’ were adopted as general terms to talk 
about nature, different species and habitats. Secondly, the way in which ‘biodiversity’ was 
protected in practice changed. According to Adams (1996), business management thinking 
was applied to biodiversity conservation. This approach refers to the idea of allocating 
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scarce resources efficiently, which means targeting the use of money to conserve priority 
(and single) species or habitats. One of the problems with this approach is that conserving a 
single species or habitat may neglect other species or habitats and abandon them to 
destruction or extinction. Allocating financial resources to some species means there will not 
be resources available for conserving other species or habitats (see, for example, Adams, 
1996). Despite the problems associated with this approach, conservation in the UK currently 
follows this targeted path of protecting single species or habitats according to the 
Biodiversity Action Plan (BAP). This trend is not only apparent in the UK, but is happening 
worldwide (Adams, 2004). The BAP was the result of the UK Government signing the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. The UK was one of 
the first countries to produce a national approach for biodiversity conservation; the Plan 
provided information about the resources available and offered a detailed plan for their 
conservation.  
Since the BAP has been central to the biological conservation policies and practices 
which are part of the object of this study (the question of whether one agrees with them or 
not being set aside), for the purposes of this research I decided to adopt the CBD’s definition 
of biodiversity: ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’ (CBD, 
1992).  
Along the same lines, in this research biodiversity conservation should be understood 
as the conservation of biodiversity as CBD defines it and achieved by conserving ecosystems 
and population processes (such as balance between birth rates and mortality of different 
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species). Incidentally, according to the literature in ecology, as I shall present in section 1.3.1 
and 1.4, ecological networks are a tool to achieve biodiversity conservation.  
Implementation of BAP and other conservation policies are seen as top-down 
approaches; however, how these policies are implemented also depends on bottom-up 
decision-making. Those who own and manage land are as important as institutions in 
implementing conservation policies. As Adams (1996: 137) rightly underlines: ‘If 
conservation is to be successful, we need to re-integrate conservation onto the local 
economy. Just as we need to reach out beyond the confines of protected area into the whole 
landscape, we nee to build links between protected areas and the needs and economic lives 
of the communities around them’.  
If ecological continuity on a landscape scale is needed for conservation, and farmland 
(private property/owned individually) creates fragmented management of the landscape, then 
farmland represents an issue for conservation ecology. This raises the following questions 
addressed: how is conservation to be managed or achieved in farmland? What are the gaps 
between conservation and land management? What are the major concerns in conservation 
ecology in relation to farmland? The following paragraphs attempt to offer some answers to 
these questions and justify the choice of ‘ecological networks’ as the object of this research 
in terms of landscape scale conservation and collaboration between land managers.  
It is important to note, however, that it is not farming per se that creates biodiversity 
loss but rather the way farming activities are carried out and the way conservation is 
conceived and practiced. That is, if farming activities were carried out not solely as 
commodity production but as part of an ecological system, as is the case in other societies 
such as among the indigenous populations in Mexico (Toledo, 1985) or New guinea 
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(Rappaport, 1968) then perhaps there would be no need to ‘protect’ and ‘conserve’ species 
and habitats (without a romantic idea of these societies, authors have documented interesting 
farming-conservation systems). Such an approach would also tackle the current discrepancy 
which exists between areas of the countryside where biodiversity is in sharp decline and 
others where biodiversity is preserved or recreated. According to Adams (1996), 
conservation of protected areas makes a holistic approach to countryside conservation more 
difficult, as it creates the perception of conservation as a sector or land use. Adams (1996) 
also mentions that this vision of segregation makes policy integration difficult: if 
conservation sets targets by conserving areas, then once the target is met there is no need for 
transversal policies in different economic sectors.  In this sense, ecological networks do not 
offer new ideas but rather aim to develop extended conservation areas or connected 
conservation areas: they aim to replicate the same patchwork logic in a network. The concept 
of ecological networks is in line with the way conservation is envisioned in the UK (and not 
only in the UK but many other countries).  However, for this study I have taken the approach 
of ecological networks as an object of study (rather than as a conceptual framework); this 
approach offered me the opportunity to study cooperation and conservation at the landscape 
scale (as defined previously) in the context of private land tenure, where land managers can 
choose to do whatever they want with their land. 
Landscape ecology demonstrates that ecological systems can be studied at different 
scales and that ecological processes are often not confined within the boundaries of 
conservation areas. It shows that designated areas are affected by the surrounding 
environment and cannot be considered ecological ‘islands’ with self-contained processes. 
Landscape ecology also helps in thinking about species adaptation to climate change via 
tracking the shift of their ‘climate space’.  Landscape ecology has, therefore, helped drive 
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the vision of conservation in the UK and has spurred the arguments for the creation of 
ecological networks, as I present below.    
 
1.3.1 Conservation and Landscape Ecology. 
If biodiversity conservation is understood as the conservation of biodiversity as CBD 
defines it and achieved by conserving ecosystems and population processes (such as balance 
between birth rates and mortality of different species), then species representation, taxa and 
habitats are vital to the study of ecological processes for conservation. However, processes 
are not isolated and happen at different scales (of space and time) depending on the species 
(for instance, lifecycle processes for insects involve a smaller scale and shorter time period 
than those of higher mammals). Interaction between species forms part of the processes of a 
system and, conversely, systems are affected by species behaviour and species extinction. 
Research on species and habitats constitutes one approach to the study of ecological 
processes and has had a strong influence on the way conservation is practiced in the UK. In 
line with such research, conservation policies are then developed with an aim to halting 
biodiversity loss and species extinction.  
 
Diamond et al. (1989) studied human-caused extinction and identified a number of 
human-related factors which could have adverse affects on the environment: these included, 
overhunting 8, effects of introduced species, habitat destruction, and secondary ripple effects 
and human growth. Sala et al. (2000), found land-use changes responsible for the largest                                                         
8 Hunting is sometimes the reason for over killing at a rate above the ‘maximum sustainable yield’. There are two types of 
populations that are especially vulnerable to overkill resulting from hunting: species with low intrinsic rates of increase 
because these have a little bounce-back built into their dynamics (for instance elephants and whales are emblematic cases in 
the world). 
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effect on terrestrial ecosystems, followed by climate change, nitrogen deposit, biotic 
exchange, and elevated carbon dioxide concentration. For the case of the UK, Thomas et al. 
(2004) mentioned that causes of extinction are related to the major clearance of primary 
vegetation leading to degradation and fragmentation of habitats. According to their study, 
climate warming has had the positive effect of intensifying the net capacity of ecosystems to 
support butterfly and, perhaps, plant and bird species. At the same time however, a few 
exotic species have colonized British ecosystems and have had a damaging impact on many 
less robust communities.9  
These cases represent the major identified trends of extinction; however, it is difficult 
to know exactly how many species are in danger of extinction because of a lack of baseline 
information about species of animals, plants and microbes living on Earth. In population 
dynamics very little is known about the role individual species play in maintaining 
ecosystems. According to May (2007), information about behaviour and ecology is available 
for fewer than 5% of the identified animal species. With this in mind, Thomas et al. (2004) 
proposed the use of butterflies as representatives of extinction rates for other taxa. Birds are, 
according to the authors, imperfect model organisms because they represent just 0.6% of the 
world’s described species10, and because the assumption that mammals and birds serve as 
indicator groups for wider species loss is untested. The authors note that the impressive loss 
of butterflies may indicate similar ‘declines in birds and plants, because insect populations 
typically respond more rapidly to adverse environmental change’ (Thomas et al., 2004: 
1880).  
                                                        
9 It is important to mention that regulation of collecting and hunting as well as targeted conservation measures have 
reversed the former declines of several species (Thomas et al., 2004).  
10 Thomas et al. (2004), present the results of research conducted in the past 20 and 40 years on plants, birds and butterflies 
in Britain. They found that 28% of native plant species have decreased over the past 40 years, that 54% of native bird 
species have decreased over the past 20 years, and that in the past 20 years 71% of butterfly species have declined.  
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With the rise of ‘ecological networks’ as both an academic and policy proposal for 
conservation, mapping exercises have been carried out to identify where such networks 
should be established. Ecological networks focus on which habitats should exist for species-
specific conservation objectives (based on a set of conditions species need to feed, survive 
and reproduce).  However, Lindenmayer and Hobbs (2007) observe that the term ‘habitats’ 
is loosely used in landscape ecology and conservation biology. The authors identified two 
different main usages: a) a species-specific entity – the environment and all the conditions 
suitable for a taxon; b) a more general usage that typically refers to the amount of native 
vegetation cover (Lindenmayer and Hobbs, 2007: 96).  
Habitats become deteriorated, fragmented or eliminated as a result of changes which 
are dependent on the species in question. The most common example is the cutting down of 
a patch of forest: this constitutes habitat destruction for species specific to the forest habitat, 
but for native vegetation the habitat is transformed but not eliminated (and is then available 
for other species). In most cases habitats are fragmented.  
The argument for ecological networks within ecological science relies heavily on the 
notion of metapopulation (see below). The study of metapopulation structure is relevant 
because it represents the conceptual framework for managing a population whose habitat is 
fragmented. Furthermore, it offers an ecological base to the policy-makers’ argument that 
ecological networks are necessary.   
Metapopulation can be defined as a ‘spatially structured population’ (Hanski, 1998: 
41) or as a ‘population of populations’ (Caughley, 1994). Metapopulation dynamics ‘covers 
any spatial dynamic’ (Hanki, 1998: 41). 
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A precursor to this concept was Levins’s patch dynamics model (Levins, 1969). The 
principal question for this approach is the condition under which a metapopulation persists11 
when habitat area is lost and the remaining habitat becomes increasingly fragmented. 
According to Hanski and Gilpin (1991, in Green et al., 2006), the theory of 
metapopulaiton ‘deals with the colonization and extinction of individual species within 
archipelagos and patchy environments. The idea is closely linked with processes such as 
population turnover extinction and establishment of new populations’ (Hanski and Gilpin 
1991, in Green et al., 2006: 86). Metapopulation implies a landscape scale approach in 
fragmented habitats and reflects the processes that occur with the ecosystem rather than with 
the population only. 
According to Hanski (1998), ‘the essence of spatial ecology is that the spatial 
structure of ecological interactions affects population as much as do average birth and death 
rates, competition and predation’ (Hanski, 1998: 41). In this sense, it is important to take into 
account the entire structure of ecological interaction rather than only empty or full ‘islands’ 
or patches. According to this perspective, where local extinctions are recurrent events the 
population survival will depend on the interaction with the surrounding populations. 
Therefore, different patches and islands should be connected to allow species movement. It 
has been suggested that if re-colonization of new patches happens easily it will lower the 
probability of extinction (Goodwin and Fahrig, 2002: 552).  
Landscape connectivity in ecology is defined as ‘the degree to which the landscape 
facilitates or impedes movement among resource patches’ (Taylor et al., 1993, in Goodwin 
and Fahrig, 2002). Because the landscape is strongly altered by farm management, the                                                         
11 Persistence is given by the equilibrium of ‘deaths’ (local extinction) and ‘births’ (establishment of new population at 
unoccupied sites).  
  
 28 
degree to which landscape facilitates or impedes the movement of species will strongly 
depend on the type of management within each farm.  
Following this approach, land managers have an important role to play as the 
interaction between the landscape structure (set by landscape composition and configuration) 
and animal movements (set by behaviour) will determine the ability of animals to move 
through a landscape. Anthropogenic habitat loss increases habitat isolation (decreasing 
landscape connectivity). Connectivity or isolation is recognised as a fundamental factor in 
determining species distributions. Landscape connectivity has been measured by interpatch 
distances, immigration rates and dispersal success. However, research is needed to determine 
if simple measures of landscape structure can be used as a measure of functional 
connectivity for the landscape. Furthermore, according to Goodwin and Fahrig (2002) there 
is no evidence for the relation between landscape functional connectivity and landscape 
structure. This is because structural properties do not guarantee that individuals of a species 
will actually traverse the landscape. However, the landscape structure represents the area 
where land managers are most able to influence species-extinction. The decisions land 
managers take can potentially improve the quality of habitats and, therefore, increase the 
number of species interacting in that habitat, as well as allowing the movement of species. 
By giving the characteristics of habitats according to the parameter of ‘attractiveness’ for 
specific species, the probability is that ‘colonization’ and ‘migration’ will occur at a wider 
landscape scale and increase landscape connectivity.  
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1.4 ECOLOGICAL NETWORKS: RECREATING NATURE? 
Landscape ecologists have proposed ecological networks (in order to increase habitat 
connectivity) as a valuable tool for biodiversity conservation, because these are supposed to 
enable species to move and re-colonize new habitats (e.g. Turner et al., 2001). Although the 
idea is not new, policy makers in continental Europe and recently the UK have adopted this 
approach as one tool for conservation (Lawton et al., 2010; Bennett and Mulongoy, 2006; 
Forest Commission, 2010). In the UK the approach has attracted more attention for 
implementation. Within the European Union, the Habitats and Species Directive proposes 
ecological networks as one way to achieve biodiversity conservation (European 
Commission, 201212).  
As noted in the previous section, the basic idea of ecological networks is that they 
connect isolated habitats in order to increase the viability of local species population (e.g. 
connecting designated areas). The implementation of ecological networks has been 
advocated by many researchers (e.g. Tiemann and Siebert, 2009; Jongman and Pungetti, 
2004; Bennett and Mulongoy, 2006; Simeonova et al., 2009; Turner et al., 2001). However, 
despite a rich literature on the subject, there are fewer cases of effective implementation 
(Bennett and Mulongoy, 2006; Jongman and Bogers, 2008; Leibenath et al., 2010) than 
studies on proposals in theoretical papers and maps.  
The theories surrounding ecological networks are well articulated on paper but are 
not sufficiently tested in practice. Despite the lack of vigorous evidence, there is an 
important amount of research that supports and values habitat connectivity as a tool for 
maintaining biodiversity (Vos and Opdam, 1993; Turner, 1989; Forman, 1995; Bennett,                                                         12 http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/habitatsdirective/index_en.htm (Accessed 10/11/12)  
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1998) and for delivering other additional services, such as recreation (Gimona and van der 
Horst, 2007), pollination (Carvalheiro et al., 2010), or other ecosystem functions (Devoto et 
al., 2012) including multifunctional landscapes (Selman, 2012). As various authors have 
emphasised, ecological networks are multifunctional by definition (Jongman and Pungetti, 
2004).  
However, some critiques to this approach relate to the danger of habitat connectivity 
acting as a network for diseases, invasive species or spreading disturbance (Simberloff and 
Cox, 1987; Noss, 1987). This calls for an evidence-based assessment of these risks 
(Postnote, 2008). One example of this problem is the case of the grey and red squirrel in the 
UK. Red squirrels are listed in the UK Biodiversity Action Plans as a key priority species, 
but grey squirrels are displacing them. Grey squirrels were introduced into the UK in the late 
nineteenth century. They now out-compete the native red squirrels for food. They are also 
carriers for a deadly pox virus which does not affect them but which is a threat to red 
squirrels (Shaw and Thompson, 2006:155). The creation of ecological networks with 
habitats for red squirrels will also favour grey squirrels and carries the risk of the latter 
taking over red squirrels: this is already the case in some areas of England and Wales. In 
fact, this is also an issue in Deeside where measures to control the incursion of grey squirrels 
moving up the river from the city of Aberdeen are being implemented (as I could observe in 
the field). Another potential example is the recent spread of Ash dyeback due to a fungine 
parasite. 
The lack of evidence for the effectiveness of ecological networks for conservation is 
perhaps due to the difficulty associated with creating ecological networks, especially on 
privately owned land. The planning system has been the most promising way to implement 
ecological networks (Selman, 2012; Jongman and Pungetti, 2004). Indeed, the few existing 
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cases of implementation have been carried out through planning systems. For instance, in a 
survey, Ahern (2004) found that in the USA 48% of states supported the idea of greenways, 
48% did not know about greenways, and only 24% of states had a plan for the development 
of greenways. In the Netherlands the development of a National Ecological Network has 
been set as an objective by the Dutch government. However, the network is not large enough 
to sustainably maintain flora and fauna (Bolck et al., 2004). Despite this, the Netherlands 
holds one of the best examples of the implementation of ecological networks. Another good 
example of implementation is the case of the Estonian Ecological Networks, which are at 
national scale. Based on the land use planning system and developed during the era of the 
socialist state, this network has been conceived using a pragmatic approach that focuses on 
delineating networks with characteristics that can be mapped and are deliverable through the 
planning system and that are also socio-economically significant (Selman, 2012). It is likely 
that these characteristics, especially the socio-economic soundness, have played a key role in 
the successful implementation of the network.  
In the UK policy arena, the Lawton review (Lawton et al., 2010) strongly supports 
the creation of ecological networks as one way to enhance species persistence and a number 
of other ecosystem services. Although plans exist to use and develop this tool in different 
areas of the UK, at present there is no implementation of significant ecological networks. 
The Cheshire Regional ECOnet is one of the first cases to be developed in the UK where the 
planning system has, in part, achieved the implementation of ecological networks on private 
land (Postnote, 2008). In Scotland there are cases where plans or implementation are in the 
initial stages of development, such as the Lothians and Fife Green Networks, Central 
Scoltand Green Network and the Scottish Wildlife Trust’s National Ecological Network 
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proposed in coordination with the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) as part 
of the National Planning Framework 3.13  
It is true that ecological networks from a conceptual point of view do not represent a 
challenging idea to conservation policies in the UK, as they protect or recreate specific 
habitats for specific species. Although ecological networks, properly understood, are areas of 
landscape with low use intensity and multifunctional benefits. However, the notion offers a 
further step into landscape scale conservation. Most importantly for this research, it offers 
me the opportunity to study conservation policy issues at a scale larger than the holding and 
consequently requires the study of cooperation and collaboration amongst land managers. 
Lawton et al. (2010) also acknowledge that land managers are likely to play a crucial 
role and advocate partnerships as an avenue to their inclusion.  This implies not only 
participation, but also cooperation and collaboration as network spans multiple properties. 
However, there has been very little work regarding how this cooperation might be achieved.  
As Selman (2012) argues, there are two main problems when connecting landscapes 
(included the creation of ecological networks): the first relates to perceptions of the 
landscape and the potential conflict between the preferences of the public and those of the 
land managers; the second relates to the practical issue of how to implement policies and 
other mechanisms to successfully unite physical systems across areas that are under multiple 
landownership -including tenancy- (Selman, 2012: 141). In chapter 3, I will discuss the 
potential of the “Adaptive Co-Management” proposal as a framework for action (Colfer, 
2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Olsson et al., 2004) to address these issues. Research has 
indicated that the desirable ecological networks in Deeside are woodland corridors for birds                                                         13 http://scottishwildlifetrust.org.uk/what-we-do/policy-and-campaigns/nen-conference-presentations/ (Accessed 
20/01/2013).  
  
 33 
and for recreation (Gimona and van der Horst, 2007). However, land managers in the area 
may not support all species or woodlands identified in the ecological networks. Land 
managers could, if they wished, contribute to the creation of woodland networks by planting 
broadleaves and coniferous trees on part of their property. Yet, as I shall present in this 
research, land managers’ preferences are diverse and the creation of robust ecological 
networks is unlikely to happen without an existing business interest or another form of 
personal motivation in place. However, in all other cases an economic incentive could help 
to create narrow habitat corridors which are easier to implement, such as networks of field 
margins to encourage insects for pollination.   
At times, the need for woodland corridors identified by ecologists and the business 
interests of some land managers coincide. This is the case for the creation or enhancement of 
riparian woodlands (this example is discussed in the analysis of interviews in chapters 3 and 
4). From an ecological standpoint, the creation of riparian woodlands serves several 
purposes in relation to water quality and conservation of protected species such as the 
freshwater pearl mussel (Margaritifera margaritifera). At the same time, land owners with 
an interest in salmon fishing (be it business or personal) will be keen to cooperate with 
agencies and neighbours to achieve these corridors which will favour the salmon (some of 
the land managers interviewed are already supporting the implementation of these corridors). 
Another example is that of woodland habitat management for the conservation of 
black grouse (Tetrao tetrix) and capercaillie (Tetrao urogallus). In this case there is no direct 
business interest (although there are some grants), but several of the land managers in the 
areas concerned (especially estates in the upper reaches of the catchment) not only expressed 
willingness but were actively engaged in conservation practices and coordination with 
neighbours and public agencies. While some grant schemes (for instance participation in the 
  
 34 
European Life+ project) were available to encourage land managers’ participation, it must be 
stressed that several estates and some smallholding owners in the area wanted to participate 
in these management practices because of an interest in the species as an iconic part of 
Scotland’s wildlife. As the wildlife manager of one estate expressed explicitly, although 
there is no economic gain in black grouse or capercaillie (unlike commercially exploited 
species such as red grouse or deer), having these species gave the estate’s public and 
commercial image extra prestige. This may eventually lead to a new economic income in the 
form of ‘wildlife tours’, but this activity is very marginal in Deeside compared to the 
Speyside area in the north of the Cairngorms National Park. Without going into details here, 
conservation practices for these species included actions such as connecting up areas of 
forest to create more extensive habitats and removing deer fences to enhance the 
connectivity between forest areas. This is an interesting example of how land managers can 
contribute to ecological networks’ implementation. In this case, the connectivity already 
exists from a vegetation point of view but the habitat is still fragmented from the point of 
view of the species to be protected due to specific land uses (here the fences for deer 
management for sports stalking). 
The few national and international examples of full-scale implementation of 
ecological corridors show that centralised planning systems, partnerships, cooperation and 
coordination must be utilised alongside economic incentives in order to succeed with the 
implementation of ecological networks. For instance, in the Netherlands one of the projects 
currently developing ecological networks, the Green Connections, has succeed by 
implementing the networks via provinces and, most importantly, through municipalities and 
water boards that carry out a coordination role (Bolck et al., 2004).  
  
 35 
This research also shows that for the case of Deeside ecological networks could be 
implemented on privately owned land through economic incentives, the creation of 
partnerships and coordination by third parties. In the following section I present the 
discussion related to economic incentives.  
 
1.5 PAYMENT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES  
The question of introducing an economic incentive to achieve landscape scale 
delivery of environmental services raises the issue of ‘public goods’ and Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES). In many countries – and certainly in the study area - land 
managers ultimately control the delivery of public goods deriving from land use. Therefore, 
without a process to define objectives and economic incentives to enhance land managers’ 
participation, public policy for the delivery of biodiversity at the landscape-scale is unlikely 
to be successful.  
 
As noted earlier, biodiversity is defined here as ‘the variability among living 
organisms from all sources including, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and 
the ecological complexes of which they are part; this includes diversity within species, 
between species and of ecosystems’ (CBD).14 Following this definition, biodiversity is 
established as a public good, as I shall discuss in chapter 5. For now, it is important to note 
that as a public good the provision of biodiversity at the landscape scale does not exclude 
people from benefiting from it at the local or global scale. Hence, land managers carrying 
out conservation related changes to their land management are delivering a public service.                                                         
14 Source: http://www.cbd.int/convention/articles/?a=cbd-02 (Accessed 26/04/2012) 
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Inevitably biodiversity in the UK is also found on private land. Under the current 
approach of partial protection of biodiversity by law, and in a context of private property 
rights, it is necessary to compensate land managers for providing this service. One approach 
is to pay for these services by using voluntary economic incentives, known as Payment for 
Environmental Services (PES) or ‘PES-like’ payments as is the case of Agri-environmental 
Schemes (AES).   
PES is defined as the ‘voluntary transaction in which a well-defined environmental 
service (ES), or a form of land use likely to secure that service, is bought by at least one ES 
buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if the provider continues to supply 
that service (conditionality)’ (Wunder, 2005). Figure 1.1 shows the rationale of PES.  
 
Figure 1.1. Source: Wunder, S. at PhD Course Copenhagen, 2009. [Q1 Most profitable land use (e.g. 
deforestation); Q2 External effects from Q1 (e.g. decline in capercaillie habitats); Q3 PES paid by users; conditions: Q3<Q2 
and Q3 + Q4> Q1; Q4 Service-friendly land use (e.g. agro-forestry, pure protection)].  
Figure 1.1. Rationale of Payment for Environmental Services  
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The principle of PES is based on the so-called Coase theorem (1960) in legal and 
economic theory. This theorem addresses the issue of the distribution of transaction costs 
associated to externalities in economic activity (Engel et al., 2008). The PES approach can 
be illustrated by using an example of a holding with mixed farming and forest land. If the 
land manager decides to cut down the forest and convert it into farmland, which is more 
profitable (in Q1 in figure 2), he will destroy habitat that, is suitable for capercaillie (Tetrao 
urogallus). The law protects this species and it is highly valued by capercaillie enthusiasts. 
The destruction of the habitat will impose an external cost (habitat creation and species loss) 
higher than the deforestation itself (Q2 in figure 2). Therefore, people affected by the 
destruction of the forest have an interest in paying to maintain and keep the habitat (Q3 in 
figure 2). The payment should be less than the costs (Q3<Q2) and should be high enough to 
persuade land manager to keep the forest (Q3 + Q4). According to the PES approach, the 
land manager will be better off by keeping the economic activity already in place 
(commercial forest) and accepting the payment for managing the habitat (Q3 + Q4 – Q1= 
provider net surplus); the capercaillie conservationists will be better off by compensating the 
land manager (Q2 – Q3 = users’ net surplus).  
 
There are many examples of public policy for conservation in the world that use the 
PES approach, but most of these are ‘PES-like schemes’ that do not exactly fulfil the 
definition presented above (Wunder, 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Munoz-Piña et al., 2008; 
Barton et al., 2008; Kalacskaa et al., 2008; Lipper et al., 2009). In addition, the majority of 
PES are not market-based but depend on agreements between individual actors or groups 
(Wunder, 2007) and are sponsored by the World Bank, governments, conservationist 
organisations, and for-profit enterprise (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). Some of the known 
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critiques to this approach address problems related to: i) the potential service buyers; ii) the 
evaluation of Environmental Services; iii) the institutions and governance; iv) ethical 
issues.15 It is also worth underlining that the PES framework is characteristic of the 
neoliberalisation of land conservation policies and of its ‘institutional blending’ between 
private property rights and instruments for the delivery of public goods as discussed by 
Hodge and Adams (2012). 
In most existing cases, economic incentives for conservation are paid at the level of 
individual holdings. This creates a scale mismatch between actions taken at the farm or 
holding scale and the need to deliver biodiversity at the landscape scale through ecological 
networks (Macfarlane, 1998). This mismatch is translated into a failure to obtain the 
services, here biodiversity, for which the incentives are paid (either through direct or indirect 
payments). This suggests the need for landscape scale coordination or cooperation amongst 
individual holdings (Goldman et al., 2007; Franks and McGloin, 2006). The problematic of 
ecological networks implementation allowed me to investigate cooperation and collaboration 
in the Deeside. Since initiatives for the implementation of ecological networks involved an 
economic compensation, and biodiversity is paid for, I decided to investigate whether an 
economic incentive alone could stimulate cooperation (i.e. without coordination). For this 
part of the research I used experimental economics and took inspiration from game theory; 
this aspect of the research will be presented in chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
 
The data collection in this research, including the experiments, was based on 
information provided by land managers in the Deeside and public agencies involved in the 
management of the catchment. I define land managers as people who have access to land                                                         15 For further discussion on this see McAfee and Shapiro, (2010) and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, (2006). 
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and are in the position to take decisions on land use and carry them out. In other 
words, those who have a direct influence on land use and consequently on the 
environment. I discuss the conceptual and methodological implications of this definition in 
chapter 4 (section 4.1). 
 
As this chapter reflects, this research uses an interdisciplinary approach, working 
across several areas of study: ecology, geography, sociology and economics. A combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods were applied in order to study landscape scale 
management for the provision of public goods (i.e. biodiversity) on privately owned land, 
and the application of AES at the landscape scale. To frame my research I used the idea of 
ecological networks’ implementation applied to Deeside, in the North East of Scotland. This 
interdisciplinary project investigates social aspects relating to land managers’ attitudes to 
cooperation and conservation. Furthermore, it tests the viability of an economic incentive to 
encourage the implementation of ecological networks and more general management at the 
landscape scale.  
This chapter has highlighted a number of gaps in the literature in relation to 
ecological networks. This study contributes to the discussion and aims to fill some of these 
gaps. This research addresses the problem of landscape scale management for conservation 
on privately owned land. This work relates mainly to pragmatic research as it attempts to 
inform policy makers and assist in the development of public policy to deliver conservation 
at scales larger than the holding. It also contributes to the academic discussion of the 
following subjects: a) multifunctional land uses and provision of conservation by different 
types of land managers whose land uses are interlocked thus creating a specific landscape in 
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the Dee catchment; b) the study of coordination and cooperation for conservation; c) the 
introduction of coordination bonus payments to assess the potential for an economic 
incentive alone to create a desirable spatial configuration. The aims and research questions 
outlined below guided my research. Each chapter presents a different angle on these 
subjects.  
 
1.6  AIMS AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS. 
This research was guided by the following general aims: 
a) to establish whether the preconditions for collaborative action are 
present in my study area and to examine the potential for collaborative action to 
promote the implementation of ecological networks.  
 
b) to assess the potential for cooperation and coordination among 
land managers to change land use patterns at the landscape scale  
c) to assess factors which stimulate or constrain cooperation 
practices to deliver environmental services and to identify the appropriate 
economic incentives for stimulating cooperation at the landscape scale.  
d) to develop a methodological framework which can inform the 
effective design of public policy tools to incentivize the cooperation necessary to 
the provision of biodiversity at the landscape scale.  
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To achieve my aims I answer the following research questions:  
1. To what extent can the Adaptive Co-management framework be 
used to study natural resource management at the landscape scale; and could 
such a process be developed in the Dee Valley (North East Scotland) to 
coordinate land managers’ decisions?  
 
2. What are the drivers and barriers for land managers’ cooperation 
for delivery of public services? 
 
3. How efficient will an economic incentive be in encouraging 
cooperation between adjacent holdings in order to influence changes in land use 
patterns for conservation practices (the implementation of ecological networks)? 
 
The main research contributions of this study are as follows:  
1) more attention to property rights is needed for the study of conservation 
management: land managers’ views and attitudes are strongly (but not only) conditioned by 
property rights and how these define interdependent relationships between land managers; 
2) this research reinforces the findings of other researchers regarding collective 
action for conservation: the Adaptive Co-Management framework in its current state sets 
useful criteria to analyse collaborative conservation practices but does not sufficiently 
address issues of power relations; 
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3) proposes an innovative methodology which combines qualitative data and 
experimental economics protocols to test an economic incentive for landscape scale 
management. This research contributes to the applied use of game experiments as land 
managers playtheir own, real-life role in the scenario games. 
 
In terms of applied research, the study of landscape scale management for 
conservation through the implementation of ecological networks in the Dee catchment 
demonstrates: 
1) collaboration and cooperation as Adaptive Co-Management proposes them are not 
sufficient for landscape scale conservation which requires coordination by third parties 
(public agencies or others); 
 2) the introduction of an economic incentive to encourage cooperation between 
neighbouring land managers can be effective for the implementation of narrow ecological 
corridors such as buffer areas or field margins (for pollinators), but is not effective for more 
robust ecological networks (such as woodlands). 
 
1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION  
Chapter 2 sets the context in which this research was carried out and presents the 
different biophysical and social landscapes of the Deeside. This is important since actors’ 
decisions on land management are partly conditioned by biophysical, social and policy 
factors. As I stressed above, the landscape ecology perspective raises the question of how to 
manage conservation at a landscape scale (where there can be no boundaries, no owners and 
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the ‘profit’ is not money) in a system with property rights (single owners in bounded spaces 
with the right to do what is most financially profitable for them). In principle this sounds 
completely contradictory, but as I will present in chapter 3 collective action and cooperation 
between land managers and public agencies represents one potential solution.  
 
 Indeed, using qualitative interview-based data, chapter 3 assesses the potential of 
Adaptive co-management (ACM) to develop processes of coordination and cooperation for 
the hypothetical case of ecological networks’ implementation. As will be explicated in 
chapter 3, ACM is both a conceptual framework and a pragmatic process for the 
management of ecosystem services which can be (and has been) combined with Payments 
for Environmental Services (PES). Accordingly, chapter 3 uses the ACM framework to 
address the issue of whether, and to what extent, the preconditions for collaborative action 
are present in the study area. Further to this, chapter 3 examines to what extent collaborative 
action could promote the implementation of ecological networks. 
 
 Central to these conditions for landscape scale collaborative action for conservation 
is the role of land managers’ decisions. In chapter 4, I present the results of an interview-
based analysis of land managers’ views and attitudes to conservation, AES participation, 
existing cases of cooperation in Deeside and landscape scale approaches. I analysed existing 
cases of cooperation to understand when land managers are willing or not to work with other 
land managers and/or other actors (e.g. public agencies). It gave me insights not only into 
cooperation practices but also into the relationship between different land managers and 
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other actors. I also analysed land managers’ attitudes to conservation and whether these 
would have an impact on cooperation practices.  
Chapter 5 of this research takes the results further in order to investigate whether an 
economic incentive could stimulate cooperation amongst land managers for the delivery of 
public goods (i.e. ecological networks). In order to answer this, I designed an experimental 
incentive which I have called ‘one-to-one coordination bonus’ (or ‘1-2-1 bonus’). This 
incentive was tested through a simulation game which addressed land managers’ decision-
making for cross-boundary cooperation. This was tested on a panel of land managers playing 
their own real-life role in a scenario situation; as such, it offered further insight into land 
managers’ decision making under different hypothetical policy scenarios. 
In the last chapter (6), I unite the three approaches in order to discuss their wider 
applications. I conclude the chapter with some remarks about the strengths and limitations of 
the findings of this research and its relevance for further research and policy design.   
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THE STUDY AREA AND POLICY CONTEXT 
 
 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
While any boundary is inevitably artificial, here I make the pragmatic choice to 
delineate the confines of the study area based on biophysical criteria. The boundaries of the 
area can then be clearly delimited by hydrology i.e. by the River Dee catchment.  
 
In this chapter, I present the Dee catchment from different perspectives. It provides a 
brief biophysical and socio-economic description of the study area. First I present the natural 
landscape, followed by the social landscape. Finally, I describe the institutional landscape in 
the third part of this chapter. The aim is to set the biophysical, social and institutional 
context and to understand how these conditions interrelate with each other.  
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2.1 NATURAL LANDSCAPE 
 
2.1.1 Biophysical characteristics of the Dee Catchment 
The Dee catchment is situated in the North-East of Scotland (figure 2.1). It embraces all the 
land that is drained by the River Dee and its tributary burns (figure 2.2). The river Dee has 
its spring on the side of Braeriach and its mouth at Aberdeen. It reaches 1250m altitude on 
the west to the North Sea in Aberdeen (Smart et al, 2001). It is 136 km (85 miles) long and 
the catchment area covers 2136.75 km2 according to MacDonald (1997). The main 
tributaries are: Geldie, Lui, Clunie, Muick, Tanar and Feuh.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Dee Catchment situated within Scotland and households distribution. Source: Author’s map using 
James Hutton database. 
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Figure 2.2 Tributary burns and the Dee Catchment (in colour the 3 Dee Vision project areas of 
Kinord/Davan, Tarland and Elrick). Source: Dee Catchment Partnership.  
 
As for the geology of the area, the Ice Age is remarkably visible in the morphology 
of the catchment. The mountains in the west were smoothed and rounded by the ice and the 
floors of the main valleys planed flat. The Dee itself, which used to flow into the sea at Nigg 
(south of Aberdeen) was forced to cut a new channel further north. Loch Kinord (see figure 
2.2, upper catchment) was formed from a huge hole left when a buried block of ice which 
has melted (Wood and Patrick, 1982). It was the case as well of Lock Davan which is home 
of a variety of specific water plants (Sedgwick, 2005).  
 
The catchment falls within the north of the Highlands fault (from Arran in the west to 
Stonehaven in the east coast) that divides Scotland. Different types of granite stone with 
some patches of old red sandstone are characteristic of the highlands of the north of the fault. 
In contrast the lowlands area is conformed by old red sandstone. The types of soils in the 
area are as follow: humus-iron podzols, peaty podzols, alpine soils, peat, limestone, igneous 
rock and alluvial (Bruneau, 2006: 45; Smart et al., 2001).  
 
These different types of soils mark the land use patterns (see figure 2.3). The upland 
area in the west of the catchment is mostly under heather moorlands, with thin peaty soils, 
mainly acidic parent materials and presents steep slopes (Smart et al., 2001). This area is 
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characterised by semi-natural land cover types (mountain and alpine heath vegetation in the 
higher parts, the middle parts are mostly moorland and the lower slopes are predominately 
managed coniferous and deciduous forest). Some of the few remaining semi-natural 
‘caledonian’ pinewoods in Scotland are to be found in this area of the catchment (The 
Ballochbuie forest). 
 
In the lowlands of the east, between Aberdeen and Banchory where red sand stone 
soils dominate, land uses are mostly arable, pastoral and forestry (figure 2.3).  
Soils and streams are acid-sensitive and according to Smart et al. (2001) there is evidence for 
post-industrial acidification of surface waters and concomitant decline in populations of 
acid-sensitive organisms in aquatic systems, especially in the upper catchment.   
 
Figure 2.3 Dee Catchment showing land use and land cover types. Source: Dee Catchment Partnership.  
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Precipitations in the east average 700mm, whereas in the west uplands they reach an 
average of 2000mm with snow as an important part of the precipitations in the high altitudes 
(Smart et al., 2001).  
 
The present landscape is heavily influenced by human intervention. Anthropogenic 
changes have impacted the natural environment for a very long time. Tree clearance has 
played an important role in the decline of species and habitats. Trees in Scotland have a long 
history. After the ice retreated, lichens, mosses, grass and scrubs were replaced by trees. 
Birch (Betula spp.) forest appeared in Scotland in 8000 BC. According to Cramb (1998), 
forests of birch oak (Quercus spp.), elm (Ulmus glabra), hazel (Corylus avellana), and pine 
(Pinus sylvestris) were slowly covering 80% of Scotland’s surface after the Arctic 
communities were restricted to the hills. According to Wood and Patrick (1982: 15) around 
3000 BC the first trees in Grampian were pine and birch. The tree line was at 800 meters 
with trees spreading in the lowlands. Oak, ash, elm and hazel were covering the land slowly, 
except where high altitude, too wet grounds and salt sea in the shore line create impossible 
conditions (Wood and Patrick, 1982). Apart from the Iron Age, which was a period of great 
forest clearance, the increases in forest clearance have been exponential especially in the last 
three centuries.  
 
In Scotland, during the fourteenth and nineteenth century overgrazing, human 
population increases were important factors in the decline of forest as were the changes in 
demand from charcoal to coal and from bark from oak for tanning leather to chemicals, thus 
making the clearance of the trees used for these purposes possible (Cramb, 1998). Because 
of over-grazing for centuries and intensification of farming systems, by the mid-seventeenth 
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century forest cover was reduced to 8% in the highlands and almost nothing was left in the 
Deeside (Hall, 2006: 91).  
 
The industrial revolution reinforced this pattern. The displacement of people from the 
countryside to urban-industrialised cities (Glasgow mainly) was accompanied by extensive 
agricultural systems. Larger numbers of sheep needed extensive open areas that prevented 
forest from growing back. All these events accelerated the decline and loss of semi-natural 
habitats.  
 
The Deeside was visited and hugely impacted by Queen Victoria in the nineteenth 
century who had special interest in nature, forest and shooting. In the land where the 
Balmoral castle was built and its surroundings (Ballochbuie, Glen Muick), primary forest 
has been protected and enhanced with new planting (Edlin, 1963: 21). In the early twentieth 
century the Forestry Commission also started planting programs. Primary forest and semi-
natural woodlands have not increased significantly comparing with the crop forest 
plantations (Forestry Commission, 1963).  
In the Deeside, forest started to recover before the implementation of ambitious 
national initiatives in the 1950s, which certainly helped to further increase forest areas in the 
catchment. Total forest surface increased during the 1950’s and 1990’s reaching 17% of the 
land cover by the end of the 1980’s (Hall, 2006: 91). The Deeside is one of the most forest-
covered regions in Scotland, alongside Strathspey. However an important qualification is 
that 12 % of such ‘forests’ is made up of exotic species planted at high density for 
commercial exploitation and cannot be considered as a recovery of semi-natural forest 
habitat. I present in figure 2.4, the Dee catchment showing in pink areas the Caledonian pine 
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woodlands (semi-natural forest) and in green areas the forest plantations (planted exotic 
species). 
 
Most of the standing forest today is therefore made up by commercial plantations 
with species of little value for conservation purposes like Sitka spruce (Picea sitchensis). 
Only around 4% has recreational and ecological value Among these, there are important 
woodlands which I show in figure 2.4 (the pink areas): Craigendarroch (near Ballater) at 
Dinnet Bridge with oakwoods, (Quercus robur and Q. petraea), and Glen Tanar with Scot 
Pine (Pinus sylvestris) with original patches of woods.  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Dee Catchment showing semi-natural Caledonian woodlands and forest plantations (conifers). 
Source: Author’s map using James Hutton database. 
 
 
Glen Tanar 
Banchory 
Breamar 
Ballater 
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Forest clearance legacy led to the decrease or extinction of species and soil erosion. 
Capercaillie  (Tetrao urogallus) was extinct in the late 18th century and reintroduced in the 
1840’s. Osprey (Pandion haliaetus) population fell during the Victorian period and finally 
was extinct in 1916 in the Deeside and Scotland. Natural re-colonization happened in the 
1950’s and since then it has slowly recovered. These species have also been reintroduced 
through Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH) and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) programs.   
 
 
2.1.2 Designation areas & Conservation issues. 
In Europe protection of habitats and species has been carried out in the last 25 years 
through the Birds Directive and the Habitats Directive. Both are the bases of what is better 
known as the ‘Natura 2000’ designation; I will present the institutional arrangements of this 
later in this chapter (section 2.3 Institutional Landscape). Here I shall describe which are the 
protected areas within the Dee catchment.  
 
 Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) and Special Protected Areas (SPA) are two 
designations under the European Commission Habitats Directive. Consequently they are part 
of the network “Natura 2000”. In table 2.1, I present the existing SAC and SPA in the Dee 
catchment and figure 2.5. Also in Appendix A, I present a full account of the habitats and 
species for which these areas are designated. 
 
The river Dee itself is classified as a “Natura 2000” area with the designation of both 
SAC and SPA. The atlantic salmon (Salmo salar), freshwater pearl mussel (Margaritifera 
margaritifera) and European otter (Lutra lutra) are the species protected under SAC. These 
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designations require specific management to protect the habitats and species. Although 
implicit, there is a call for landscape scale management in these legal designations. By 
definition the waters of the catchment are connected, fish populations spread through the 
river and subsidiaries and their protection requires landscape scale management.  
 
 
Dee Catchment Designation areas 
Specific Areas of Conservation 
(SAC) Special Protected areas (SPA) SAC and SPA 
Coyles of Muick Loch skene spa Cairngorms National Park 
Dinnet Oakwood  Ballochbuie 
Morrone Birkwood  Glen Tanar 
Morven and Mullachdubh  Muir of Dinnet 
River Dee  Caenlochan 
The Maim   
Red Moss of Netherley   
Lochnagar   
Table 2.1 Areas designated under SAC and SPA within the Dee catchment (some of which are presented in 
figure 2.5). 
 
Other designated areas under international agreements are the Sites of Special Scientific 
Interest (SSSI), and in the study area there are 28 such sites. Wetlands designation areas in 
the Dee are Lock Skene and the Muir of Dinnet which are recognised under the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands (see figure 2.5). 
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Figure 2.5 Dee Catchment showing reserves and designation areas (all existing reserves and designated areas 
are mentioned in table 2.1. This map shows only some of these). Source: Author’s map using James Hutton 
database. 
 
 
 Recognised National Natural Reserves are as follows: 
 • Cairngorms (National Park) 
 • Morrone Birkwood 
 • Muir of Dinnet 
 • Glen Tanar 
 • Dinnet Oakwood 
 
The Cairngorms National Park, which includes the upper Dee, almost half of the 
catchment, occupies a special place within the environmental protection policies in the area. 
The park, which was created in 2003, is the largest in Britain and its importance at the 
European level is due to its wildlife, flora and landscape: 25% of Britain’s threatened birds, 
animals and plants are within its area (Cooksley, 2007: 23).  
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Morrone Birkwood next to Braemar is a National Natural Reserve because of its 
downy birch (Betula pubescens) which is one of the finest examples in the UK and includes 
the largest population of juniper (Juniperus communis). The Muir of Dinnet is important 
because of the habitats for flora and fauna and the geomorphological features. Dinnet 
Oakwood is especially important because it contains many groves of sessile oak, rare fungi 
species that are dependent of the oak and charcoal. Other species include many fish, 
amphibians, ferns, insects, mosses, reptiles, spiders and mammals (See figure 2.5 for the 
location of the Reserves). Glen Tanar has some of the most important native pinewoods and 
special plants such as twinflower and orchid creeping ladies tresses. Other species present in 
Glen Tanar are Scottish crossbill, capercaillie, black grouse, goshawk, ptarmigan, merlin, 
golden eagle and red squirrels (Gamekeeper, personal communication). 
 
Although the number of protected areas has increased between 1991 and 2009, 
especially for the number of SAC and SPA and Ramsar sites, conservation and biodiversity 
have not particularly improved, although they stabilised or stopped declining but some 
species are still threatened. For instance capercaillie (Tetrao urogallus) and black grouse 
(Tetrao tetrix) are still in ‘red status’ (Shaw et al. 2006: 296). On the other hand deer 
numbers, overgrazing and trampling still create problems for instance in relation to 
woodland natural regeneration or subalpine and alpine scrub which are damaged and almost 
lost (Hall, 2006: 103).  
 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones (NVZ) should also be mentioned. Areas under this 
designation are those identified to be at risk of elevated nitrate levels in the groundwater. 
The eastern part of the catchment is within this designation.  These depart somewhat from 
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the designations above, because they are not linked directly to species or habitat 
conservation. Nonetheless they have some influence on land use. 
 
Finally, another important ecosystems service provided by the Dee Catchment is the 
domestic water for the whole of Aberdeen city and over half of Aberdeenshire. The 
catchment waters are used for light industry and agriculture, and receive discharge of 
effluents (Cooksley, 2007: 30). Therefore conservation and water quality is vital.  
 
One common thread in these efforts for conservation is that all of them are isolated 
protection plans. It has been recognised that landscape scale coordination and collaboration 
are needed for conservation, as single habitat and single species protection have high 
chances of failure. According to landscape ecologists this is because species do not evolve in 
isolation but to the contrary interact with other species and colonise new habitats in order to 
survive and reproduce. As I have shown in this section, the present context of decline in 
semi-natural habitats and the resulting landscape fragmentation creates an antagonistic 
environment for species and their conservation to succeed. This has been recognised by 
social scientists and approaches have emerged to solve this problem through ideas of 
collective action (McFarlane, R, 1998; Goldman et al., 2007; Schenk et al., 2007; de Groot et 
al., 2010; Scott and Shannon, 2007). 
  
 
2.1.3 Ecological networks in the Dee catchment 
One proposition to overcome the landscape fragmentation created with isolated 
protected areas, habitats and species is to connect them through ecological networks.  
Fragmented landscapes represent a danger for species confined to relatively rare specific 
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habitats or with limited dispersal abilities and/or which are unable to cross non-habitat areas, 
such as red squirrel or capercaillie or many understory woodland plant species.  
Theoretical and empirical work in landscape ecology has shown that reducing fragmentation 
is often a valuable strategy to compensate for habitat loss (Jongman and Pungetti, 2004). 
 
Despite the fact that ecological networks are not a panacea to the problem, especially 
regarding invasive species which can benefit from the habitat connectivity to invade an area 
(e.g grey squirrel competing with local red squirrel), on balance they are believed to provide 
a possible alternative to halt biodiversity loss (Moseley et al., 2008)  
 
Regardless of the fragmentation of the residual semi-natural habitats, including 
woodlands, in the Dee catchment there is no planned implementation of ecological networks 
yet. However scholars have developed figures that identify the potential implementation and 
the benefits of forest networks for provision of biodiversity and recreation (Gimona and van 
der Horst, 2007, Forestry Commission Scotland, 2010). As mentioned before, the 
implementation of habitat networks is often difficult and very costly, especially in a context 
where the management of privately owned land is for commodity production and business-
oriented objectives dominate land use decisions. 
 
Land managers’ views and attitudes are therefore a crucial factor. Land managers' 
knowledge, interests, and generally the social, economic and institutional context need to be 
understood for the implementation ecological networks.  
Social and economic trends that influence and shape land use and consequently condition the 
state of biodiversity are presented in the following section, while in chapter 3 will deal with 
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public agencies and land managers collaborative practices and land managers cooperation 
and attitudes to conservation in chapter 4. 
 
2.2 THE SOCIAL & INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 
 
Landscape-level management becomes difficult as layers of policy objectives, 
individuals objectives, property rights and administrative boundaries come into play.  
 
Administrative and political boundaries divide the catchment between Aberdeenshire and 
Kincardineshire counties and embrace 19 parishes (Appendix B). Each administrative entity 
follows different objectives and they have little impact on the land management and land 
uses in the countryside.  
 
The impact of designated areas generally concerns urban development and planning 
permits which, to a certain degree, incorporate some elements of landscape scale 
management, mainly for beauty (e.g. forbidding building new houses in landscapes that are 
considered of interest). Recently in Scotland the planning system has been used as a tool for 
the implementation of ecological networks (e.g. in the Lothians and Fife green network 
partnership, which started in 2008). 16 However it is not clear if this could be effective in the 
Dee area, as such experiences are still too recent to draw conclusions about their 
effectiveness. 
 
 
                                                         
16 Source: Lothians and Fife Green Network Partnership (n.d.)   
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2.2.1  Population.  
Within the Dee Catchment there is one major urban concentration of 260 000 
inhabitants living in Aberdeen (Scotland’s Population, 2007), and four minor urban centres 
in Banchory, Aboyne, Ballater and Braemar (table 3.2 presents inhabitants by urban centres). 
The rest of the area is with dispersed settlement. The population practically vanishes further 
inland nearing the river’s spring in the western uplands. Downhill, population growth has 
provoked pressure on the land, enlarged the size of settlements and increased the demand for 
housing and related services in the east of the catchment.  
 
Agricultural land extends from Aberdeen city to Aboyne. In this area the numbers of 
smallholdings are higher than in the west. Going farther to the west the land use and the 
settlement pattern changes. Large estates own the land and population diminishes as 
mentioned. The west of the catchment is part of the highlands, which have experienced 
different periods of population decline, the last one occurring during the 1990’s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population (by settlement) 
Main settlement 
Aberdeen      260 000 
Ballater      1260 
Dinnet      90 
Aboyne      1950 
Banchory     6050 
Milltimber     5930 
Cults      4350 
 
 
Table 2.2 Population by settlement in the Dee catchment. Source: ONS, 2009. 
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2.2.2 Shaping nature (the construction of the environment): Land ownership 
and Land tenure. 
Two aspects of the institutional framework should be mentioned as part of setting the 
context of land managers’ decisions: land rights and environmental law. These two aspects 
play a crucial role in the provision of biodiversity, implementation of ecological networks 
and are important because they refer to the socially constructed set of norms and rules that 
frame the human-nature relationship. They are the institutionalised worldview of natural 
resources management and they establish the foundations for negotiation and set the bases 
for what is and what is not possible to achieve.    
 
In Scotland, landownership is a property system which, under Scots law, ensures that 
every square inch of land, inland water together with the surrounding coastal waters and 
seabed, from the ground down to the centre of the earth and up to the sky above is legally 
owned by somebody (Wightman, 1996; Callander, 1987). Regarding property rights, the 
legal basis of Scots law was in the feudal tenure, which was valid until 2004. It “[added] a 
‘vertical’ dimension to property rights whereby more than one person can enjoy property 
rights over the same area of land” (Wightman, 1996: 5). In Scotland during the feudal 
system land was owned by three groups of people, each with different type of rights within 
the same area of land, the Crown, the ‘Superiority’ and the ‘vassals’. The greater royal rights 
(regalia majora), which cannot be sold, include rights over the sea, the foreshore between 
high and low water mark, and tidal stretches of rivers. The lesser royal rights (regalia 
minora) include salmon fishing and precious metals. These “can be sold or otherwise 
disposed of” (Wightman, 1996: 6). The Crown also owns land which is now neither a 
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property of the monarch nor of the parliament but is administered by the Crown Estate 
Commissioners (Crown Estate Act 1961).17   
 
The second level of rights used to be held by the ‘Superiority’ (the superiors to the 
vassals) which “typically retained mineral rights and could impose any number of burdens 
on land which they [had in] feu. These most commonly [were] rights of preemption or rights 
to control or share in the value of certain developments (for example house building) ” 
(Wightman, 1996: 6).  
 
The last level of rights was that possessed by the ‘vassals’. As Wightman clarifies:  
“Below the vassals are the tenants whose occupancy and rights are derived from the vassals 
and today are usually governed by legislation” (ibid.). 
 
With some exceptions, Scotland was dominated by feudal tenure until 2004 when the 
feudal land rights system was abolished. Because of the recent date of this change, there are 
still many current examples of vertical superpositions of rights (for instance between rights 
to the use of the forest and shooting rights).  Apart from the recent abolition of the feudal 
system and the Crofters Act in 1886, there was no substantial land reform before in Scotland. 
Nonetheless even before the land reform of 2004, feudalism itself had become much less 
significant whereas common law, case law and statute have been of growing importance in 
defining the modern interpretation of the Scots property law.  
 
                                                        
17 ‘Crown property’ is part of the hereditary possessions of the sovereigns ‘in right of the Crown’ but “is managed by the 
Crown Estate Commissioners who have the duty to maintain and enhance the value of the Crown Estate. The 
Commissioners are appointed by and report to the Sovereign and to Parliament” (Wightman 1996, p.6). . 
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The Dee Catchment reflects the most common forms of currently existing land tenure 
in Scotland. These are: estates, tenancies, small landownership, and commonties. Within the 
catchment, 61% of the land is owned, 31% is rented and 8% is seasonally rented 
(Agricultural Census, 2000). There is a concentration of small holdings (from 50 up to 1000 
ha.) in the eastern part comparing with the west of the area where most of the land is owned 
by estates (from 1000 ha up to 50 000 ha.) In Figure 2.6, I present the property boundaries 
and in the Appendix C I present the list of holdings within the Catchment by ownership and 
size according to Wightman (1996).  
 
Figure 2.6 Property boundaries in the study area, according to Wightman, 1996. 
 
Commonties are one form of Common Good Land, or burgh commons.  Legally they 
are the undivided and uninhabited common property of neighbouring landowners over which 
extensive rights of common use persisted (Commonweal, n.d.). They range from less than 1 
ha. to thousands of hectares and a lot of them were divided amongst neighbouring 
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landowners during the 17th century. Today, there are three widely known commonties in 
Scotland. These are: Forest of Birse, in the study area; North Hill of Alyth in Perthshire and 
Gifford Common in East Lothian. 
 
Although it is said that legally there are another 87 existing commonties in Scotland 
most of these are unidentified and unknown (Callander, 2003). Commonties are different 
from the crofting system of the Highlands and Islands. Crofters are agricultural tenants with 
statutory rights within the estates who hold individual crofts on an annual tenancy from a 
landowner as well as an area of common grazing (Wightman, 1996).  
 
Estates tenure in the study area varies in size, but in the western part of the catchment 
are some of the biggest extensions of land under single ownership. For instance there are 
some estates that cover up to 50 000 has. extending to more than one administrative 
boundary and a number of them are within the Cairngorms National Park. Some of these 
estates have been owned by the same family since the 15th century or earlier. They normally 
deal with a number of holdings under tenure, fishing, stalking and shooting.  
 
Most Estates are interested in shooting activities and this has in some cases caused 
controversies about the potential benefit or damage of habitat management (including 
control of birds of prey and other predators) and regarding the  population density of red 
deer which, if too high, can lead to overgrazing thus destroying red grouse (Lagopus 
lagopus) habitat. Gamekeepers are in charge of wildlife management and their number per 
estate varies depending on the size of the shooting business. In this area it ranges from 1 to 
15 gamekeepers. Tenants usually concentrate on farming activities.  
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In Scotland the relationship between landlords and tenants is regulated through the 
Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Act. The different Acts have been amended several times 
since the 19th century, but the bases of their modern version are the 1991 and 2003 Acts. The 
currently most common types of tenancy are the ‘secure 1991 Act tenancy’ (representing 
79.6% of the total tenancies in 2008)18; and ‘1991 Act Ltd. Partnership’ (representing 10.3% 
in 2008)19; grazing or mowing lease for not more 365 days’; ‘Short Limited Duration 
Tenancy –SLDT- of no more than 5 years (representing 6.2% of the total tenancies in 
2008)20; ‘Limited Duration Tenancy -LDT- for a minimum of 15 years (representing 2.8% in 
2008)21. Tenancies under the ‘secure 1991 Act tenancy’ can be inherited. In the area there 
are tenants that have been under the same tenancy for 6 generations. As I shall present, land 
rights both limit and enable in various ways what decisions land managers can take and the 
cooperation patterns between them (see chapter 4). 
 
There has been very little written in the literature about relationship between estates 
and tenants (Maye et al., 2009) but nothing has been written about this in relation to 
conservation practices. I discuss cooperation between these two groups in chapter 4. 
 
Given the low influence that the State has over landownership and tenure patterns 
and land use in Scotland, rural areas are mostly under the decision making of land managers. 
The results of this research shows what Wightman (1996: 15) mentioned about the factors 
influencing land use: 1) owner motivations: from private enjoyment to profit maximisation; 
2) process of landownership changes; and 3) land use incentives and development. 
                                                        
18 Source SG (n.d.): The Scottish Government, Agricultural Tenancy Statistics at 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Agriculture-Fisheries/tenancy0507 (accessed on the 19/04/2012) 
19 Ibid.  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
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Incentives however, do have an important influence on land use and development. 
According to Wightman (1996: 15), the CAP has incited the development of ‘corporate 
investors’, landowners who are not interested in farming as such but in the profit and capital 
gains that can be made with the land independently of the farming activities. 
 
2.2.3 From the tractor to the gun:  Local economy 
Scottish Agriculture has accounted for 1.3%, 0.8% and 0.9% of the GVA for the 
years 2005, 2007 and 2009 respectively (Scottish Agriculture 2006, 2009 and 2010). 
Although agriculture, forestry and fishing represent less than 1% of employment in Scotland 
(SG, 2009b: 7), 18% of the population lives in rural areas and rural areas represent 94% of 
the land (SG, 2011b: 8). As these figures show agricultural production is not crucial in the 
national economy, neither is forestry nor fishing, although these activities are very important 
in the local economy of the Dee. Agriculture is however key to Scotland’s food and drinks 
sector.  
The most important sector in Scotland’s economy is services, including tourism, also 
very important and linked to other activities in the study area. In 2011, tourism was at the 
front of the economic performance despite the economic crisis. Important for the tourism 
sector in Scotland is the beauty of landscapes and outdoor activities.  
 
In the catchment there are no heavy industries and the river is not navigable. The 
catchment is especially popular for tourism because of its royal history and it is known as the 
‘Royal Deeside’. Besides angling and salmon fishing, the local economy relies on water 
recreation activities in the river, lochs and sea, such as canoeing, kayaking, rowing, water 
skiing, sailing and windsurfing.  
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In the study area salmon fishing is estimated to create an income of between 5 and 6 
millions of pounds/year. According to the report on the ‘Economic Impact of Game and 
Coarse Angling in Scotland’, 920 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) jobs are directly dependent on 
angling activities in the North East Scotland and the activity contributes to the annual 
income of households by £11.5m GVA (SE 2004). In Scotland large estates are mostly on 
poor soils and the opportunities for diversification are limited to a mix of sporting, forestry 
and hill-farming enterprise. The case of large estates in the upland of the Dee catchment is 
not an exception. Estate owners rely on fishing and shooting activities, despite the annual 
capital investment required to provide well managed sporting shooting22. These economic 
activities are of benefit to the area not only for those who directly provide the service or 
product but also for others providing activities such as accommodation, restaurants and 
related services. This multiplier effect economically benefits the estate, the pluriactive 
farming household being and other local businesses.  
 
Sport and recreation activities are increasingly important for the whole of local 
economy (Slee et al., 2009), but in the East of the catchment, closer to Aberdeen, the land 
use is mainly agricultural, whereas in 88.6% of the total area, land capability is low for 
agricultural purposes. The land use are 20% crops and improved grass; 58% Uplands 16% 
woodland.  
In the East of the catchment Aberdeen’s influence as an international city and 
Europe’s main hub for the oil and gas industry has direct impact on demand for outdoors 
sports and land prices.  
 
                                                        
22 Shooting activities have been estimated at £47m of direct adds to GVA and a total of £240 of impact to GVA (direct, 
indirect and induced expenditure) according to Scottish Government (2009). 
  
 67 
2.2.4 Conserving nature (the protection of the environment): Economic 
Incentives and Environmental Law. 
The economic activities in the area are partly dependent on the land and its natural 
environment. However most of these activities may be to some degree in conflict or 
harmony with biodiversity conservation and contribute to its deterioration or enhancement. 
Environmental law is critical to balance different interests and protect the environment. 
Economic incentives are vital to compensate land managers for biodiversity enhancement. 
European Union (EU) Environmental law and the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
are directly related to land uses, how the environment is shaped and have an impact on 
conservation practices and biodiversity through the designated areas and CAP subsidies. 
These represent important economic support and legislative documents for Scotland’s 
countryside.  
 
It is at the European Union level where a number of legislation and subsidies are 
designed and objectives set. Member states in turn implement these legislations and decide 
on how the subsidies will be applied depending on their particular circumstances and 
depending on EU and national economic funding. This is the case of the EU Agri-
enviromental Schemes, Water Framework Directive (WFD) and designated areas. In the Dee 
valley, designated areas include the Dee as Specific Area of Conservation (SAC) under the 
EU Habitat Directive. As presented in 2.1.2 all the existing categories of designations are 
represented in the valley. Furthermore the economic incentives are necessary for the 
economic viability of the agricultural sector and they are important for the forestry sector. To 
illustrate how the institutional framework works, in the rest of this part I present how the 
Forest public policy works in Scotland and how it could influence land managers decision 
making.  
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i) Forestry sector and institutional framework. 
Traditionally forests have only been managed and developed by landowners, their 
woodland staff, nurserymen and timber merchants (Edlin, 1963). However this changed with 
the creation of the Forestry Commission (FC) in 1919. The role of FC has been to manage 
public forests as well as giving skilled advice on management to land managers and 
economic incentives for tree planting.  
Until 1999, forestry policies formulation and objectives were decided for the whole 
of the UK by the UK parliament and through the Forestry Commission. With the political 
process of devolution in 1999, Forestry Commission Great Britain was subdivided in three 
parts and transferred responsibility to Scottish, Wales and England (Forestry Commission, 
2002). The creation of Rural Affairs Departments in each country (Scotland and Wales) and 
the publication of the Forest Strategies were the most important changes in the domestic 
forestry policy (Forestry Commission, 2002). Forestry Commission - Great Britain still 
exists as a national public body that coordinates activities across the board when Scotland, 
England and Wales agree to collaborate. However ‘Forestry Commission Scotland’ reports 
separately to the Scottish Minister (this is also the case for Wales and England). Figure 2.7 
presents the institutional framework with the roles and responsibilities for forest policies in 
Scotland after devolution. This figure shows that Forestry Commission is an over-arching 
public body at the national UK level. At the Scottish level the Forestry Commission Scotland 
(FCS) is responsible of designing, promoting, implementing and reporting back to Scottish 
Ministers (Forestry Commission, 2002).  
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Figure 2.7 Forestry Institutional Framework for Scotland after devolution  
As mentioned one of the most important changes within forest policy was the 
publication of the Scottish Forestry Strategy in 2000 and 2006 (SE, 2006). With this strategy 
the Executive set out the aims and vision of what is desired for the whole of Scotland: 
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Increased forest cover from 17% to 25%; creation of multifunctional forests from which 
people can benefit (SE, 2006). Some of the forest functions recognised in this strategy 
document are timber, climate change mitigation, sustainable development, integration with 
other land uses and biodiversity, amongst other services. The strategy is embedded in the 
web of Scottish policies, regulations and national objectives such as the Rural Scotland: A 
national Approach, 2000; Improving Health in Scotland- the Change, 2003; Scotland’s 
Biodiversity –it’s in your hands, 2004; A partnership for a better Scotland: partnership 
Agreement, 2003; Smart successful Scotland 2004 and many other documents.  
The strategy is a comprehensive document explaining in detail why and what is 
important for forests in Scotland however the implementation plan (published in 2007) 
clarifies how and who should implement it and how different documents interlink with each 
other. Reviews and evaluations of the strategy achievements are planned every five years. At 
national level are the strategic plans that set objectives, aims and requirements from the 
forestry sector. Of all these, only two documents are statutory instruments: the Planning 
Circular 1/2009 and 1/2011; and the Climate Change Act, 2009.  
The first Land Use Strategy was approved by the Scottish parliament and published 
in 2011 in response to the Climate Change Act 2009 (SE, 2011). The most important point 
of the Land Use Strategy regarding forests is the clarification of the objective to reach a 25% 
increase in forest by 2050 (although mainly as a response to climate change rather than as a 
direct concern for biodiversity).  
Also at the national level, the National Planning Framework 2 (NPF2) sets objectives 
and aims for Scotland’s different sectors taking into account scale and spatial configuration 
(SG, 2009a). NPF2 gives guidance when planning permissions are requested or in the 
  
 71 
preparation of development plans by local authorities. The most important points regarding 
forestry are that NPF2 can designate national developments, for example the ecological 
networks in Clyde Valley Green Network; or when ecological networks implementation are 
considered as national infrastructure projects and therefore developed through the planning 
system rather than economic incentives (SG, 2009a).  
All these national strategies, plans, objectives and challenges set in the different 
documents are linked to and in tune with each other.  
The implementation however is at regional and local levels. At the regional level 
there are a number of documents that guide the implementation phase such as the National 
Inventory of Woodlands and Trees (Forestry Commission, 1997), which identifies where 
trees are and should be protected. Also ‘The right tree in the right place’ guides planners and 
other governmental agencies in the spatial aspects of forest expansion (Forestry 
Commission, 2010).  
All these documents are very useful in setting national objectives and guiding on the 
achievements, however the implementation relies only on voluntary economic incentives 
showed at the local and farm level. Besides the two statutory documents already mentioned 
above, the preferred tools to achieve national objectives are voluntary economic incentives, 
which in part come from CAP and/or national budgets. Therefore the achievement of 
national objectives relies mainly on land managers’ willingness to apply for voluntary 
schemes and depending on what they want to do in their own land.  
The Scottish Rural Development Program –Rural Priorities and Land Management 
Contracts are the channel through which economic incentives are given to land managers for 
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forestry and agri-environmental schemes. Forest schemes used to be given by Forestry 
Commission and Scottish Natural Heritage, however all of them are now closed to new 
entrants as shown in figure 2.8 (although some of the payments are still being made to 
former participants). Rural Priorities and National Forest Land Scheme are the only 
economic incentives available to land managers for forest plantation.  
 
Figure 2.8 Succession of Forestry Schemes in Scotland since 1990’s. 
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2.3 THE SCOTTISH RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM –RURAL PRIORITIES, CAP AND 
FORESTRY SCHEMES. 
In Scotland, the UK, and more generally in the EU, environmental public goods are 
provided using top-down environmental regulations and bottom–up voluntary economic 
incentives such as prescribed agri-environmental schemes (AES) and other funds for 
conservation projects (e.g. LEADER). EU member states aim at achieving their 
commitments to various international agreements to enhance biodiversity and halt 
biodiversity loss through Pillar II, Axis II subsidies of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) in addition to other funds. 23 
Although CAP is the most important economic incentive for agricultural production 
in Scotland today, economic support for food production has had a long history (e.g. see the 
‘deficiency payment’ for cereals in the 1930’s, Warren et al. 2008). The EU Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) is a land management policy and decision-making instrument at 
the international European level but has had a primary role in shaping the environment 
through subsidies to agricultural production at the local level. The creation of the European 
Community’s CAP in the 1950’s had as a primary objective to maintain strategic self-
sufficiency in food supplies. For decades CAP economic incentives aimed at food 
production with little attention to the environmental impact that the production systems 
caused. However in part for this reason CAP has been reformed in 2003 to decouple funding 
from agricultural production (Pillar I) re-orienting them towards environmental measures, 
animal welfare, food safety and rural development (Pillar II).  
                                                        
23 For the case of Scotland there are a number of international agreements, such as Convention on Biological Diversity 
(through the EU habitat and birds directives), Rio summit 1992, Global strategy for plant conservation 2002 to mention 
some.  
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Depending on the implementation by member states, this reform could have more or 
less impact on environmental policy and environmental improvements (Gay et al. 2005). As 
part of these changes farmers have to comply with the Good Agricultural and Environmental 
Conditions (GAEC) and Statutory Management Requirements in order to receive direct 
support under Pillar I (Single Farm Payments, -SFP-), which are the most important in 
farming production.  
 
Habitat connectivity and reduction of habitat fragmentation are explicitly part of the 
Scottish Government’s biodiversity objectives (SG, 2004b). The effectiveness of this tool, 
however, has been questioned in the light of biodiversity loss and farmers’ attitudes towards 
more conservation and environmentally friendly actions, as I will present in further chapters.   
 
One of the main problems is the mismatch between payments at the holding scale 
and the landscape scale needed to achieve the biodiversity objectives. Most of the AES in 
Europe are applied at the holding scale. Some exceptions to this approach are the Meadow 
Birds Agreements in the Netherlands (Verhulst et al., 2007) and Hedgerows Planting scheme 
in Denmark (Kristensen, 2001; Busck et al, 2007). The Netherland case is special because 
they have a long history and experience in farming organisation and farmers’ participation in 
co-operatives. Since 1994 ‘agri-environment collectives’ have become a very important 
channel for AES implementation. The objective of the collectives is to increase ecological 
knowledge and encourage members to implement the schemes where they are more effective 
(Verhulst et al., 2007). For the Meadow Birds Agreements the collectives are crucial because 
they encourage members to participate and the scheme application is for a minimum of 100 
ha. Payments are a combination of action-based (delayed mowing) and outcome-based 
(number of clutches farmers have on their land). This suggests that payments are a 
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combination of income forgone, additional costs and payment by clutches (Schwarz et al., 
2008).   
The Hedgerows in Denmark is another special case. It started in the 1800’s and has 
continued since then (Kristensen, 2001; Busck et al., 2007).  Prevention of soil erosion was 
the objective at the beginning, but now in addition to that the objectives are also to increase 
biotopes and ecological networks in agricultural lands.  
 
There are other cases within AES that could have an impact at the landscape scale; 
such is the case of the Rural Priorities of the Scottish Rural Development Program (SRDP), 
which gives an option for joint applications. However, the applications may or may not be 
for adjacent holdings, therefore, the landscape scale potential may be lost. Another case is 
the Higher Level Stewardship in UK, which requires the entry of three farms with specific 
management practices for each to guarantee the conservation advantages. Further examples 
are the cases of common land in England and the Top-Tier AES in Wales. 
 
Although tackling habitat fragmentation through ecological networks is one of the 
biodiversity objectives, there is no mechanism in place to achieve this objective. There is no 
coordination or payments that compensate for both income forgone and the costs of trust that 
cooperation implies, or the costs of risks of defection due to cross property management that 
the scheme involves.  
 
Most EU AES are action-based payments and the calculations are based on income 
forgone and additional costs. As mentioned earlier, this method does not allow for the 
differences in costs and opportunity costs across farms, letting low cost farms enter into the 
scheme, rather than the parcels needed for the habitat connectivity or farms that can offer 
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higher additional biodiversity benefits (Schwarz et al., 2008). However, AES payments are 
the easiest pragmatic payment method that avoids the uncertainties of measuring 
environmental outcomes or complexity of landscape scale management.  
 
There is but little autonomy in the choices for payment design. The grounds for this 
are the changes in the CAP and the agreements with the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
As a result of the negotiations with the WTO, CAP was reformed in 2003 and significantly 
changed environmental standards and payment subsidies. Cross-compliance was introduced, 
which is a minimum environmental standard condition for farmers to fulfil in order to 
receive EU subsidies. In addition, direct payments to support traditional markets and 
products were considerably changed to subsidies that are identified as non-trade distorting 
i.e. in tune with the Green Box compliant schemes.24  
 
CAP reform has been taking place since 2003 and every year there are cuts from 
Pillar I and more incentives are available in Pillar II. Despite these efforts the allocation of 
economic incentives is still mostly related to agricultural production. The SFP represents 
50% of the farming income in Scotland (SG, 2011a). 
 
In this regard the study area follows the national trend where in 2009, 81% of the 
subsidies were directly related to agricultural production, Pillar I (in the study area these 
figure was 82%); and only 18.90% corresponded to rural development Pillar II (in the study 
area these represented 17.76%) as figure 2.9 shows.  Within Pillar II the Less Favourable 
Areas scheme is very important for Scotland and for the Dee catchment.                                                         
24 ‘Green Box’ is the terminology used in WTO to identify subsidies that are permitted under the agricultural agreements. 
Other subsidies are part of the amber box which are forbidden subsidies and the blue box for subsidies that are tied to 
programmes that cap production. 
  
 77 
 
 
Figure 2.9 CAP payments by type of payment at national and regional level.  
 
The implementation of CAP-Pillar II subsidies is carried out through the Scottish 
Rural Development Programme (SRDP). For Scotland the objective of the SRDP 2007-
2013, is to increase competitiveness in agriculture and forestry, improve the environment 
and the countryside and ‘enhance the quality of life in rural areas’. The emphasis in 
Scotland is ‘rural areas’ as opposite to only ‘agricultural areas’.  Consequently the schemes 
are open to land managers, communities and any other groups of stakeholders who aim to 
enhance the quality of life in rural areas. In the study area this is of benefit to land managers, 
trusts and partnerships of land managers and public agencies that have applied for the 
schemes. The SRDP certainly represents an opportunity for landscape scale management. 
 
The SRDP has concentrated older schemes and proposed new ones, the most relevant 
SRDP programme for the context of this research is the Rural Develop Contracts for Rural 
Priorities.  
In Scotland the Rural Development Contracts were introduced in 2007, these are a 
competitive scheme, and they help to link support under Pillar I (Single Farm Payment and 
other direct schemes) with Pillar II support (Tiers II and III of the SRDP) under CAP.  
81.06% 
18.90% 
82.23% 
17.76% 
CAP payments for 2009 at national (inner circle) and 
regional level (outer circle).  
DirectEAGF (%) 
RuralDevelopment (%) 
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This scheme aims to deliver 5 outcomes of the SRDP, which are: 
a) business viability and competitiveness; b) water quality; c) adaptations to mitigate climate 
change; d) biodiversity and landscapes; and e) thriving rural communities.  
The scheme is implemented in Scotland (11 regions) and has specific priorities for each 
region. It creates synergies between different policy documents, national strategies and other 
national commitments. Table 2.3 shows SRDP – Rural Priorities and how they achieve the 5 
objectives of the SRDP for the region in which the study area is included. 
 
 
Grampian region 
Business Viability 
and Competitiveness 
Priorities 
Improving business practices (production, distribution, etc.) including options 
relating specifically to New Entrants and Organics. 
Biodiversity 
Priorities 
 
Halting the loss of biodiversity and reversal of previous losses through 
management, conservation and enhancement. Protection of rare/endangered 
species, reducing threat from non-native/invasive species, achieving 'favourable 
condition' on SSSIs and increase in area of connected natural habitats are all 
encouraged. 
Landscape Priorities 
 
Enhancements of the rural landscape which have a positive impact on people's 
environment. The importance of Scotland's woods and forests is also highlighted. 
Built & Cultural 
Heritage Priorities. 
 
Conservation and enhancement of the historic environment by increasing 
vernacular rural buildings and sites of archaeological or historic interest that we 
protect, enhance and manage. 
 
Water and Soils 
Priorities 
 
Improvement of habitats/water quality through various means. Reduction of diffuse 
pollution, flood protection, protection against risk of erosion and actions within 
Nitrate Vulnerable Zones, Bathing Water Catchments, shellfish growing areas and 
Drinking Water Protected Areas are all identified. 
Adaptations to 
Mitigate Climate 
Change Priorities 
Reduce emissions of greenhouse gasses, improving efficiency of practices and 
better management of current climate change actions. 
 
Public Access 
Priorities 
Public access provision with a particular emphasis on creation, improvement and 
promotion through various means. 
Diversification of 
Rural Enterprise 
Priorities 
Improvement of rural enterprise through diversification. Innovation, Strengthened 
links between primary producers and other sectors, improved environmental 
performance, career development opportunities and maximisation of tourism are all 
highlighted. 
Thriving Rural 
Communities 
Priorities 
Empowering and encouraging rural communities to take a positive role in 
addressing the issues which affect them. Support for community led initiatives, 
improvement of skills, knowledge and capacity as well as access to sustainable 
rural buildings are all highlighted. 
Table 2.3 Rural Development Contracts-Rural Priorities for the Grampian region, 2010. 
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Another change in the SRDP is the inclusion of the Forestry Scheme. All new 
applications have to be done through Rural Development Contracts - Rural Priorities and 
Land Management Options schemes. All plans have to be approved by Forestry Commission 
and in some cases by SNH.   
 
Public and private afforestation has not been of great success; in more than eighty 
years of planting the forest covers only 17% of Scotland (Cramb, 1998: 41). Native species 
cover less than 2% of land surface (less than 20% of the forest cover). Commercial forest 
plantation was based on exotic species, single-species blocks that destroyed habitats 
especially in upland grazing areas and peatlands (Cramb, 1998: 41). However changes in 
practices and new rules for planting are in place since the beginning of the 1990’s.  
The relative failure in forestry and the lack of success in increasing forest cover is explained 
in part because it relies mainly on voluntary economic incentives.  
 
Contrasting with forestry policy where a voluntary economic incentives approach has 
been taken, I present very briefly how the scenario changes if environmental measures are 
enforced by law taking as an example the Water Framework Directive and how it works in 
the Dee Valley.  
 
2.3.1 The case of the Water Framework Directive (WFD) 
The Water Framework Directive (WFD) is an initiative at the EU level which was 
adopted in Scotland in 2003. It stipulates that all member states have the obligation to meet 
‘good ecological status’ for water bodies by 2015 and to prevent deterioration. On behalf of 
Scottish Ministers, the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) is the public 
agency in charge of introducing regulatory controls over activities in order to protect and 
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improve Scotland’s water environment (Cooksley, 2007). SEPA is in charge as well of 
carrying out the assessments of water bodies in order to evaluate the achievement of the 
obligations under the WFD.  
 
In Scotland the implementation of WFD at the local level is carried out through river 
basin planning. In the case of the Dee there is the Dee Catchment Management Plan, which 
identified actions and specific management practices for the catchment. A partnership was 
set up to implement the plan, the Dee Catchment Partnership, with more than 15 institutions 
and public agencies participating. Their influence in the land uses is restricted to what land 
managers are willing to do. SEPA has direct impact because they are in charge of the 
implementation of the law. They can therefore fine land managers if they contaminate or do 
not follow the law (although this is limited by the resources of the agency for monitoring and 
evaluating land uses on a regular basis). The partnership has to persuade land managers to 
carry out specific management work, which may or may not be effective. The Dee 
Catchment Partnership uses external funding or CAP money (AES) whenever possible to 
compensate land managers (farmers and others) to carry out specific works. As I shall 
present in other chapters, the plan works very well on paper but not so much in practice 
(chapter 3 and 4). 
 
2.3 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have presented the biophysical, social and institutional landscape of 
the Dee Valley. It showed that each of these landscapes have ‘boundaries’ that either 
constrain or present opportunities to land managers. Decision-making by land managers is 
embedded in the interactions of these different landscapes. I present in the next chapters how 
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these changing landscapes influence land managers’ decision-making but at the same time 
how land managers shape biophysical, social and institutional landscapes. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
MISSING LINKS: ASSESSING THE 
POTENTIAL OF ADAPTIVE CO-
MANAGEMENT FOR ECOLOGICAL 
NETWORKS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE DEE 
VALLEY, NORTH EAST SCOTLAND 
 
 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION  
As discussed in chapter 1, habitat loss represents a threat to wildlife due to both loss 
of habitat area and fragmentation of these areas. In the UK, the biodiversity for the eight 
identified habitat groups (both aquatic and terrestrial) is reduced or degraded, and 30% of 
these habitat areas are in decline (UK NEA, 2011). It is likely that this loss and 
fragmentation of habitat area will become an increasing problem as the effects of climate 
change will create a need for species to move across the landscape in the attempt to track 
their climatic niche (Gimona et al., 2012).  
As discussed in chapter 1, during the last 60 years most countries have protected 
biodiversity in designated areas at international, national, regional and local scales. 
However, natural scientists, and more recently policy advisers, have highlighted the need to 
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connect these designated areas and, more generally, to link viable patches in the landscape in 
order to increase resilience and cope with the afore-mentioned pressures.  
It has been recognised that the protection of isolated designated areas does not 
guarantee biodiversity protection (Adams, Lawton et al., 2010; Biodiversity Action Plans 
UK; Government Office for Science, 2010). Influential reports, such as the Land Use 
Futures study (Government Office for Science, 2010) and the Lawton Review (2010), noted 
that management of the wider landscape is needed as land use changes outside protected 
areas could compromise management within the areas. Therefore, the implementation of 
landscape-scale ecological networks has been advocated in addition to new forms of 
governance (Land Use Futures, 2010, Lawton et al., 2010).  
 
Adaptive Collaborative Management (ACM)  
The principles of Adaptive Management (AM) are appropriate to establishing an 
environmental management paradigm capable of accepting the uncertainty and complexity 
of natural resource management (e.g. Schreiber et al., 2004). AM adopts a system 
perspective which encourages managers to treat knowledge as provisional and tentative and 
to constantly learn from evaluation of their activities.  
AM has also been proposed as a conceptual model for the design and implementation 
of ecological networks; studies  have  indicated  that  AM  can  be  useful  in  assessing  the potential  effect  of  networks  and  network  design  (e.g. Rowland and Wisdom, 2008). 
However, to date the use of AM appears mainly limited to creating maps and developing 
policy guidance. Land managers ultimately control the delivery of public goods deriving 
from land use, and without their help policy objectives are likely to be missed.  
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AM, however, does not specifically address the process of collaboration amongst the 
stakeholders involved. Yet collaboration is a crucial attribute in the management of socio-
ecosystems (e.g. Plummer and Armitage, 2007), including the implementation of ecological 
networks (Simenova, 2009).  
This deficiency in AM is resolved by the Adaptive Collaborative Management 
Framework (Adaptive Co-management or ACM); this framework fuses adaptive 
management and collective management with a view to enable capacity building and 
encourage social and ecological resilience. 
 
Aims, Objectives and Research Questions 
I used Adaptive Co-management (ACM) as a framework in order to investigate the 
possibility of implementing ecological networks on land owned by multiple actors.  
The ACM framework has been utilised by academics but in practical application has 
been limited to ‘common pool’ resources; national parks; and reserves (Colfer, 2005; 
Armitage et al., 2007; Olsson et al., 2004). Therefore, I do not expect ACM per se to be in 
place on embarking on the study area and for the subject of forestry networks. However, I 
have chosen ACM as a framework because of its application in studying processes of natural 
resource management at multiple scales with multiple groups of stakeholders.  
The aim of this chapter is to establish whether the preconditions for collaborative 
action are present in my study area. This chapter will also examine the potential for 
collaborative action to promote the implementation of ecological networks.  
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The objectives of this chapter are: (i) to draw parallels between existing practices 
in the Dee Catchment and the case of ecological networks (which need to be 
implemented by multiple land managers); (ii) to highlight institutions and activities 
that might predispose land managers to undertake collaborative endeavours at the 
landscape scale; and (iii) to highlight gaps and areas where the comparison is not 
applicable and clearly breaks down.  
 
In this chapter I focus on the potential for development of collaborative processes 
through ACM, among land managers and public agencies for the implementation of 
ecological networks in a private ownership regime in North East Scotland. My analysis is 
based on my fieldwork, the interviews I carried out with representatives of public agencies, 
researchers and land managers, and on the existing literature about the study area. When 
referring to specific land managers I will generally stipulate whether they are estate owners 
(or factors25), smallholding owners or tenants; these distinctions will be further addressed in 
the following chapter as they play a role in understanding attitudes to conservation and in 
establishing whether there is a propensity to cooperate amongst land managers. The 
differences in attitudes to conservation were found to be distributed across three clusters of 
land managers; as these differences were essentially related to land tenure, I identified the 
three clusters of land managers accordingly.  
As noted in chapter 1, I defined land managers as people with access to land who are 
in a position to take decisions and carry them out; in other words, people who make 
decisions on land use which can have an impact on the environment.  
                                                        25 Factor or land factor specialises in Estate Management.  
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From a social science perspective, I answer the research question, what are the 
opportunities and barriers influencing the development of ACM for the 
implementation of ecological networks?  
In this section of the thesis, I first study collaboration and partnerships and 
investigate the extent to which ACM is in place; secondly, I question whether ACM 
processes could be used as channels for the implementation of ecological networks.   
 
3.1 ACM COMPONENTS  
To answer my research question I assess three key components of ACM (Armitage et 
al., 2007, 2008a and 2008b; Berkes and Folke, 1998; Berkes 2008): 1) local ecological 
knowledge; 2) sharing power; 3) evaluation (to assess adaptation).  
 
3.1.1 Local Knowledge and Scientific Ecological Knowledge  
Ecological knowledge across multiple scales is vital to effectively building and 
managing ecological networks; as such, the question of whether the actors involved possess 
this knowledge is of obvious importance.   
 
Knowledge is institutionalised, practiced and embedded in the social, cultural, 
economic and political context (Roth, 2004). Local and traditional ecological knowledge are 
contested terms; in this research the term ‘traditional ecological knowledge’ is understood as 
the cultural continuity transmitted in the form of social attitudes, beliefs, principles and 
conventions of behaviour, and practices derived from historical experience (Berkes, 2008). 
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This knowledge evolves and adapts over time in response to the relations of living beings 
with one another and with their environment. What makes this knowledge useful is not its 
antiquity but rather the way it is acquired and used (Battiste 2005). Berkes (2008) observes 
that local and traditional knowledge refers to an ‘ecological understanding built, not by 
experts, but by people who live and use the resources of a place’. In other words, local 
knowledge is produced through observation of the local environment and may include both 
practical and scientific knowledge (Olsson and Folke, 2001).  
 
In this research, the notion of ecological knowledge is identified with Berkes’s 
concept of ‘knowledge of the land’ (Berkes 2008); this refers not only to the physical space 
but to the living environment. Berkes (2008) follows the idea of Aldo Leopold’s (1945) 
‘Land Ethics’, where ‘knowledge of the land’ refers to land as an ecosystem which includes 
both the land itself and the processes happening there. Similarly, Kalland talks about 
‘paradigmatic knowledge’: knowledge of the living environment gained through 
observation, but interpreted through people’s worldview (Kalland 2000).  
 
To evaluate knowledge in these terms, Berkes (2008: 17-18) proposed different 
levels of study: 1) individual (one person) and individual knowledge of species of animals 
and plants, soils etc; 2) the use of this knowledge in management practices (the management 
of systems implies the use of knowledge through practices, techniques and tools); 3) 
practices that are embedded in social institutions, rules-in-use, norms and codes of social 
relationships (e.g. fishers, hunters, agriculturalists, etc.); 4) worldview, which shapes 
environmental perception and gives meaning to observations of the environment (how 
empirical knowledge is acquired and how it is shaped by values and culture). 
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A degree of shared ecological knowledge is necessary to manage habitats and 
develop ecological networks. Ecological systems are affected by decisions and resulting 
actions. These decisions can be taken at different scales, which affect ecological systems 
differently. The decisions made by land managers are in part constrained by policies, laws 
and access to subsidies. Therefore, in this work, local ecological knowledge is also about the 
ecological systems and the regulatory policies and other documents that affect ecological 
systems. 
 
In section 3.3.1, I present the results of the interviews with reference to the four 
levels of knowledge identified by Berkes (2008: 17-18). I do not compare local and scientific 
knowledge, but rather argue that these can complement each other when both scientists and 
traditional knowledge holders are open to understanding each other in collaborative 
processes and power sharing.   
 
3.1.2 Sharing Power 
Collaboration would be needed, at least among neighbours, to manage an ecological 
network adaptively. For example, the land managers involved would need to agree on the 
spatial configuration, any land use change, management timing and regime in order to 
benefit species using the networks.  
A central idea behind collaboration is the sharing of rights and responsibilities by the 
government and civil society (Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). This idea is important since 
the management of natural resources is becoming more a question of negotiation and 
agreement amongst stakeholders than a matter of appropriate expertise (Brunner et al., 
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2005). This would imply that land managers, public agencies, researchers and other actors 
interested or affected by the management of natural resources, agree on management 
practices. However, this is difficult to achieve due to property rights; ultimately, land 
managers have the right to do whatever they choose with their land.  
Management that enables cross-linkages, both horizontal and vertical, builds capacity 
and aims at institutional resilience. It calls for decentralisation and the sharing of power 
through alternative governance approaches. Armitage et al. (2007) observed that there is a 
need to develop decision-making processes that result in partnerships and empower 
communities and local resource users. Wiber et al. (2009), found that empowerment through 
collaborative learning, political engagement, and dealing with power difference constitute 
the key elements in developing effective community-based fisheries management.   
I analysed the sharing of power by investigating existing arrangements where 
partnerships and other collaborative initiatives were in place. This analysis offers insight into 
decision-making processes and the empowerment of local resource users. It is important to 
distinguish between collaborative initiatives and Adaptive Collaborative Management 
(ACM). In this study, ACM is said to exist only when processes of local ecological 
knowledge, sharing power and evaluation are in place. 
 
3.1.3 Evaluation Processes (learning-adapting cycles) 
Berkes and Folke (1998) mentioned that a key principle of Adaptive Co-management 
is ‘learning’. Learning is the process whereby agents can improve their management 
practices and policies as they respond to the feedback from ecosystems. Policies and 
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management strategies are considered experiments where trial and error permit the 
development of practices that are adaptive and open to improvement.  
 
This learning process assumes constant knowledge acquisition through knowledge 
flow: knowledge and practices should be shared and transmitted through social networks and 
institutional frameworks. In this process, the role of public agencies is crucial in allowing 
information flows to link local-level land managers and other stakeholders on the ground, 
with high-level national and international institutional policies and law. Figure 3.1 presents 
the cycle of learning-adapting processes at an individual level; figure 3.2 presents the same 
cycle at a collective level. Constant acquisition of knowledge and evaluation of practice 
allows community-based management systems to cope with change and uncertainty and 
create resilient communities (Gadgil, et al., 1993; Berkes and Folke, 1998; Smit and Wandel, 
2006).  
In this research, I assessed whether interviewees had a process of evaluation in place 
as an indicator for the existence of feedback loops of learning practices and evaluation-
adaptation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Feedback loops 
of ‘adaptive management’ at 
individual scale. Source: 
Based on own field data. 
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These three components (local ecological knowledge; sharing power; evaluation 
processes) are essential to the functioning of adaptive co-management cycles. The creation 
and reproduction of these cycles both depends and builds on the resilience of a socio-
ecological system. 
 
Figure 3.2 Feedback loops of ‘adaptive collaborative management’. Source: Based on own field data. 
 
Ecosystem Resilience is the degree of disturbance that can be absorbed before a 
system alters its structure by changing the processes that control behaviour (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002). Alder (2000) notes that social resilience refers to the capacity of human 
communities to endure external shocks to their social infrastructure in relation to 
environmental, social, economic and political disturbance (Alder, 2000). Bakers et al. 
(2003), identify three central features of resilience: 1) the ability of a system to absorb or 
buffer disturbances and still maintain its core attributes; 2) the ability of a system to self-
organise; and 3) the capacity for learning and adaptation to the context of change.  
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Based on these ideas, I used the model of adaptive management proposed by 
Rowland and Wisdom (2008), for the design and implementation of the ecological networks. 
I adapted the model to be appropriate for ACM. I therefore integrated the ‘collaborative’ 
dimension of ACM to use the ACM model as a benchmark for existing cases of 
collaboration for ecological networks in the study area. Ideally, a process of ecological 
networks design and implementation should use this model as guidance for practice. Figure 
3.3 shows the differences between AM and ACM. 
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Figure 3.3 AC and ACM for implementation of ecological networks (adapted from Rowland and Wisdom, 2008). 
 
  
 94 
 
3.2 METHODS  
 
I conducted face-to-face, semi-structured interviews. I interviewed a number of 
public agencies and officers from non-governmental organisations involved in the Dee 
valley, working on natural resource management. Overall, I report results of a total of 42 
face-to-face, semi-structured interviews with land managers, public agencies, non-
governmental organisations, researchers and one local authority (see list of interviewees 
below and Appendix E).  
I recruited public agencies and non-governmental organisations by first identifying 
all of those involved in natural resources management in the case study area. I found both 
their telephone and email details and made initial contact by email. I then called them to 
make an appointment if they were identified as willing to participate in this research.  
 
Table 3.1 List of interviews.  
 
 
Informant 
identification 
number 
Type of 
informant 
 
Agency or institution 
name. 
Tenancy type 
 
Holding size 
(ha. approx) Multi-functional Land uses 
1 Public agency 
Cairngorms National 
Park Authority 
(CNPA) 
  
2 Public agency 
Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency 
(SEPA) 
  
3 Land manager Tenant 50 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
4 Land manager Tenant 50 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
5 Land manager Smallholding owner and tenant 120 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
6 Land manager Tenant 70 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system and other sport 
livestock production. 
7 Pubic agency Scottish Environment   
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Protection Agency 
(SEPA) 
8 Land manager Smallholding owner 350 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Other: Shop. 
9 Land manager Tenant 50 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
10 Public agency Forestry Commission Scotland (FCS)   
11 Land manager Estate 3500 
Arable land and grazing are in hand. 
There are a number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing for letting, 
woodlands, shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
 
12 Charity 
Royal Society of 
Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) 
  
13 Land manager Smallholding owner and tenant 200 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
14 Land manager Small holding owner 130 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Woods for bird hunting. 
Other: shop. 
15 Land manager Tenant 130 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
16 Land manager Tenant 90 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
17 Land manager Estate 3300 
Agricultural land and grazing are 
leased to a number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing and woodlands are 
managed by the estate. 
18 Land manager Estate 3000 
Arable land and grazing are in hand. 
There are a number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing for letting, 
woodlands, shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
19 Land manager Small holding owner 250 
Let land for crops and livestock. 
Recreation and environmental 
activities. 
20 Land manager Tenant 200 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
21 Land manager Smallholding owner and tenant 400 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
22 Land manager Tenant 250 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
23 Land manager Tenant 100 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
24 Land manager Smallholding owner - N/A 
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25 Land manager Smallholding owner 150 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Other: Shop. 
 
26 Land manager Tenant 300 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
27 Local Authority 
Chester Ecological 
Networks   
28 Public agency Scottish Natural Heritage   
29 Researcher-Scientist 
Wageningen 
University   
30 Researcher-Scientist 
University of 
Cambridge   
31 Land manager Tenant 130 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
32 
Land manager 
(Trust- 
community 
organisation) 
Commonties   
33 Land manager Smallholding owner 100 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
34 Land manager Estate 50000 
Arable land and grazing are tenanted. 
Farming is mixed. Housing for letting, 
woodlands, shooting and fishing, 
skiing and other recreation activities 
are managed by the estate 
35 Land manager Estate 3500 
Tenanted all arable land 
 
36 Land manager Estate 2500 
Arable land and grazing are in hand. 
There are a number of tenants. Farming 
is Mixed. Housing for letting, 
woodlands, shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
37 Land manager Estate 20000 
In hand arable land and grazing. There 
are a number of tenants. Mixed 
farming, woodland, housing shooting 
and fishing are managed by the estate. 
38 Public agency 
Scottish Government 
Rural Payments 
Inspections 
Directorate (SGRPID) 
  
39 Land manager Smallholding owner and tenant 400 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
40 Public agency Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH)   
41 Land manager Estate 15000 
Arable land and grazing are tenanted. 
Farming is mixed.  Forest, shooting, 
fishing, recreation, housing are 
managed by the estate. 
42 Public agency Local Biodiversity Action Plans Officer   
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A combination of methods was used to recruit interviewees within the Dee 
Catchment. First the business Yellow Pages were taken as a starting point to identify and 
send letters asking for participation on a voluntary basis. I searched under ‘farmers’ and 
‘land agent’ because there was no other category under which I could search; there was no 
category for ‘land managers or estates’; even in the case of ‘land agent’ there were very few 
listings. However, the resulting list could be confused with a ‘convenience sample’ or a 
‘sample of volunteers’ (Rachad, 2004) since not all the individuals selected through 
sampling answered the letter of invitation. Moreover, not all land managers are in the 
Yellow Pages and, as Burton and Wilson (1999) point out, the less commercial ones are 
excluded from that source. Therefore, I contacted people by attending different public events 
across the catchment and taking the contacts from their websites (some estates have their 
own website). Furthermore, from the initial contacts onwards, a snowballing methodology 
was used to include further land managers. However, very few land managers gave names of 
other land managers and in other cases the person named did not want to participate. 
Therefore, snowballing had a limited impact: only four new contacts were made and only in 
one case were they neighbours. 
 
 Although the number of interviewees represents a significant proportion of the study 
area’s land managers, the objective was not necessarily to attain a statistically representative 
sample. Indeed, this part of my research was really meant to produce predominantly 
qualitative data about land managers’ practices and views, as described in this and the 
following chapter. However, so as to avoid any bias due to the recruitment methods, I took 
caution to have a geographic distribution of land managers representing the different parts of 
Deeside and of different types of land managers. 
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Interviews were one hour long on average and were split into sections (see schedule 
of the semi-structured interviews in Appendix D). Each of these sections covered different 
aspects of the three components of ACM. The local knowledge section refers to respondents’ 
knowledge of conservation, environment and practices, awareness of designated areas and 
BAPs, knowledge about species and habitats, and law and policy objectives at different 
scales .  
In terms of landscape-scale management, the main question addressed is whether 
participants see their management within the wider context of the Dee catchment. The  
section on power sharing (collaboration and partnerships with other land managers and/or 
public agencies, existing cases of collaboration). Finally, section on the evaluation I asked if 
interviewees had an evaluation process in place by which they reflected, evaluated and 
adapted their practices for their own business or organisation. I also asked respondents if this 
process was in place in cases where they participated in partnerships or collaborative 
management.  
There were other questions addressed in the interviews which are not included in this 
chapter: these are explained in chapter 4 where the information is analysed in detail.  
 
In accordance with the choice of taking a qualitative approach to land managers’ 
practices and views, my investigation was carried out in the form of ‘field research’ (Beaud 
and Weber 2003) and I used semi-structured interviews as a method for its openness 
enabling interviewees to express their views more freely (Becker 1998). Therefore, although 
the nature and time constraints of this research did not allow for proper ethnographic 
participant observation (i.e. spending several weeks or even months living on or near a farm 
or an estate and following people in their daily activities), my engagement with land 
managers was certainly inspired by my previous experiences of ethnographic fieldwork. I 
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believe this was crucial in terms of my position as a researcher in the relation to the 
interviewees. All interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s place of work.  
  
As Bourdieu (1993) underlines in his seminal essay on the necessary methodological 
reflexivity to be applied by the researcher in social sciences, the methods one uses are never 
neutral and any situation of investigation in social science is still a social relationship. This is 
why I decided not to proceed by telephone interviews, although this would have been a more 
cost-effective method both in time and in fieldwork expenses. Indeed, I am convinced this 
would have produced far less useful and reliable answers. As Bourdieu suggests (1993: 3), 
even with the best of intentions the social scientist cannot avoid the fact that his interaction 
with the people in his study is automatically charged with some form of symbolic violence 
or another. As such, it is essential that the researcher is aware of how this might affect her 
investigation and that she takes measures to minimise possible undesirable effects on the 
quality of the information obtained.  
 
In comparison to a face to face conversation, the rather anonymous phone call from 
someone working for a research institute can be a situation quite prone to symbolic violence, 
especially with those land managers less used to interaction with the academic world (for 
example, those with small farms or tenant farmers). It can also induce an intimidating 
perception of remoteness, creating an image of the scientists in their offices who have some 
kind of claim of superior knowledge regarding what should happen in the countryside. 
Conversely, this can be looked down upon by some land managers who might be more 
confident in dealing with civil servants and researchers. These managers may be more vocal 
about agricultural and environmental policies and may, depending on their social position, 
even have influence on policy makers. Moreover, they may feel, and actually often are, more 
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knowledgeable regarding government’s processes of policy making. I clearly felt this was 
sometimes the case with estate owners or managers. 
Proceeding by field visits allowed me to minimise some of this distance by meeting 
with interviewees literally ‘on their ground’.  In several cases, I met with land managers on 
more than one occasion, either through repeat visits at their home, or by meeting them first 
at a public meeting and then again at their property or at another meeting. This allowed me 
to build a rapport with interviewees, to ‘break the ice’ or even to gain their trust.   
 
In a sense, the fact that I am actually a foreigner also worked to establish a more 
neutral position towards different types of interviewees: to start with, I have a foreign accent, 
so cannot be situated within Scottish (British) class relationships which are so 
characteristically identified by the way one speaks. This made those land managers who 
spoke Scots/Doric English more understanding and patient with my difficulties to understand 
them and with my requests for them to repeat their statements. I believe my outsider status 
and experience also reduced observer bias and made it easier for me to suspend any 
judgment on what interviewees were telling me. 
 
As mentioned earlier, all interviews were conducted at the interviewee’s place of 
work and, whenever possible, part of the interview with land managers was carried out 
whilst walking through the fields of the holding. This was important methodologically, as it 
allowed for the production of a discourse situated in context, which presents several 
advantages. Discussing land managers’ interactions with the land while walking through 
their fields or woods is itself a situation of interaction with the land (see Jones et al., 2008; 
Carpiano, 2009); as such, it allows ad hoc commentaries and connections between different 
decisions and activities carried out by the land manager to be raised.  
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  All the information from the interviews was recorded, transcribed and analysed with 
QRS Nvivo 8 software. Coding was applied to all interviews, allowing me to establish a 
systematic inventory of answers expressed. I created four ‘parent nodes’ with three ‘child 
nodes’. Figure 3.4 presents how nodes were created and organised.  
 
Figure 3.4 Shows tree nodes created to analyse the interview data. There are two ‘parent nodes’ (highlighted in 
orange): the first contains data regarding social-environmental interactions (horizontal across the landscape); 
the second contains data regarding policies and other statutory documents in relation to environmental 
management (vertical across international, national and regional scales). All others are ‘child nodes’ organised 
by knowledge, evaluation and sharing power. I differentiated between opinions and practices because often 
interviewees have views about how things should work or how they used to work, but have other management 
practices in place (at the time of the interviews).  
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I present the results of the analysis in the following section. I use numbers to identify 
interviewees and the type of respondent, for instance ‘public agency [1]’ or ‘estate [23]’ etc. 
 In the following chapter, where the expression of more personalised views was 
important for the analysis, I have used personal pseudonyms to safeguard the anonymity of 
participants while still conveying some sense of the personality of the interviewees. The list 
of interviewees with their identifying numbers can be found on page 94 and Appendices E. 
As I noted above, for land managers I distinguish between estates, owners of smallholdings 
and tenants as a result of the specific analysis of land managers’ attitudes to conservation 
and propensity to cooperate (see chapter 4).  
 
3.3 RESULTS 
 
I present the results of the interviews for the three components of ACM: local 
ecological knowledge, sharing power and evaluation.  
 
3.3.1 Local Knowledge and Practices 
According to the four levels I presented above based on Berkes’ definition of 
ecological knowledge (section 3.1.1), the results showed that all interviewed land managers 
tended to relate ecological knowledge to their empirical knowledge about the production 
system they managed. In other words, ecological knowledge was considered as relevant to 
them mainly in as far as it was subordinated to the economic soundness (profitability) of 
their business. This is important as agricultural activities often compete with land allocation 
for ecological networks. There is, therefore, a competition between the economic objectives 
of their business and non-economic value products such as public good biodiversity. In 
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chapter 4 I analyse some of the variations between land managers’ views, with a specific 
focus on conservation.  
 
The extent of land managers’ knowledge about ecological processes, such as soil 
erosion or diffuse pollution, is very variable. As a public agency representative noted [40], 
‘[some land managers] are unaware that they can do anything better, some are either 
unaware or aware but simply don’t care, and there are some who care and are willing to but 
can’t afford to in the present climate’.  
 
Various other respondents confirmed this. Some of them were aware of the damage 
the farming system or forestry practices caused to the environment, but they did not have 
any motivation to change their practices. Knowledge, interest and willingness are at the 
centre of the decision-making of land managers. Empirical knowledge, what respondents do 
in their everyday practice, is institutionalised through norms and codes of practice. The 
results suggested that institutionalised organisations, such as the National Farmers Union, 
work as platforms where knowledge is exchanged and norms and codes of human-nature 
relationships are partly laid down (not homogeneous across the whole organisation but 
across areas or groups within the NFU).  
Norms and rules are also institutionalised through land managers’ self-identification 
with a certain group. For instance, the results showed that those who identified themselves as 
‘agriculturalists’ or ‘farmers’ felt that they were taking care of the environment by the 
practices they undertake [smallholding owners -tenant 21 and tenant 26]. They gave 
examples such as ‘keep[ing] the ground clear of weeds’ or ‘tidy[ing]’, and they were 
generally not interested in forestry (see also chapter 4).  
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Self-identification and participation with certain groups allows knowledge exchange 
and, to a certain degree, extends common knowledge. Such sharing of ecological knowledge 
often takes place through informal interactions. As an owner of a small holding commented: 
‘Most of the information I get is from people, the two or three people that I know, on the 
beats on the day. One of them in particular I know is on the Dee committees and when we 
are fishing obviously lunch time is the time to catch up and he’s been telling me quite a bit 
about keeping cattle back from the burns, cleaning the burns, removing all the obstructions. 
I’ve not read anything about it.  But I just get the information from two or three of these 
people’.  
 
 
This common knowledge amongst groups sometimes leads to similar objectives and 
practices being established; e.g. in the case of estates management of habitats for red grouse 
(Lagopus lagopus), and to a lesser extent for capercaillie (Teatro urogallus). For tick (Ixodes 
scapularis) control, land managers learned from different sources but the actions of their 
neighbours played a very relevant role in their decisions [estates 18, 36]. In other cases I 
found that for management of deer and the waters of the Dee (for fishing), land managers 
participate in formal partnerships (i.e. Dee District Salmon Fishery Board); in these formal 
partnerships, knowledge is exchanged and transferred and common objectives and practices 
are agreed.  
However, I did not find any group of land managers that identified themselves as 
‘environmentalists’ or ‘environmentally friendly producers’, while individuals would 
identify themselves in terms such as ‘I am a farmer’ or ‘I am an estate owner’. There were 
cases where land managers mentioned they were interested in the environment, but these 
managers did not identify themselves primarily by this interest. The implementation of 
ecological networks did not appear as a priority to them. This suggests that land managers 
have to be persuaded to implement these networks. Moreover, more knowledge exchange is 
needed regarding the status of aspects of ecological networks as an added value to the 
business, rather than as a purely environmental service. In cases where environmental 
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management practices are enforced by law, land managers are obliged to deliver and this 
changes their knowledge and understanding of environmental management. Only in a few 
cases was this change led by personal decision [smallholding owners 8, 19 and estate 17] or 
a combination of both personal decision and legal obligation, as one respondent observed: 
 ‘We get paid to deliver processes and public benefits rather than traditional land uses. [We] 
used to […] produce dead things – dead wood and dead animals. Now [we] produce 
experiences. Another service we provide is biodiversity [through] two national nature 
reserves SSSI, several tourist sites, also its got [sic] a range of species that are concomitant 
with that, from raptors such as eagle, osprey, harrier and so on and so forth to fresh water 
pearl mussel, salmon and so forth’. [estate 41] 
 
  Interest and values are a strong motivation for acquiring new knowledge. My results 
show that biodiversity per se did not have any significant economic value for respondents, 
and only in one case was it explicitly expressed as having ‘spiritual value’ [estate 17]. Along 
the same lines, semi-natural woodlands were interesting only for a limited number of land 
managers who managed these areas for shooting and recreation (in which case the habitats 
are a by-product). Land cover under semi-natural woodlands represents a small extension 
compared with forestry plantations; this indicates land managers’ interest in forest 
plantations. These results are important as forest plantations have very limited ecological 
benefits but do have value for carbon sequestration. This creates trade-offs and competing 
policy objectives: multifunctional ecological networks could create synergies between these. 
As mentioned, knowledge within ACM is about both ecological systems and the policies and 
statutory documents that affect these systems. The results of this study showed a lack of 
knowledge by land managers about land use decision-making at different scales from 
international and national law to regional and local policy objectives. Respondents were 
aware of the general objectives of the public agencies they worked with, yet little was known 
about their national objectives. For instance, the majority of land managers among the 
interviewees did not know about the Biodiversity Action Plans (BAP), even though these 
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plans were first published in 1994 as part of the UK’s commitments in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CDB).  
Conversely, some public agencies had scarce contact with different types of land 
managers and little knowledge about their interests, objectives and local knowledge. 
However, some agencies recognised the need for integrating scientific and local ecological 
knowledge in their decision-making process [SEPA, 2]: ‘[land managers] will have any 
intimate details, knowledge of that, which is vital to the process. You have, yes, they have 
knowledge that we need and we have to engage them somehow’.  
 
It is important to note that this recognition of farmers’ knowledge does not mean that 
knowledge integration is taking place. Regarding scientific knowledge, the respondents 
[SEPA, 2] commented that the problem is how this knowledge is used and prioritised.  
 
Knowledge exchange is fragmented across-scales (horizontal and vertical). I 
identified a few cases where respondents [estates 41, 34, 17 and Trust-community 32] have 
knowledge exchange programs in place. For instance [estate 41]: ‘[works with between 100 
and 150 different groups this year, people who do knowledge transfer. So there might be 
volunteers doing hands on conservation work but they will be getting some ecological 
briefing as well as part of that. So the groups we work with are from pre-school playgroups 
to academics postgraduates’.  
 
This example shows that some land managers are well aware of the ecological 
knowledge they have through their land management practices and are willing to share it. 
This same example also reminds us that the boundary between local and scientific 
knowledge can actually be more blurred than one might initially assume, especially given 
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the fact that larger estates often hire biologists among their rangers. Some land managers 
clearly see themselves as producers of knowledge which is useful for the public in general, 
other practitioners and even scientists, as a ranger of the above estate [41] highlights: 
‘So other expertise we provide, I’m just in the middle of organizing a seminar just now for 
wildlife managers to come to [the estate] so we can explain what we are doing and so on and 
so forth. So we provide a focus for knowledge transfer, KT, so people think about an estate 
as just providing stuff, things that go out on the back of a truck, whether its venison or a load 
of logs and that’s obvious and of course we do do these things. But actually what’s as 
important and certainly what’s more critical to the way we manage the place are the less 
tangible aspects that we provide benefits and activities which we take part in’. 
 
According to one academic respondent [researcher 29], communication between 
scientists and policy makers is not always easy: ‘policy makers don’t have the time. They 
always have their other obligations and are not interested in what the science is saying so the 
policy interface needs a lot of thinking how to do this [sic]. I had to learn to talk to 
politicians as well. That took me several years. You have to learn to communicate with each 
other. And they are different worlds’ [researcher 29]. In considering the potential 
implementation of ecological networks through ACM, the results suggest that common 
knowledge about ecological networks across the valley will increase land managers’ interest 
and willingness to participate. 
  
Land managers need more information about the benefits and disadvantages of 
ecological networks. In addition, it is necessary to coordinate and integrate existing local and 
scientific knowledge across-scales.  
 
3.3.2 Sharing Power and Evaluation 
The idea of collaborative management, or ‘co-management’, explicitly refers to the 
sharing of responsibilities and power in the management of natural resources. In the study 
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area there are many examples of collaborative management at a small scale. For instance, it 
is common for neighbouring estates to work together for vermin control and burning of 
heather (for red grouse habitat). It is also common for an estate owner or manager to come to 
agreements with their tenants when specific land management practices require coordination 
throughout the estate; this is the case for riparian woodland corridors, as described by this 
estate manager [estate 41]: 
‘We have to prepare a forest plan for [the estate] and it should be on our website and some of 
the suggestions that were made for how we develop our forestry, would mean that we would 
have to negotiate with tenant farmers because it would mean that we would have to negotiate 
things like riparian planting and obviously that would have an impact on them – on their 
watering rights and obviously there is good grazing next to the streams. I think we decided at 
that point that it was probably more appropriate that the tenant farmers apply for the funding 
to do the work rather than we take all and away from them and then we applied for that. I 
think that was the decision that was made then. That way we still get the rent, but then they 
get an income as well’. 
 It  is  worth  noting  here  that  such  coordination  of  land  use  may  lead  to collaboration and shared work between the estate and its tenants; this is because such practices  may  be  required  in  order  to  apply  for  subsidies  from  agri‐environmental schemes. In some cases, this can require the estate and its tenants to share both the work and 
the benefits of agri-environmental schemes by submitting a joint application for funding. 
This is something that has been encouraged by the Dee District Salmon Fishery Board for 
the development of riparian woodland, as the owner of another estate testifies: 
‘Yes, well at the moment we are doing a joint project through the Dee district board for 
further improvement on the river Feugh in the catchment area so it’s going to be a joint 
application with four farmers, by doing further fencing off of areas that are burns or streams 
going into the river Feugh, trying to exclude livestock from certain areas. Yes, there’s been a 
fair bit of work on that’. 
 
Sharing power and knowledge are widespread characteristics of common resource 
management found in successful cases of ACM. In the study area there was only one case of 
common resource management that echoed these ideas: the forest of Birse, which is common 
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land (see section 2.2.2 for a presentation on this). Birse Community Trust (BCT) is in charge 
of the management of the forest, and for them common knowledge is vital for the 
functioning and existence of the organisation:  
 ‘[…] you always have to deal with knowledge security. BCT is responsive to the 
knowledge, skills and interests within the community, but also has to have an idea and 
approach to how you maintain and continue that as the community changes. That’s where 
you have…because of its approach of not having an employee or a manager, the knowledge 
is spread between a lot of different people in the community and the community’s 
knowledge base is therefore more secure because of that […]’.  
 
 
As already indicated in chapter 2, in the case of the Birse Community Trust, sharing 
of power and knowledge does not happen only within the community, but also between the 
community trust and neighbouring estates as a result of shared rights on the same forest. No 
other organisation in the study area was close to BCT in terms of common knowledge and 
practices. However, for some public agencies knowledge exchange and transfer is part of 
their modus operandi, as is the case of Scottish Natural Heritage. This public organisation is 
in charge of managing the wild habitat and landscapes in Scotland. Their work includes 
implementing environmental law and many other conservation issues, such as raising 
awareness. Consequently, they work with all types of stakeholders and end users (as figure 
3.5 illustrates).  
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Figure 3.5 Scottish Natural Heritage and existing knowledge exchange and transfer with other institutions and 
land managers. Source: Based on own field data. 
 
In my data, SNH was the only case identified where a public agency was 
coordinating and creating partnerships with land managers (including estates, smallholding 
owners and tenants). These partnerships represent cases of sharing power when they are 
implemented on the ground, and demonstrate collaboration with a range of stakeholders in 
the decision-making process.  
 
Taking into account the three components of ACM, I found only three examples of 
Adaptive Collaborative Management: the Birse Community Trust, the Deer Management 
Group and the Dee District Salmon Fishery Board. These three cases operate across the 
landscape (horizontal) with the participation of public agencies (vertical). There are many 
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other collaborative practices where sharing of power exists in the catchment, but these are at 
the smallest scales as mentioned above (generally two/three partners).  
 
Based on the three characteristics of a) trust, b) power, and c) interest, I identified 
existing cases of collaboration as symmetric and asymmetric according to the balance or 
imbalance of shared power. I labelled cases as symmetric collaboration when there was a 
balanced sharing of power: in other words, when all participant parts in the collaboration 
defined objectives and agreed management practices and processes for evaluation of results 
(see figure 3.6). 
 
Figure 3.6 Shows symmetric collaboration where power is balanced. Based on balance of different 
combinations of trust, interest and power. Source: Based on own field data. 
  
I applied the label asymmetric when there was no sharing power but rather a 
hierarchical (top-down) power relationship. Figure 3.7 presents the types of collaboration.  
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Figure 3.7 Shows asymmetric collaboration where power is imbalanced. Based on imbalance of different 
combinations of trust, interest and power. Source: Based on own field data. 
 
 
The results show examples of symmetric collaboration for estates that tend to work 
with other estates (see figure 3.8, which indicates this with arrows in both directions): for 
instance, for management of shooting (deer and red grouse), fishing (salmon), and forest 
management (fire). These are cases of symmetric cooperation because participants’ self-
interest and empowerment leads them to trust others that are in the same position. In these 
cases there is power sharing, with agreements on common objectives and common 
management practices and agreed evaluation processes (management of the river Dee waters 
and numbers of salmon are monitored every year). Participants in these collaborations help 
to decide on whether to repeat the same pattern of collaboration or to change it, which 
suggests that they have an evaluation process in place. The same relationship was found 
amongst tenant farmers who tended to work more with other tenant farmers. 
 
I found that symmetric collaboration happened in different degrees: from 
occasionally helping each other to having common objectives and long-term collaboration.  
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As one respondent noted [tenant 26]:  
‘there’s not enough people working on the land now and everybody has got enough of their 
own to do. You help your neighbour if there is a problem and the same as someone would 
come and help me if we were needing help but just being neighbourly you give one another a 
hand’. 
 
 
Similarly,  another interviewee [tenant 23] remarked,  
‘oh aye, if I was asked to help my neighbour get rid of water I’d have no objections to that. 
You’ve got, well there is so few people on the land now, you really have to see your 
neighbour and help them out’.  
 
 
Other interviewees had more formal collaboration arrangements, for instance for 
harvest time (sharing machinery and exchanging labour with neighbours) or buying barley 
and other cereals from one farmer in exchange for livestock work; these collaborations will 
be presented in detail in  chapter 4. 
 
Smallholding owners in the study area were, in general, the more independent group, 
although there were some exceptions as figure 3.8 shows. Sharing power between estates 
and tenants is rare (see chapter 4 for the analysis on cooperation). I found two cases where 
collaboration was symmetric, five cases where there was no relation at all, and ten cases 
where the relation was asymmetric. Not surprisingly, I found that asymmetric power 
relations were very often established between estates and tenants;  in such cases the 
asymmetric power relationship is not purely vertical (i.e. the estate dictating to tenants) as 
tenants also have some power backed up by tenancy legislation. As interviewees mentioned 
[tenant 15]: 
  ‘[…] you just pay the money every year and he can’t put me out, unless I’m a untidy farmer 
or do everything….there’s rules and regulations that you do when you are farming so if I 
broke all the rules in the lease then he would have the powers to put me out through a long 
legal fight’. 
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  Yet, overall, tenants have very limited possibilities to exert pressure over estate 
owners, as is illustrated in the words of another respondent [smallholding owner and tenant 
39]:  
 ‘[…] when we had the problem with our water supply we could say the estate was more 
concerned with the quality of water in the burn than they were about the quality of water that 
we were drinking. That’s generally the case. They would rather plant hedges than fix our 
roof when we were living in a damp mouldy house […]’.  
 
 
Along the same lines, for some estates tenants are part of history: ‘[…] the 
agricultural ground we have six small tenant farms […]. All of them are far too small – I 
would suggest that its history’ [estate 35]. This illustrates the normative judgments expressed 
by estates regarding tenancy regulation in general; many estates considered the long leases a 
limitation to their own land use decisions and business opportunities because of the land 
being tied up for years, or even for generations. 
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Figure 3.8 Recurrent symmetric and asymmetric relationships between and amongst groups of interviewees. The 
diagram presents the results of the analysis of the interviews. It shows the links of the symmetric or asymmetric 
collaboration between groups (indicated by arrows in one or two directions). Based on chapter 4, where I will present three 
distinct groups of estates, tenants and small owners, here I also present these groups as one sole group of land managers 
(blue circle). The width of the arrow indicates the number of times the same relation was found (if the same type of 
relationship was found ‘> 10 times’ the arrows are thicker). There are some areas in which no arrows are drawn which 
denotes an absence of links. The most obvious relations are the work collaboration from estate to estate, tenants to tenants, 
and public agencies to public agencies. The links between public agencies and land managers, and especially with estates, 
are robust as well. Public agencies also work with local authorities and other stakeholders. Work between estates and 
tenants is, in most cases, asymmetric, with estates often asking for work from tenants (therefore, the arrow is one way). 
Small owners are in general a more independent group of people, although they work with public agencies and other 
institutions. Links between land managers and other stakeholders are very often one-way only. The only group that works 
on a more symmetric basis, in the sense of exchanging information and setting up common management objectives, 
working with different land managers, public agencies and other institutions, are the ‘commonties’ (of which there is only 
one case in the study area). 
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I did not find any case where tenants asked estates to collaborate with them, 
suggesting a lack of shared power. However, there were cases where estates asked tenants to 
carry out specific work, asked permission to carry out work on their land, or were 
exchanging land with tenants to carry out specific management. I identified these cases as 
asymmetric collaboration with unbalanced power relations. There was one case where, as a 
condition of the lease of land, tenants had to carry out specific conservation work. Talking 
about water protection through fencing of river margins, one respondent [tenant 20] noted,  
 ‘Part of it was that the landlord was on a renewal of the tenancy. It’s a limited tenancy 
duration and it was up for renewal and this was things that the landlord was asking us to do. 
But it wasn’t a problem as it was grant aid and there is something in it’. 
 
  
For others it was only a matter of allowing the estate to do work on their tenanted land 
[tenant 26]: ‘I don’t know which scheme. They are doing everything. I’ve nothing to do with 
it. I just give them permission to do it’.  
The factor of one estate keen on conservation [estate 17] mentioned that  
‘[…] all the limited duration tenancies have requirements to undertake environmental 
improvements […]. And we haven’t been putting pressure on the remainder, but we will be 
working with the remainder to make sure they fulfil their obligations under their tenancy 
agreements’.  
 
For other farmers (tenants and smallholding owners), when asked whether they were 
collaborating with estates, their answer was a consistent ‘no absolutely not’ [smallholding 
owner 33]. By contrast, when asked whether they were in collaboration with other farmers 
their response was, ‘[o]h yes, [with] other farmers hugely’ [tenant 6]. 
 
  Regarding the collaboration of public agencies with land managers, the results 
suggest that these were similarly based on a) trust, b) power, and c) interest. I identified three 
forms of collaboration with agencies (all three understood from the point of view of land 
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managers): a) Intentional when land managers approach public agencies to work together or 
through voluntary membership, asking advice, consultancy work etc.; b) Compulsory when 
implementation of environmental law is the basis of the cooperation; c) Coerced when 
public agencies have to persuade land managers to participate in specific projects, raising 
awareness, and so on. I considered all these relations as asymmetric since trust, power and 
interest are not shared between parties. Figure 3.9 presents these types of collaboration.  
 
Figure 3.9 Intentional, compulsory and coerced collaboration. Source: Based on own field data. 
 
The National Farmers Union (NFU) is an example of intentional collaboration, 
where land managers approach the NFU and participate on a voluntary basis. As some 
participants mentioned regarding their membership with the NFUs [smallholding owner 25], 
‘oh well they definitely keep you in touch with things in business ways and the legal side, 
they really help you greatly on that […] if you’ve kind of made a mistake maybe, you don’t 
mean to make a mistake filling up a form or something, they help you out there. Then of 
course I do all my insurance through NFU so they are definitely excellent. A lot of 
information at their meetings [sic]’.  The Dee District Salmon Fishery Board is another 
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example of intentional collaboration that echoes the ACM process. This is a regulatory body 
that aims at protecting and enhancing salmon stocks in the Dee and other rivers. However, 
land managers’ participation is ‘voluntary’, as they mentioned, because they have direct 
interest and see the economic benefit of the scheme. When asked about their participation, 
land managers commented [estate 34], ‘[o]n the fishing side we have a voluntary catch and 
release program. We could kill fish but we decided not to. The season starts and finishes and 
we have to abide by that’.  
 
Other forms of intentional collaboration are found when estates, other land 
managers and public agencies create partnerships. The nature and scale of the estates make 
symmetric and asymmetric collaborations essential for effective management:  
 
‘[…] the fishing and the deer are the two important ones where everybody works closely 
together. Because the fish move up and down and the deer move around. So the deer – 
you’ve got the Deer Management Groups and the board which are the two main mechanisms 
for communicating and working jointly together […] working with the landowners and the 
government agencies and the fishery board […]’.  
 
Compulsory collaboration (e.g. designated areas, such as SAC or SSSI) is a top-
down process where the management has to be agreed between public agencies and land 
managers. In this respect, interviewees noted that [estate 34] 
 
 ‘[…] you have to make certain that you are complying with the designations. Sometimes it 
is an opportunity and sometimes it is a challenge. Sometimes, […] it [is] the government or 
the Scottish Natural Heritage says this is what should happen. Then we have to agree with 
what they say and we have to do what we are told so that can happen […] we are very much 
controlled […] we have to do what we are told by the government. On a designated site – if 
it is not designated it doesn’t matter so much’.  
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However, top-down environmental law is shaped at the national or international scale and, as 
representatives of public agencies commented, ‘[i]n Scotland our laws don’t allow us to 
under implement things in any shape or form so if the EU say that pigs will have a certain 
area to lie in then that’s exactly what we will do [sic]’ [SGRPID 38].  
 
Coerced collaboration is found when, for instance, public agencies’ objectives imply 
persuasion of the land mangers. In these cases, persuading land managers can become 
challenging for both parties. According to the findings, land managers do not trust public 
agencies, either because they do not want to or because they are unable to. Representatives 
of public agencies mentioned that [FCS 10]  
 
‘[t]here’s a mix of estates and some are quite private about their business and others are 
more public. Especially the private, the kind of approach is more face to face, maybe a site 
visit. We just might have a telephone conversation or at an event. Relatively informal 
because it is a persuasive job rather than telling them to do anything because they will just 
tell us to get lost, in the nicest possible way. So it’s all about building a working relationship 
and it’s quite informal’.  
 
 
Other public agencies noted that establishing communication and understanding between 
parties is difficult [SEPA 2, SEPA 7]. Land managers and public agencies highlighted the 
need for trusting each other; for instance, one land manager suggested that public agencies 
‘have got some interesting ideas which I wouldn’t implement [for instance] wide margins 
round the fields. That was [a public agency] idea and they couched it in terms of all good 
farmers do this and I thought uh-uh, I’ve never heard of this idea before and I thought of all 
the farmers that I knew that didn’t do that’. [tenant 6]  
In other cases, respondents have a negative opinion based on their experience with public 
agencies, as the following comment illustrates [tenant 6]: 
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 ‘[t]he way the department word all their letters about subsidies via threats of thousands of 
pounds worth of fines and jail terms if we don’t – if we don’t do everything correctly to the 
letter. It’s alright for them to make mistakes, but we don’t make mistakes.  We are just trying 
to cheat. And it really was very alienating. Because the subsidies were so essential to our 
survival, it was very intimidating. We got used to it after a while […] I think I don’t read 
them any more. The rules change all the time. So I’ve just given up completely trying to 
keep track of it all. I’m told when I need to know something’.  
 
  
Despite the number of land managers that reported similar feelings, most of them were found 
to work with public agencies or non-governmental organisations in one way or another.  
 
However, the work of public agencies also involves communities and other stakeholders. My 
study produced limited data which suggested that land managers collaborate with 
communities and other stakeholders in further ways; while my information is insufficient to 
report on this here, it is worth noting that the data suggests that these were not strong links. 
The results show that land managers provided services to communities through estates’ 
community woodlands, path access, recreation activities or, as some respondents mentioned, 
‘designation areas which are a way to provide biodiversity services to society’. In this 
respect, one respondent [estate 41] recalled, ‘[w]e get around 40,000 visitors a year to this 
place for informal recreation, spiritual enjoyment and […] organise seminars for wildlife 
managers […] so we can explain what we are doing’. 
 
This indicates that land managers provide services and exchange information rather 
than collaborate with communities and society. This characteristic is represented in figure 
3.8 by the thin arrow in one direction. Public agencies share power, but they collaborate for 
landscape scale management only when the organisation has this as an objective. As 
respondents mentioned [CNPA 1],  ‘[...] each organisation has got its own particular 
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priorities and I think there’s a big issue in a lot of organisations in terms of the resources that 
they can input into a consultation from as supposed to on their own particular objectives’.  
 
Respondents identified that limited resources, large objectives and large areas to 
manage make collaboration necessary: ‘[…]away from the formal planning side, is actually 
trying to persuade people to do things for us in a way or do things that will compliment both 
our objects and their objectives as well’ [CNPA 1].  However, it is people, personalities, 
which make collaboration happen. In the words of one respondent, ‘[i]t’s not the plan that 
makes it easy, it’s the group […] the useful thing is having a group that brings everyone 
together, which gives you a forum to kind of work with’ [FCS 10].  
 
Commonties are a special case in the study area. Sharing power occurs to a certain 
extent in the Forest of Birse, through the Birse Community Trust (BCT). Inhabitants of the 
parish of Birse participate in the decision-making process, but they also have to agree with 
three other estates because they are the owners of the salmon and shooting rights. According 
to respondents, sharing knowledge and responsibilities amongst those who participate in the 
management of the land is a common practice.  
 
BCT also works with public agencies and stakeholders. These characteristics of 
sharing power allow them to manage other woodlands and be involved in a number of other 
projects over the parish level. BCT has established a symmetric relationship with other 
estates. It is an interesting case because there is little trust between BCT and the estates (due 
to a long process over the shared rights); however, they have a similar level of empowerment 
and interests that allow them to negotiate and agree on common management practices. As 
one of the interviewees mentioned [estate 36], 
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 ‘[t]he arrangement is they run a native pine wood scheme and that’s an area that we have 
shooting rights over so we basically do is deer management for them and they pay us. And 
we do it in cooperation with them but it’s basically done for the benefit of the community 
[…] and then there is general rights that everyone has over the whole of it. Basically [the 
other estate] shoots over part of it, we shoot over part of it, his tenants graze part of it, we 
graze part of it and commonty in Scots law is something where rights are held in common 
use’. 
 
 
 In the words of another land manager [estate 37], 
 
 ‘The forest of Birse has got a complicated arrangement of rights with different 
understandings and interpretations of what they are […]. But we have a management 
agreement in relation to a set area […] we have regular dialogue with the parties to agree on 
management operations […] the management agreement has a forestry plan and its an 
approved plan with the forestry commission and the Scottish forestry grant scheme so we 
know what’s happening within that plan and if that involves the felling of trees or whatever 
then that’s something we’ve all agreed and approved’.  
 
 
The same empowerment between the parties helps to balance each party’s interest 
with the common interest and facilitates agreement in the management.  BCT identified the 
advantages they perceived from managing the woodlands [Trust community organisation 
32]: ‘[…] it was about estates […]. Now the estates consult the community. [Apart from the 
salmon and the shooting rights], all the other rights of use for the whole area are now held by 
the community – forestry rights, grazing rights, rights to put bees up there, rights to pull 
heather, rights to do everything’.  BCT power sharing structures make natural resources 
management possible at the landscape scale and at the parish level; these structures also 
facilitate working with public agencies, non-governmental organisations and researchers 
when needed. For instance, regarding conservation practices [Trust –community 
organisation 32], ‘[w]e look at different habitats and species and run projects across the 
whole parish and we take a lead in organising the Deer Management Group and we are well 
known […] for capercaillie conservation and other things […]’. Furthermore, they 
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commented, ‘[…] we have lots of red squirrels with the pine woods and the grey squirrels 
are just across the river […] so they get shot but what we are doing is to put a leaflet into the 
260 households and we’ve coordinated the estates so that if a grey squirrel appears we can 
produce lots of fire power and because of the cohesion of the community, putting the leaflet 
in allows us total feedback’ [Trust –community organisation 32].  
Along the same lines, BCT works in partnership with public agencies and local 
authorities. For instance, regarding a path network plan for the Dee Valley they ‘have a 
particular partnership with Aberdeenshire council […]. Why not? We know the people and 
in consulting the people locally, we don’t go and put silly lines on the map that gets 
everybody upset and we can deal with the estates and everything’.  BCT know their 
relevance as an institution for the delivery of public goods and management of natural 
resources at the scale of the parish. This is also recognised by public agencies, although 
negotiations can be difficult at times. A BCT representative mentioned, ‘the forestry 
commission have always been a main partner of ours […] we have given them great value 
for money because we are seen as one of the leading community forestry initiatives in 
Scotland […]. We’ve had up and down relationships with SNH […]’.  
 
The history of BCT is an interesting case and further investigation is needed to 
highlight processes of community empowerment, negotiation and practices for natural 
resource management at the scale of the parish. Evaluation and adaptation are processes 
resulting from feedback loops within resources management. According to the ACM 
framework, these feedback loops should happen for both natural and social systems; 
consequently, they should occur across-scales and along horizontal and vertical power 
relations. This presupposes common knowledge and power sharing.  
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Figure 3.10 The case of BCT and how they work for the management of forestry (and other services) at the 
parish level. Source: Based on own field data. 
 
 
 
As mentioned, I found none of these operating across the entire valley. However, I 
did find cases where common knowledge, interest, power sharing and evaluation processes 
were in place on a smaller scale. Some of the larger estates have moved away from the 
traditional estate model, focused on forestry and shooting, towards a more diversified model 
which includes tourism, leisure activities and the provision of (sometimes subsidised) public 
amenities; as such, they are also involved in public engagement activities. This implies a 
form of evaluation of the estate’s activities through public consultation. This is only possible 
when the estate can count with a substantial management team, as this ranger responsible for 
public engagement highlights [estate 41]: 
 
‘Your other question was about how you integrate the different land uses. I referred earlier to 
the management team and we meet on a monthly basis and go over what our plans are on the 
short term and medium term plans and discuss any issues that have come up. In addition to 
that we all prepare longer term strategic plans which obviously go round the houses, i.e. go 
round our colleagues firstly, but are usually open to public consultation as well. Certainly the 
woodland one, the core paths plan and all sorts of things and they have all been out to 
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consultation. So that way we try to identify up front what the issues would be and decide to 
try and plan these issues and to try to minimise them, what’s that called? Mitigation, we try 
to do that. But also the fact that we have an in house management team means that if there 
are issues that come up, we can play around them. That’s adaptation to borrow the climate 
change jargon’. 
 
 Three cases in particular had systematic evaluation processes as part of their 
resources management (horizontal and vertical): Deer management, Dee Salmon Fishery 
Board and Birse Community Trust (see figure 3.10). The three cases are different and there 
is a need for further research on these ACM processes to assess whether these structures 
could represent the channels for ecological networks implementation.  
 
The findings showed that, in most cases, for land managers the evaluation process is 
a reflection based on the financial performance of the business. Take Andrew, a 
smallholding owner who came from an oil and gas background and bought a farm which he 
is managing with a partner. When asked about whether they had a process of evaluation or 
self-assessment in place he answered, 
 
‘No, just me and S. [business partner], we sit down and over our coffee or lunch we just chat 
about what we are doing, where we are going and at the end of the year we sit down with the 
accounts and we look through them and just look at them and say we spent too much on 
equipment, we spent too much on this. Yeah, we got some money for the cattle, but there is 
no big evaluation’. 
 
 
Despite Andrew’s unusual background, his answer is very similar to that of many 
other more traditional land managers, whether smallholding owners, tenants or estate owners 
or managers. 
 
   Land managers adjust management practices based on the economics of the business 
and solve environmental problems as they emerge. However, more research is needed to 
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investigate evaluation and adaptation to environmental change and to assess evaluation 
processes when environmental problems emerge.  
 
3.4 DISCUSSION  
 
In this research we have considered the implementation of ecological networks as a 
tool to deliver biodiversity. However, the implementation of ecological networks calls for 
collaboration and cooperation across horizontal and vertical scales, with different types of 
stakeholders. In this chapter, I aimed at investigating whether ecological networks could be 
implemented through coordination and collaboration amongst stakeholders.  
To achieve my aim I used the Adaptive Co-management (ACM) framework because 
it refers to landscape-scale natural resources management. In particular, I utilised three 
components of ACM: local knowledge, sharing power and evaluation.  
 
There were two points to highlight on knowledge from this research and in relation to 
parallels with ACM, gaps between existing practice in the catchment and the ACM model 
and cases where the parallel breaks down: 
 
1) The common trend for the majority of respondents is that ecological knowledge is 
primarily for commodity production. This differs from other societies where a 
broader base of local ecological knowledge has facilitated the implementation of 
ACM; that is, where local ecological knowledge is closely related to cultural aspects 
(see the ‘Key cultural species’ idea, Garibaldi and Turner, 2004) or common 
knowledge is shared across common-pool resource users (Nadasdy, 2003; Norberg 
and Cumming, 2008). My results showed only three cases where knowledge was 
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acquired and shared in a systematic way: one case of common-pool resources (Forest 
of Birse), one case of a charity (National Trust of Scotland), and the case of public 
land. In all other cases, I found that ecological knowledge is shared and transmitted 
and new knowledge is acquired chiefly if it will improve the economics of the 
business. Therefore, new knowledge on the benefit of EN should be introduced from 
the perspective of the business; for instance, landscape scale field margins for 
bumble bees to promote pollination, or riparian woodlands along the river to keep 
water at low temperatures for salmon (given climate change and increases in water 
temperatures).  
2) Provision of ACM is not secure in the long run, but rather depends on each 
individual land manager’s willingness to provide it as property rights are held 
individually and land managers can decide what they want to do with their land.  
 
In the study area, individuals are free to pursue their own objectives on their land. I did 
not expect to find common knowledge across the whole catchment, since individuals have 
different interests and resources to manage. However, I found common knowledge about 
management practices that explicitly or implicitly involved scales beyond the single 
holdings. Examples were for deer management, salmon fishing, crops and/or forestry 
management. People share practice-centred knowledge within a group, and these groups do 
not necessarily share knowledge with other groups. This creates fragmented ecological and 
biodiversity knowledge rather than common knowledge across the entire valley. I argue that 
this does not represent a barrier for the development of ACM, but rather presents a challenge 
to move from individual to common conservation knowledge, to more shared knowledge. 
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Authors have repeatedly stressed the importance of common learning in the ACM 
process (Schultz et al., 2011; Armitage et al., 2011; Leys and Vanclay, 2011). I found 
initiatives in place that echoed ACM in their practices of common learning. Some of these 
examples were for capercaillie management and included the seminars given by Birse 
Community Trust to a range of land managers and other stakeholders.  In these cases, 
knowledge sharing involves combining local and scientific knowledge as well as knowledge 
about regulations and policies.  
Birse Community Trust is a form of common-pool resource and the learning process 
happens within the parish-community, but also occurs beyond the local community. Other 
examples exist where land managers share knowledge with other stakeholders. I argue that 
some of these processes parallel ACM; therefore, these cases could be used as platforms to 
share knowledge and initiate a common learning process explicitly for conservation and 
ecological networks implementation.  
 
Processes of common learning could act as a powerful tool to improve asymmetric 
collaboration between land managers and public agencies, and could in due course result in 
relations of trust. I believe that knowledge exchange, both of local and scientific knowledge, 
is especially important to build trust horizontally (i.e. across holdings and land manager 
types) and vertically (i.e. across scales, public agencies, policymakers). There is a need for a 
better understanding of the socially and politically complex context of natural resource 
management in developing countries (Wilshusen et al., 2002), but also in developed 
countries. Existing institutions and power relations do not allow the flow of communication 
amongst different stakeholders and especially between public agencies and land managers. 
In any case, more research is needed to address this issue for the case study presented here.   
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Sharing power parallels were found in three cases and in many other collaborative 
practices that echoed the ACM process. However, in many other cases I found asymmetric 
collaborations, power relations, distrust and divergent interests in the same place. The latter 
represent a difficult barrier for utilising ACM for the implementation of ecological networks.   
Time and human resources are required to develop ecological networks. This will be costly 
in the short run, but in the long run the idea is to build capacity amongst public agencies and 
land managers to allow for sustained practices of landscape scale collaboration. 
 
My results showed that in the Dee catchment, power relations are deeply rooted; this is 
partly due to the old Scottish system of property rights, which until 2004 was based on 
feudal structures. To dissolve this through Adaptive Co-management could take significant 
time and resources. Both of these are scarce for land managers and public agencies. In 
addition, to overcome asymmetric relationships and create power sharing requires a deeper 
understanding of social, cultural and historic issues. Adaptive Co-management cannot 
guarantee the dissolution of these relations in the short run. Furthermore, this confirms the 
need for some degree of sharing power and sharing responsibility to enable co-management 
(Berkes, 2007).  
My results showed a number of cross-boundary collaborative initiatives, but I argue that 
these are only collaborative initiatives, rather than co-management practices.  
 
Collaborative initiatives have been highlighted as a promising approach for the 
management of resources such as biodiversity (e.g. Goldman et al, 2010). They can be an 
alternative to top-down approaches and may be more effective in delivering objectives 
through negotiation, coordination of multiple public agencies and consensus of rules 
amongst a range of stakeholders (Sabatier et al., 2005). I argue that existing collaborative 
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initiatives and cases that resonate with ACM should be taken as a starting point from which 
to expand ACM to the whole study area for ecological networks implementation. 
 
Although I did not find ACM cases which would operate across the whole catchment, I 
argue that existing collaborative practices could be the starting point; however, more 
research is needed on existing agreements of collaboration in the study area. My research 
showed numerous cases of collaboration between land managers. Collaboration in this 
research is about negotiation, synergies of interest, power and trust. I argue that to 
implement ecological networks these collaborative cases have to be used as channels to 
develop a long term process of building capacity for conservation at the landscape scale.  
 
The Birse Community Trust, the Deer Management Group and the Dee District Salmon 
Fishery Board, are the three examples found in this study that parallel ACM; however, 
further research is needed to assess their potential to be expanded or used as a channel for 
management of other resources such as biodiversity per se or implementation of ecological 
networks (in a multifunctional sense). In addition, further investigation is needed on the 
transaction costs involved in using ACM frameworks for landscape conservation and 
ecological networks implementation.  
 
Finally, collaboration and coordination by third parties is needed in order to connect 
existing initiatives. Coordination of land managers by public agencies could be achieved, 
especially in cases where a relationship of trust already exists between them. Coordination 
can also be achieved between public agencies, for instance through steering groups of public 
agencies and NGOs.   
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Therefore, ACM alone and at first will not be sufficient for implementing ecological 
networks. As I show in the next chapter, there is a need to overcome different interests and 
attitudes to conservation amongst land managers, build trust between public agencies and 
land managers as I showed in this chapter and design adequate economic incentives as I 
show in chapter 5.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
To conclude this chapter, I highlight five points regarding barriers and supports for the 
implementation of ACM for ecological networks in the Dee catchment.  
 
1) Regarding Local Knowledge:  the results showed that in the study area local 
knowledge responds to financial motives and little is known about ecological 
networks (benefits for the business and for the environment). Therefore, if ACM is to 
be implemented there is a need for ‘common knowledge’ about ecological systems. 
Along the same lines, I found a lack of information flows regarding policies and 
other national objectives on land uses and environmental management. 
Reinforcement and/or creation of information flows is needed to create common 
knowledge horizontally (across different stakeholders) and vertically (across policies 
and individual interests). In this sense, it is more likely that public agencies take the 
role to coordinate and create the information cycles across-scales, although this 
represents a cost.  
 
2) Regarding Sharing Power: I presented the results regarding sharing power and 
highlighted different types of relationships established between stakeholders. I 
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identified i) trust, ii) power, and iii) interest, as bases for symmetric and asymmetric 
relations. The results suggested that power relations represent a difficult barrier to 
overcome, because these are rooted in a pre-existing context of social relationships 
marked by Scottish rural history. More research is needed to better understand these 
relations, especially in cases of cooperation amongst land managers. However, my 
results showed that cooperation and collaboration is sometimes taking place at a local 
level; these cases could be used as a starting point for further environmental 
management above the holding scale. In chapter 5, I will analyse the results of testing 
an economic incentive that aims at stimulating cooperation across holdings as an 
alternative to a purely ACM approach.   
 
3)  Regarding Evaluation: the results showed that land managers’ evaluation processes 
are mainly based on financial reasons, rather than on environmental management. 
More research is needed to study processes of evaluation when land managers face 
environmental changes. This is because, according to my results, land managers take 
action on a daily basis (to deal with problems, e.g. a high tick population or dry 
weather) regarding environmental management, rather than using systematic and 
planned actions. In most cases land managers keep the same management practices 
year after year, and base these on commodity production with business turn-over as 
the main evaluation criterion. In order to implement ecological corridors through 
ACM, it will be necessary to stimulate processes where land managers are more 
actively involved in environmental cycles of learning-evaluating-adapting 
management (perhaps in the way Lawrence, 2006 and 2007 suggests).  
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4) Regarding existing cases of collaboration and ACM parallels: in the results I 
presented existing cases of collaboration and cases that echoed ACM. Assessed in 
line with the three components mentioned above, ACM parallels suggest that 
processes of ACM are happening for specific management practices; therefore, if the 
adequate resources were allocated, ACM could be extended to the majority of the 
catchment. The common trends in these cases were: asymmetric power relations 
were overcome; synergies of interests were created or identified; trust was in place; 
common knowledge was acquired; evaluation was part of the process and, therefore, 
learning cycles were possible. Ecological networks could be implemented through a 
process similar to one of the three examples presented here if these conditions were 
developed. I also presented a number of collaborative cases where the characteristics 
are present in a greater or lesser degree and are combined in different ways. Although 
further research is needed regarding the varieties of arrangements among land 
managers and between land managers and public agencies, my results show that 
these cases can facilitate the understanding of sharing power and local knowledge,; 
therefore, they can be used as starting points from which to develop ACM processes.  
 
5) Finally, the information presented here suggests that public agencies would be 
paramount in initiating the development of ACM processes for ecological networks.  
This is because these agents possess knowledge about policies and other national 
objectives to be achieved: they could be the ‘bridge’ between top-down and bottom-
up interests. It is also in the interest of public agencies to build capacity and networks 
with land managers and other stakeholders as they often have to execute policies, 
which change frequently. To create and consolidate networks is essential to mobilise 
the social capital needed for national land use objectives.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
LAND MANAGERS’ ATTITUDES TO 
CONSERVATION, AES PARTICIPATION 
AND EXISTING CASES OF COOPERATION 
  
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I present the analysis and results from my interviews with land 
managers with a particular focus on their attitudes and views about conservation, existing 
cases of cooperation, AES participation and landscape scale approaches. As I mentioned in 
the previous chapter, chapter 3 and the present chapter are complementary and should be 
read as parallel analyses rather than one as a sequence of the other. While in chapter 3 I 
presented the analysis from all interviewees (public agencies, land managers, researchers 
etc.), here I take the analysis further by focusing only on the interviews with land managers. 
As individuals, land managers play an important role in the provision of public goods; 
therefore, I wanted to ascertain their attitudes and views regarding landscape scale 
management so as to identify the conditions which prompted their cooperation.  
 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, most developed economies use a number of 
instruments to obtain land managers’ participation in the provision of public goods and 
services from agro-ecosystems. The principal tools used to achieve such participation are 
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environmental law, environmental planning and voluntary agreements, including economic 
incentives in the form of Agri Environmental Schemes (AES) and Forestry Schemes (FS). In 
the EU, AES have long been the preferred policy tools. However, many empirical studies 
have questioned the effectiveness and efficiency of existing AES in delivering ecosystem 
services and biodiversity conservation (Stoate et al., 2009; Vickery et al., 2002, 2004). 
 
One of the key reasons for this poor performance lies in the spatial pattern of AES 
uptake at the multiple farm scale (Hodge, 2001; Gimona and van der Horst, 2007; 
MacFarlane, 1998). Most existing incentive schemes in Europe (and also the US, see 
Goldman et al., 2007) operate at the holding/farm scale, whilst the effective protection of 
biodiversity and delivery of most ‘non provisioning’ ecosystem services (see Millennium 
Assessment, 2005) requires coordinated land management action at watershed, ecosystem or 
landscape scales (e.g. Gottfried et al., 1996; Parkhurst et al., 2002; Michael, 2003; Franks 
and McGloin, 2007;). This would require a radical redesign of AES to persuade 
neighbouring farms into cooperation and collaborative action. Central to this is to investigate 
what are land managers’ attitudes to conservation, cooperation practices and AES 
participation.  
 
Voluntary schemes aimed at the provision of public goods, such as landscape scale 
AES, are unlikely to work without positive attitudes from land managers, their willingness to 
participate in AES, and their willingness to cooperate with each other for the provision of 
these non market-value services. Land managers’ attitudes towards conservation have been 
among the preferred subjects treated by the literature on AES (Wilson, 1996; Wilson and 
Hart, 2000; Fish et al., 2003). Farm structure, transaction costs, knowledge transfer, 
information asymmetry and tacit knowledge are identified as amongst the important factors 
  
 136 
in the study of the uptake of AES (Hanley et al., 2012). An important part of these studies 
resulted in proposing patterns of participation, using typologies of participants and non 
participants, ‘passive’ and ‘active adopters’ and other forms of classification based on 
farmers’ behaviour or attitudes (Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1996 and 1997; Lobley 
and Potter, 1998; Wilson and Hart, 2000; Fish et al., 2003; Andersen et al., 2007; Wauter et 
al., 2010). However, only a few of these studies have highlighted, as part of broader results, 
how patterns of land managers’ attitudes influence landscape scale management (Davies et 
al., 2004; Siebert et al., 2006) – especially looking at land managers beyond farmers. 
Moreover, there is a lack of literature on the attitudes of different types of land managers and 
how they interact at specific scales; this information is vital to addressing how provision of 
ecosystem services by heterogeneous groups of land managers could be achieved.   
 
As other authors have suggested, landscape scale connectivity should be included in 
AES’s ‘outcome effects’ (environmental impact, as mentioned by Wilson and Hart, 2000).    
 
In the AES literature, little attention has been paid to cooperation and collaboration 
practices, perhaps because there are but few examples of existing cases. The literature has 
tended to focus on, a) drivers and barriers to collective action for environmental services 
(Burton et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2004); b) using new institutional economics (NIE), which 
refer to how institutions can shape behaviour and influence the decision-making of economic 
actors (Smits et al., 2008). Also, there is extensive literature on the Dutch cooperatives and 
collaborative initiatives as examples to follow elsewhere (Franks, 2010; Smits et al., 2008; 
Verhulst et al., 2007), with some cases focusing on ecological networks implementation 
(Jongman and Bogers, 2008). 
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  In this study, a landscape level approach (see chapter 1 for discussion of this) is taken 
in the analysis of land managers’ attitudes regarding conservation and AES participation to 
investigate if, and under what conditions, cooperation is in place, and to analyse the 
opportunities this offers for the delivery of ecosystem services.   
 
4.1 CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS  
 
This chapter uses different concepts that deserve definition and clarification. I use the 
concept of ‘land managers’ as distinct from that of ‘farmers’ (although farmers are included 
in this category). It is used as a generic term to refer to people who manage the land 
(independently of the economic activity or type of tenure); the only condition to be identified 
in this category was being in a position to make land use decisions and carry out those 
decisions. I worked with a heterogeneous group of respondents including: a) people who 
have only diversified activities (e.g. commonties, charities); b) people who have diversified 
activities with agriculture as only one element of their management practices (e.g. estates, 
farmers); c) farmers (e.g only farming activities); d) people who did not identify themselves 
as ‘farmers’ even when farming represents the main economic activity. It is important to 
make these distinctions, and to include land managers who are not farmers or who do not 
identify themselves as such despite carrying out some farming activities. In order to develop 
ecological corridors it is necessary to include the properties of all types of land managers.  
 
This chapter focuses on land managers’ attitudes to conservation, participation on 
AES and existing cooperation cases. Regarding the study of ‘attitudes’, there are many 
theories used in psychology, most notably the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) 
which has been applied in the AES literature (e.g. Wauter et al., 2010; Edwards-Jones, 2006; 
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Beedell and Rehman, 2000). However, I decided to use a definition capable of explaining 
attitudes in my study area without going into a whole body of specialised theory (partly due 
to time constraints). Therefore, in this study I understood ‘attitudes’ as theorised in Siebert et 
al. (2006: 326): (a) attitudes are dispositions that relate to behaviour; (b) attitudes are 
organised systematically, that is to say, people relate their views on one topic (e.g. the 
environment) to their views on other topics (e.g. family responsibilities, agricultural 
production) in a consistent way; (c) people share attitudes and thereby mutually confirm 
group affiliation. The examination of attitudes offers insight into land managers’ decision 
making as it reveals how their behaviour relates to their dispositions to conservation and 
cooperation. The results and discussion of this chapter address whether there is a direct 
relation between attitudes to conservation and AES participation (sections 4.3 and 4.4). 
Some researchers have found positive changes in attitudes to conservation through AES 
participation (Fish et al., 2003; Bager and Proost, 1997), while others found a negative 
impact or no change (Lowe et al., 1999; Herzon and Mikk, 2007; Schenk et al., 2007; 
Schmitzberger et al., 2005). 
 
From a sociological point of view, attitudes depend on actors’ social positioning in a 
web of relationships and on their social capital. For instance, cooperation is facilitated where 
social capital is strong (Pretty and Smith, 2004; Pretty, 2003; Davies et al., 2004).  It is 
generally agreed that trust, reciprocity and exchanges, common rules, norms and sanctions, 
connectedness, networks and groups are some of the elements of ‘social capital’ that enable 
and reinforce social structures (Burton et al., 2006; Davies et al., 2004). This refers to 
Bourdieu’s idea of social capital, which is defined as the totality of the present and potential 
resources that are linked with a group membership and social networks (Bourdieu, 1980: 2). 
The quantity of social capital that an actor possesses depends on the size of the network of 
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connections that he can effectively mobilise (economic, cultural and symbolic) (Bourdieu 
1980: 2). The quality of the social and cultural capital is produced by the totality of the 
relations between actors, rather than the quality of the group. It refers to how actors get 
involved in a social network, and how they use it and develop relations to improve their 
social position in different fields.  
 
For the use of the notion of ‘cultural capital’ I took inspiration from Burton et al., 
(2008). Although their work was only with farmers in conventional farms, it offers an 
excellent study on cultural capital in relation to attitudes and participation in Agri-
environmental Schemes. As they observe, represented cultural capital is the ‘prestige’ 
performed in everyday life and expressed through the farmers’ farming skills. A ‘good 
farmer’ is one who masters a process of self-improvement where repeated practice aims at 
improving ‘the mechanical, motoric and managerial skills required to effectively manage 
farmland’ (Burton et al., 2008: 20). The farming community share the same ‘perceptions and 
appreciations’ and the performance of the skills are recognised by the community. The 
generation and embodiment of cultural capital becomes the motor of the farmer’s behaviour. 
In this context, any other activity that does not transmit farmers’ social or cultural capital 
will encounter some resistance within the agricultural community as it requires a change in 
perceptions and behaviour. The same idea applies for other types of land managers.  
 
I used these concepts and definitions to guide the analysis and present the results of 
this chapter.  
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4.2 METHODS 
The methods used here are the same as those presented in chapter 3. The difference is 
that here I present the results from 27 interviews with land managers (8 estate, 14 tenants 
and tenants who are also smallholding owners, 5 with smallholding owners, see Figure 4.1.) 
rather than the complete corpus of 42 semi-structured interviews. As already noted, the semi-
structured interviews were one hour long on average and were split into different sections. In 
addition to the sections presented in chapter 3, there were further questions asked including, 
different aspects of land managers’ personal history (how they became land managers) and 
business issues (such as history of the holding and the woodlands, main changes over time, 
land uses, land tenure, holdings size, business plans, incomes from land uses, etc.); their 
experiences with subsidy schemes (participation and views of different schemes, i.e. Single 
Farm Payment SFP and AES, pros and cons of SFP and AES); conservation issues (what 
does conservation mean to them, local knowledge about conservation practices, awareness of 
designation areas and BAPs, knowledge about species and habitats); landscape scale 
management (if and how they see their management within the catchment); cooperation with 
other land managers and/or public agencies (existing cases of cooperation with other land 
managers and/or public agencies). In figure 4.2 I present a flowchart describing the steps I 
followed for the analysis of the semi-structured interviews for this section. Coding and 
queries were applied to the 27 interviews, allowing a systematic inventory of views 
expressed by land managers (see Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.1 Map of the Dee Catchment, showing designation areas and location of the interviews included in 
the study by type of tenancy. Source: own field data.  
 
 
I regrouped the ‘attitudes’ on conservation according to similarities using text 
analysis methodology. In particular, I distinguished between conservation seen as an end 
product (as a separate set of practices needed to allow and maintain habitat and species 
reproduction) versus conservation seen as a secondary result of existing, current 
management practices. I also established a more generic distinction between those land 
managers ‘interested in conservation’ versus those ‘not interested at all’ (as they stated 
themselves). I then looked for consistent attributes of land managers to explain the 
differences regarding views on conservation and propensity to cooperate. Based on the 
results, I formed cluster of land managers’ answers and analysed practices of cooperation. 
 
  
 142 
 
Figure 4.2 Methods used to collect and analyse data. 
 
4.3 RESULTS 
In this section, I present the results of the interviews using clusters of land managers’ 
answers. The clusters were identified as a result of the analysis of interviews on attitudes to 
conservation and propensity to cooperate. This clustering revealed that the opinions 
expressed are mainly correlated to land tenure type. I therefore distinguish between a) 
managers of estates (factors or owners), b) tenants, and c) owners of smallholdings, to 
present these different views and attitudes. It should be noted that the category of 
‘tenants’ includes those who also own some land (or ‘tenant-small owners’ in the following 
pages) as long as the area in freehold is inferior to the area tenanted. 
 
The analysis is presented in relation to the following three themes: a) attitudes to 
conservation and AES participation; b) the landscape scale approach, that is whether they 
  
 143 
see the need for landscape management and designation areas; and c) cooperation (existing 
cases of cooperation among land managers). 26 Appendix E presents a table with the 
characteristics of each informant (land tenure, property extension and type of production, 
attitudes to conservation and AES participation). 
 
4.3.1 Estate owners 
The nature of estate business clearly illustrates the notion of multifunctionality with 
diversified activities well beyond agriculture (in the study area estates range from 1500 ha. 
to 50 000 ha.). All the estates hold shooting and fishing rights. Activities and services 
delivered by estates are, generally speaking, game shooting, deer stalking and red grouse 
shooting, angling, recreation (hill walking, mountain biking), forestry, farming, tourism 
(hotels, cottages, restaurants, farm shops, and other services related to the sport activities) 
and residential property developments or property for letting (residential, commercial and 
land).  
 
a) Estate owners’ attitudes to conservation and AES participation 
In most cases, the estate managers’ knowledge and interest in conservation 
corresponds to their concern with shooting and fishing. For instance, for Stewart27 
conservation work is seen as a consequence of their management rather than an aim in 
itself:   
   ‘ [… ] well, this is the point; we don’t say we do this for conservation reasons but the 
management of the river bank ties in the management of the fishing […] and there is an 
awful lot of other things that benefit the management of the fishing. I put quite a bit of effort 
into riparian management because yes, that’s part of our general ethos but also it’s a benefit 
to the fishing […]. Oh yes. 25% of our forestry is regarded as conservation or amenity and 
yes, we do, but the interface between what’s commercial, what’s environmental and what’s 
amenity is difficult to define’.                                                          
26 We refer to cooperation as the action or process of working together towards the same end; as well as assistance, 
especially by complying readily with requests. Oxford Dictionary of English 2ed. 2003. 
27 All names have been changed to ensure anonymity. 
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What representatives of estates mentioned about having no intentions of paying for 
conservation per se confirmed this view. For them, conservation should go hand in hand 
with the economics and interest of the business in order to succeed. As Matthew put it, 
‘Everything is a balance between commercial, conservation, economics, people, you know, 
all sorts. But obviously the conservation of the wildlife is an important consideration along 
with all the other things. But everything has to be paid for’.  
 
All the estate owners questioned will apply to AES for work they are already doing 
or planning to do, or will slightly adapt their management if there are AES that fit their 
interests. 
Land managers follow the management that is most convenient for the business. Private 
interests lead to practices that result in positive or negative externalities (externalities are 
unintentional side effects, see chapter 5) i.e. conservation (or not), as a by-product. This is 
illustrated by the example of deer shooting for sport as ‘conservation through hunting’ 
(MacMillan and Leitch, 2008) in the case of habitats which have deteriorated because of 
increasing numbers of red deer (Cervus elephus). Another example is the conservation and 
management of heather moorlands, which is carried out for shooting species such as red 
grouse (Lagopus Lagopus). Specific management and conservation of the habitat for red 
grouse (such as moor burning) create ecological processes that are beneficial for this game 
species (Ratcliffe and Thompson, 1988), but which may be detrimental to other bird species 
(Thirgood et al., 2000). In many of these examples there is a conflict between estates’ 
private interests and management practices that have an impact on the public domain and 
public interest (MacMillan and Leitch, 2008). Perhaps the most striking example of this is 
the conflict between the conservation of wild raptors and habitat management for game 
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shooting species (Thirgood et al., 2000; Thompson et al., 2009; Redpath and Thirgood, 
2009).  
 
b) Landscape scale approach and designation areas 
 
The idea of ‘landscape scale’ management in the Dee catchment was obvious for the 
owners or factors of the eight estates. The extent of the estates and their involvement in 
different economic and social activities facilitates this view: the combination of their 
activities relies on different services delivered by the ecosystem. Most of the interviewees 
are involved in landscape scale organisations such as fishery boards, woodland associations 
or deer management groups, where coordination of activities between estates is imperative. 
Although none of these organisations are focused on biodiversity per se, the activities are of 
benefit to the conservation (as by-product) of at least some of the species listed in the 
Biodiversity Action Plans (BAP). Conservation management is the final objective in only a 
few cases (management for capercaillie, Tetrao urogallus, for instance). 
 
Regarding designated areas, estate management and decisions are sometimes constrained 
when national or international conservation interests come into play (i.e. for SSSI, SAC, 
etc.). In addition to what I presented in chapter 2 (section 2.3), it is important to note that 
land managers’ practices within the designated areas are framed by a specific plan. For 
instance, Paul has a number of designated areas within his property and he has changed his 
views about how to manage this land over time:  
 
‘[…] we have to manage our interests according to those designations. It means close 
cooperation with Scottish Natural Heritage […] to make sure our management activities are 
not prejudicial. Examples are […] erosion of riverbanks and what impact that may have on 
our salmon fishing interest and we’ve got to think about fresh pearl mussels and to a lesser 
extent otters and Atlantic salmon. We are doing some green engineering solutions […], 
which is a trial where we planted some willow. That’s a consequence of ultimately the river 
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Dee becoming a way of conservation. I’m not sure that’s the only reason but it’s changed our 
thinking and how we do things […]’  
   
The framework of practices imposed by designations is often easier to follow if it 
corresponds to the estate owners’ economic interests. For instance, in the example just 
quoted, Paul’s estate draws a substantial income from salmon fishing. As the river Dee itself 
is designated a SAC and the estate has fishing interests in salmon, the rules to follow for 
water quality and habitat conservation are of benefit to all (and are perceived as such).  
 
c) Existing cases of cooperation 
Cooperation amongst estates is common, although in the first instance they may not 
recognise it and state that they work independently. Given the shape and size of some of the 
estates, their participation in cross boundary management is essential for some important 
resources; without this participation landscape scale conservation would be very difficult, 
and in some cases impossible, to achieve.  Cases of cooperation in the Dee catchment are 
often for riparian woodlands. One of the most significant plans of this type is the Upper Dee 
Riparian Woodland Project, which consists of a riparian corridor between the National Trust 
of Scotland’s estate (Mar Lodge) and two neighbouring estates. The three estates cooperate 
and, as noted earlier, Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), Cairngorms National Park Authority 
(CNPA) and Forestry Commission Scotland (FCS) coordinate the project. In this specific 
case, the cooperation and coordination has a direct benefit to all participants and is indirectly 
reinforced through statutory documents. In this case the objective is to protect the waters of 
the Dee, including water quality and temperature, to restore streams and riverbanks, and to 
restore the population of salmon (source: interviews and River Dee annual report 2009).  
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Estate owners are not the only people to manage the land, and even within their 
property significant areas are actually leased to tenants; therefore, both parties are 
constrained to a certain extent. Estate owners have limited control over these areas, and the 
land management for landscape scale habitat conservation also depends on choices made by 
tenants. 
   
4.3.2 Tenants 
 
Tenants represent the other end of the spectrum compared with estate owners’ 
interests and views. In the case of tenancies, property rights are restricted to the exploitation 
of land and there is very little interest in shooting or sport fishing activities. In Scotland, land 
productivity is poor and tenants’ choices of food and fibre production are limited. Holding 
extensions are in the range of 40 ha. to 300 ha. There were only five cases (out of fourteen) 
where tenants also owned some land (reaching 400 ha. in total). Most of the tenants manage 
a mixed farming system of cattle and/or sheep, with crops (barley, wheat, rape seed and 
oats).  
a) Tenants’ attitudes to conservation and AES participation 
 
Farm size was one of the first issues mentioned by tenants in relation to conservation 
and AES. In almost all cases, when asked about conservation the informants’ answers were 
about AES (in some cases respondents explicitly asked if the question referred to AES). Out 
of 14 tenants and tenants smallholding owners, 8 expressed negative opinions or did not see 
the need for conservation practices and AES and 3 expressed no interest in conservation 
practices. A further 3 expressed positive views to conservation but with some reservations.  
 
  
 148 
In addition, for some respondents there was no need for conservation practices per se 
as they looked at conservation as a consequence of their management practices (as a by-
product). Russell lets and owns part of the farm and for him conservation comes with food 
production, as he mentioned:  
 ‘I haven’t a huge interest in conservation. I think the best way for the countryside to look 
after itself is well farmed land, well managed land, so I haven’t a huge interest in 
conservation. I don’t like to see paths being left just for conservation and not used for 
anything. I prefer they were used for farming production as long as it helps the environment. 
I don’t want farming to hinder conservation but they’ve got to go together. I don’t like 
seeing paths or land being just left to help wildlife if it’s not producing anything’. 
 
 
Trevor expressed similarly critical views about public spending on conservation 
through AES, and offered a particularly articulate discourse conveying an even more 
negative judgement of conversation policies. Trevor differentiated these from conservation 
as a practice, which for him was inherent to farming. Certainly, the fact that he is the local 
NFU representative explains his views to some extent, and accounts for the fact that he is so 
vocal in expressing them; this position also accounts for the fact that he clearly identifies 
himself first and foremost as a farmer and food producer. His farming operation covers 900 
acres (360ha), half as his own holding and the other half on rented land for grazing. He 
keeps 150 breeding cows (not counting their calves), 600 breeding sheep, and also produces 
some barley and some silage.  
 
  Given Trevor’s role in the NFU (and therefore his influence among the farming 
community), and the fact that his attitudes are representative of those land managers who 
self-identify primarily as farmers (which is actually more often the case for tenants), a larger 
quote from our conversation on conservation policies seems justified here: 
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‘Conservation  is  great but they need to get into their heads that conservation has been 
practiced by agriculturalists for hundreds of years. If it wasn’t for farmers you wouldn’t have 
the biodiversity in the landscape that you have got right now. But government and 
government agencies have latched onto the idea of conservation which is fine, but I think, in 
the part of the world we live in, you can see for yourself, its pretty well looked after as it is. 
There are bits less well looked after. I think the nearer you get to the city boundaries the 
worse it is. There’s waste lying about and everything else. Look out here, you know, we’ve 
got a nice view to see and things are pretty tidy more or less. Conservation is great but they 
are going to have to draw the line somewhere. They can’t go on and on spending public 
funds on conservation. There is going to have to come a time when the conservation area has 
come to its limit, where they have to refocus on producing food, you know, the world 
population is multiplying […] and there’s a finite amount of land available. You know, land 
is actually decreasing. […] So that means that the production of food is going to have to 
move out. […] And the way the currency is now, the economy worldwide, we can’t afford to 
import it. We have the people right now with the skills to grow it, but if things don’t stabilise 
and get better, not or get better but have to get better, you will loose that skill base and 
instead of being concerned just to protect the birdies, you will have to bring into the 
conservation areas to feed the people. So I think there  is  a  very  fine  line  to  be drawn 
somewhere. I’m not against conservation at all, but they are going to have to see the bigger 
picture. And really see where you are going to get all this food for all these people. So that’s 
where I am but I know conservation has done a lot of good things […]. So you’ll see a whole 
different picture of agriculture. Instead of agriculture being supported by these things, 
agriculture will stand on its own two feet with a market that’s actually following it. It’s 
going to be difficult for these guys that have gone down the conservation route, got used to 
this amount of money coming in and maybe dropped some of their stock so they could do 
this and get money from a different source, it’s not an easier but a different source’. 
 
  Interestingly, Trevor’s main point is that agricultural producers should be allowed to 
stand on their own feet, and that spending public money to force them to apply conservation 
measures on their land is not the way forward; instead, he suggests that food production and 
conservation need to be managed jointly by ensuring an economically viable agriculture. 
 
Margaret and Roland (wife and husband), were, in their own way, more explicit 
regarding their views on conservation: 
 
‘Well, we have heard of this con… [conservation] whatever you call it, but we’ve nothing to 
dee [to do] with that, hiv wi [have we]? it doesna [doesn’t] affect us, does it? Not here. Its 
oor [our] friend along the road that has all this wild flowers.  He’s into that, nae [not] us. But 
its nae oor [not our] farm so we canna dee [cannot do] it, like. Disna [it does not] bother us, 
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does it? […] I’ve just never thought about it. He’s taken in a good bit money off that, our 
neighbour’.  
 
Negative views about conservation are widespread among tenants but they are not 
necessarily causing non participation in AES. For instance, Russell has tried to apply to 
AES, despite his reservations on conservation, but he has not been successful (he did not 
qualify for the competitive scheme he applied to). It is perhaps the failure of this application 
that reinforces his negative views on conservation. In some cases, interviewees openly 
expressed that, in their position, ‘getting the money’ of the AES was the only reason for 
applying. This is not surprising since, as mentioned, the farming industry in Scotland relies 
heavily on CAP subsidies. Keith, for instance, noted,  
‘It’s not something that I’m really into. But I see the point of it and I’m happy to participate 
in something that helps it. Unfortunately that’s where the money comes from. It’s the same 
ones all the times – the grass margins, unharvested areas and mowing grassland for birds. 
We only do it to get the money. Not only, no it’s nice to see the wildlife that comes along. I 
wouldn’t say there has been a tremendous increase but we did see some […] but I can’t say 
that’s down to the scheme or not’.  
Similarly, Donald suggested, ‘the people that’s in the rural stewardship scheme 
they’ve no interest in wildlife. They are in it for pennies [money]’. He thinks that since “they 
are gifted with land and should be producing the food”. This expresses a certain moral 
judgement which is anchored in tenant farmers’ cultural habitus and self-image as 
agricultural producers. 
 
b) Landscape scale approach and designation areas 
For the majority of estate owners questioned, the landscape scale and conservation 
practices seem to be more obvious because of the multifunctionality inherent to the estate 
business; however, they are remote notions to most of the 14 tenants who were interviewed. 
When dealing with smaller holdings, the possibilities for landscape scale management and 
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the choice of services and goods to be produced is more limited. As such, it is less likely that 
tenants will be interested in landscape scale management or even conservation practices.  
Limited access to land and restricted property rights contribute to shape tenants’ views 
regarding landscape scale and conservation.   
Allan is the second generation of a farming family, and his son has taken over the 
farm which is let from two estates. His comments on conservation illustrate the concern 
about the extent of land available:  
‘My wee bit of ground – I need it for farming. Now I suppose if I got another 80 – 100 acres 
of rough ground I could say, well, maybe I’ll make a pond there because it’s nae deing ony 
good onyhow [it’s not doing any good anyhow]. But for me to make a pond in the middle of 
my ground, I’d never thought of that’.  
When it comes to collaboration with other land managers for designated areas, none 
of the informants in this group seemed to be aware of the local designation areas, the BAPs 
or other statutory or guidance documents for environmental protection. If these findings 
were confirmed more widely it would indicate a failure of existing policies to reach those 
who are ultimately to implement them. 
 
c) Existing cases of cooperation 
Cooperation between tenant farmers was found to happen frequently on an informal 
basis (in addition to the cooperation that can be organised through participation in 
organisations such as the National Farming Union, NFU). According to my evidence, 
farmers most frequently lend each other tools and machinery and, to a lesser extent, labour. 
In the study area, farmers will help each other for the silage period in November. For 
instance, Macvean, a tenant-small owner shares the machinery and exchanges labour with 
two of his neighbours for every silage period: ‘You need a few labourers and tractors at that 
so we pull our labour from three farms. My two neighbours. There’s one with a mower and 
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I’ve got a chopper and we provide each other with labour and we do each others silage […], 
we call it a square, where we sit down and work out the costs due to each other and balance 
[sic]’.   
 
These practices of labour exchange and sharing of costs could be considered a form 
of continuation of the labour exchange for ‘corn stack’ or ‘corn ricks’ practiced in Scotland. 
In the 18th and 19th centuries it was common that groups of farmers got together for 
threshing corn (also for ‘hay making’). This was a labour-intensive task for a minimum of 12 
people, which was then reduced to 9 people in the late 19th century with the introduction of 
steam threshing machines in most of Britain’s rural agricultural businesses (Higgs, 1964). In 
Deeside, corn ricks were still practiced in the 1960s (as was noted by an informant based on 
a photograph he had taken then).  
 
Another example is that of Russell and Duncan. They have an ‘established’ 
cooperation, whereby Russell buys the barley from Duncan to feed his animals, and in return 
Duncan helps him to move his 300 sheep to another area in the Dee for winter. There are 
many more examples along the same lines.  
 
Cooperation for conservation or other public goods is also starting to happen among 
tenants. Neil and his neighbour started a footpath that crosses the two farms; as he 
commented, ‘if I had just done a footpath on my own it was going to lead to nowhere. So 
this way we could join it up and it made a circular route. And it made more sense’. After 
four years another neighbour joined the group, creating a bigger footpath. The Upper 
Deeside Access Trust has helped as a coordinating body and an umbrella for cross-boundary 
cooperation for footpath networks in the study area.   
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Similarly to estate owners or factors, tenants see conservation as a by-product of their 
management practices rather than as a specific objective. Despite these views, and the 
differences in land tenure and property rights, tenants and tenants smallholding owners were 
willing to cooperate with other land managers when certain conditions were in place, such as 
having the right person to talk to and an appropriate economic incentive.   
  
 
4.3.2  Smallholding owners 
Smallholding owners are in the middle of the spectrum of opinions, between estate 
owners and tenants. Smallholding owners are mostly farmers but they demonstrated different 
attitudes to land than other groups. Often they have had other experiences in their 
professional careers, for instance some had worked in the oil and gas industry before 
becoming farmers. However, not all of these cases can be called ‘hobby farmers’ (Holloway, 
2001) because their main income actually comes from farming or from the land they manage 
(although they do rely on contractors or employees with the expertise to carry out some of 
the management they want).  
 
This difference is important and often underestimated in the literature on the subject. 
For instance, an interviewee mentioned that he had to change from a mixed (breeding cattle) 
farming system to mostly crops, renting grassland and fattening cattle because of the loss of 
the employee with the necessary expertise. Several times respondents mentioned the need for 
labour and expressed problems in finding it. In most cases, smallholding owners farm out of 
choice, because they like it.   
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The land extensions held by smallholding owners in the study area vary between 80 
ha and 400 ha. All of them own the shooting and fishing rights and they often have an 
interest in outdoor activities (sport or other).  
 
 
a) Smallholdings owners’ attitudes to conservation and AES participation 
 
Hendry belongs to the second generation of farmers in his family. Before he became 
a farmer he was a land agent. Since he inherited, he has extended the farm with a farm 
amalgamation scheme. He is interested in conservation. This can be observed from the 
appearance of his holding which presents freshly planted hedges and patches of woodland 
with different species of trees of varying ages. For Hendry his farm is like ‘a big garden’ as 
he mentioned when talking about conservation, landscape and woodlands: ‘[…] [it] is all 
amenity. It is all for conservation and environment really; and beauty’. Along the same lines, 
for James, ‘nature and the environment enhance the looks of the place too’.   
 
Since all smallholding owners interviewed had an interest in conservation or outdoor 
activities, they were also better informed about conservation issues. All interviewees showed 
knowledge of their land and thought of it as unique. James talked about the flora he has in 
his land:  
‘we have wild orchids growing up in that bit of ground […] the orchids here are lovely 
flowers […] unless you go looking for them, you don’t see them, you know […]. And the 
ones we have up there are quite rare […]. I go up and see if I can find new ones you see. 
[…]. So a lot of people wouldn’t recognise, they wouldn’t even bother. They wouldn’t know 
what they were and they wouldn’t worry anyway. They just think it’s a wild flower and 
never think anything of it’.   
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However, views about AES are not homogeneous within this group. Four out of the 
five smallholding owners were willing to apply and be paid for the work they are doing for 
conservation. Hendry is one of the most interested in the schemes and justified his 
motivation in the following words:  
‘I think [it is] just a love of trying to improve the environment. […] I think it’s a super thing 
to do. Also we get the fencing. The fencing was paid for. The money is very good […] 
hedges are very important for the environment; for the countryside. It’s an excellent 
investment from the point of view of the Scottish office and the common market. It’s always 
going to be there – hedges are going to be everlasting’.  
  
Despite applying to the schemes, some of these respondents still expressed 
scepticism. For example, Arran, who was in the oil industry before he bought his farm. He 
and his son manage and own the farm and an outdoors equipment shop. He expressed the 
following views about conservation and the schemes:  
‘Like a lot of the schemes I think what I’ve seen of it you have to do a lot of paperwork and 
you had to self assess it and to me that is not a good thing. I think the environment has to be 
protected. I think there’s far better ways of protecting the environment than just putting it 
down on a piece of paper. I’m not greatly enthused by the thing’.   
 
Arran has some AES for wild birdseed; he was interested in the scheme for its 
conservation aspect. As he mentioned, the money was one of his reasons for joining the 
scheme but essentially they were going to do participate anyway. In contrast, for forestry he 
prefers to pay for the work and plant trees rather than spend almost the same quantity of 
money in the application process.  
  
As an illustration of this self-reliant thinking, other smallholding owners also 
preferred to pay themselves for the conservation related work they were doing rather than to 
go through all the paperwork of a funding application. 
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Their views on conservation reflect their interest in outdoor sport activities, including 
their shooting and fishing rights. Informants mentioned several times that they have 
enhanced the habitats and conservation for species for shooting, which they mainly used for 
personal entertainment rather than solely for business. Take Hendry, mentioned earlier, 
whose sons come up from London to enjoy a bit of sport at the family farm. For him this is 
one of the main motivations to do conservation work on his land: 
‘Well we always shoot really. I have two sons and they both shoot but it’s not run 
commercially. I haven’t got a commercial let. The objective is to improve it [the habitat] for 
shooting really, for birds; whether it’s for pheasants or hares, but there is a lot of wildlife 
here. A lot of game; tremendous amount of partridge, hares, a lot of yellow hammer, a lot of 
finches, a lot of just general lovely birds’. 
 
  At the same time, besides the shooting or fishing-driven interest in conservation 
among owners of smallholdings, changes in the landscape due to conservation works on 
their land are often seen as increasing the value and the aesthetics of the property.  
 
b) Landscape scale approach and designation areas 
 
The idea of landscape scale management for conservation was obvious to owners of 
smallholdings and they even insisted on the need for it, especially those who have an interest 
in fishing as a sport. In fact, for some, this was the main concrete experience they had of the 
broader landscape scale, for instance Eileen (who took over the farm from her father): ‘I’m only aware of the catchment area in terms of the lack of fish in the burns that there’s been and the fact that there are now only the odd fish to be seen quite far out. There used to be fish all the way up. I’ll show you before you go’.  
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As with the estates, the fact that wildlife moves across boundaries makes the idea of 
landscape scale management particularly meaningful for those owners of small holdings who 
have interests in hunting and fishing. This is the case for Hendry: 
‘I think it would probably be excellent. I mean what I’m doing here is putting in all those 
hedgerows and lovely bits of wood and it draws, it’s a magnet, for game birds apart from 
anything else. So a lot of these shooting interests like the [neighbouring] estate, those people 
who are coming and shooting down their pheasants and birds and then they wonder why they 
disappear. And then they wander down my hedgerow and we shoot them here and then they 
wonder why. Its common sense that, if you plant more. These properties, maybe they put in 
a game crop or they feed a lot, but birds will naturally go somewhere where the habitat is 
good. It’s like a human being, you go where it’s nice to live. A bird is the same. It wants 
somewhere nice to live so naturally they will converge. It’s like bees to a honey pot. So I 
think I’m quite happy for people to improve [habitat]. I think it’s a good idea. I hope many 
people will put in new hedgerows’. (Hendry)  
 
 Linked to these interests in cross-boundary conservation is the fact that all 
respondents in this group were aware of the designation areas in their vicinity such as SSSI, 
SAC and others. In terms of the Biodiversity Action Plan, respondents in this group knew at 
least some of the species and habitats covered and were also aware of some local 
organisations involved in land management coordination in the catchment, such as the Dee 
Fishery or Deer Management Group.  
 
c) Existing cases of cooperation 
 
Compared to tenants, smallholding owners are more independent in their decision-making. 
In fact, they can also be more independent compared to estates since they have both access 
to land resources and the property rights of the land they manage.  
 
Regarding cooperation, smallholding owners reported that land managers ‘are 
terrible people for not working with one another. I have no problem with that [accepting it]’ 
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(Arran). Compared to the two previous groups, smallholding owners seem to be more 
independent and individualistic. That is not to say that they consider their holdings as 
‘islands’, but they tend to work exclusively alone or rely more on employees and contractors 
rather than exchange help with their neighbours as the other two groups of land manages do 
more often.  
For some smallholding owners, there is a certain pride associated with finding out by 
themselves through trial and evaluation, in order to improve their management through a 
learning process (through ‘experimenting’). The pride they feel over managing and 
improving their own piece of land plays a role in their attitudes (as they have a different 
identification with the land than estate owners or tenants have). Although they do ask advice 
and share knowledge with other land managers, they often referred to their experience as a 
process of self-learning. Only one interviewee mentioned asking neighbours for help in cases 
of emergency (such as the tractor breaking down).   
 
4.4 DISCUSSION  
 
I discuss my findings in the light of existing literature, drawing particular attention to 
the drivers and barriers for the delivery of ecosystem services as revealed by my research. 
 
The clustering of land mangers’ answers, based on land tenure, into tenants, estates 
and smallholding owners was carried out as a result of the analysis of the interviews: these 
were not identified as categories prior to the analysis. This post-clustering helped to explain 
existing cooperation cases, where land managers cooperate more within their group (tenants 
with tenants, estates with estates, small holding owners were the only more independent 
group) than across groups (with a few exceptions).  
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Land tenure has been mentioned as one of the factors affecting AES participation; for 
instance, Wilson and Hart (2000), in their study across different countries of the EU and 
Switzerland, found that farmers with more than 50% of land as freehold property were  
likely to uptake AES than those with less than 50% (Wilson and Hart, 2000, p. 2175). There 
are many other studies that mention ‘tenure’ as one of the farm-structure factors for 
participation in AES (e.g. Brouwer and Lowe, 1998; Brouwer and van Berkum, 1997; Buller 
et al., 2000; Morris and Potter, 1995); however, there is no study on AES participation 
focused specifically on land tenure. 
Within the AES literature, Wilson and Hart (2001) studied whether AES could affect 
farmers’ attitudes to conservation and found that it did have an impact in some cases. 
Although I did not test how AES participation would change land managers’ attitudes, I 
found that conservation per se was mainly practiced by smallholding owners who saw this as 
increasing the value of the property, with one estate seeing the benefit to the environment 
and to their own land as worth pursuing in itself.  
The other two groups saw conservation as a result of their management, as an 
inherent by-product; therefore, for them there was no need for management practices aimed 
solely at conservation. Authors have studied how farmers’ attitudes to conservation affect 
AES participation and non-participation (e.g. Wilson, 1996; Morris and Potter, 1995). I was, 
however, more interested in how these attitudes affect environmental management and what 
the drivers and barriers were for delivering ecosystem services. Consequently, I have 
presented how land managers’ decisions on commodity and/or services produced can affect 
biodiversity conservation: management for shooting versus farming (the main impact is on 
the type of species conserved). 
 For the case of estates, their management activities to serve fishing and hunting 
interests may, in part, have a negative effect on other/wider conservation efforts; similarly, 
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other activities co-deliver certain types of wider benefits for landscape biodiversity. These 
trade-offs and synergies have been studied both in England (Oldfield et al., 2003) and 
Scotland (Thirgood et al., 2000; MacMillan and Leitch, 2008; Thompson et al., 2009; 
Redpath and Thirgood, 2009). On the other hand, farming practices can create benefits for 
biodiversity conservation through the creation of habitats for some species, such as Corn 
Bunting (Emberiza calandra), Reed Bunting (Emberiza schoeniclus), and Tree Sparrow 
(Passer montanus). However, these effects are marginal compared with the losses, as the 
decline in farmland birds over recent decades shows (Hails, 2002; Boatman et al., 2007; 
Butler et al., 2007). In addition to this, and as things stand now, ecosystem services that need 
landscape management (Bailay et al., 2002), such as carbon sequestration and protection 
from soil erosion, are under-delivered in farmland (Donald and Evans, 2006; Govaerts et al., 
2009). There is a need for tools to deliver these at the landscape scale, such as the Dee 
catchment, to increase the sustainability of agricultural activities. 
 
Since I used ecological networks to frame my research on landscape scale 
management, and these ecological networks were mainly based on forest habitats (Gimona 
and van der Horst, 2007), I asked land managers specifically about forestry schemes.  
 
 Some respondents reported reservations in applying for forestry schemes; these tenants 
were uncertain of whether they were allowed to apply for such schemes. This can partly be 
explained by two facts. The first is associated with the Single Farm Payment (SFP), 
established in 2005. When the SFP was introduced, one of the conditions to receive these 
Payment Entitlements was that ‘the land must be used for arable land [or] permanent pasture 
[…]’; the conditions explicitly stated that areas for non agricultural use, permanent crops, 
forest, fruit, vegetables, table potatoes were excluded (Scottish Executive). In the 
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hypothetical case of people wanting to afforest they would lose their entitlements. The 
second fact is related to Agricultural Law. Until 2003, tenants did not have rights over the 
trees; all planted trees were the property of the landlords, regardless of who planted them. As 
a result, tenant participation in forestry schemes was very limited (Appleton and Crabtree, 
1991).  
 Although the legal framework has changed for SFP and Agricultural Law, it seems that 
not all tenants are aware of, or interested in, the new opportunities. Authors have studied 
land managers’ attitudes to woodland plantation and the results show similar findings. The 
degree of lack of interest varies amongst land managers (as does its appraisal in different 
studies), but the most common reasons for lack of interest were identified as follows:, low 
level of financial incentives; lack of knowledge about planting schemes; uncertainty on 
financial returns (Sandys, 1994; Bishop, 1992; Watkins et al., 1996).  
 
 As with my own findings, a few studies identified land tenure as a restriction to 
woodland planting (the Marsoton Vale farm survey and Scambler, 1989). Bishop (1992), 
mentioned that woodland schemes should therefore be seen as an ‘innovation’, and 
suggested more time was needed for land managers to be willing to take up schemes and/or 
increase woodland areas. However, I argue that my results show that many of these 
motivations for not planting remain the same, including the size of the farm and even, for 
some informants, the view that it would be ‘morally’ wrong if they converted their 
agricultural land into woodland (as Watkins et al., 1996 also observed). Therefore, for me it 
is rather a question of identifying the conditions that allow for some ‘innovations’ to be 
adopted and others rejected. 
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Moreover, my results suggest that the Agricultural Holding (Scotland) Act 2003 (S42 
Tenant’s right to timber) allows tenants to plant trees under agreements between the tenant 
and the landlord, and between landlords who are willing to apply to AES for land that is 
tenanted. There are an enormous number of formal and informal agreements between 
landowners and tenants. There is a lack of research on the spectrum of these agreements, 
especially for environmental management and conservation practices. Therefore, for me it 
was important to study existing cases of cooperation amongst land managers. 
 
Propensity to cooperate varies between the three groups and although all of them 
cooperate in one way or in another, the level of commitment is different. Cooperation 
appears to be more common within than across each of the groups and occurs to a lesser 
extent between different groups. Smallholding owners were the most independent land 
managers. 
 
When estates and tenants cooperate, their relationship is often asymmetric (using the 
classification of chapter 3), in the sense that the terms of the cooperation are set by the 
estate. Examples include the application to specific AES to improve water quality in the 
river Dee; in this case the estates make it a condition when they lease the land under Short 
Duration Tenancy.  
 
When given the example of the implementation of ecological corridors, respondents 
from all three groups of land managers often mentioned the need for coordination of 
practices by a third party. It was interesting that, of the three groups, only estate factors or 
owners could see their role as coordinators; this was particularly the case for those who 
already had a plan for their estate, for footpaths or field margins for instance. In other cases, 
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the coordinating person is the consultant who is in charge of helping tenants through the 
application for AES (when the estate has a plan for these schemes). This offers a valuable 
example where bottom-up processes are taking place, and suggests the need for more 
channels to stimulate such processes.  
 
Policies to deliver conservation per se address market failure in relation to the 
delivery of public goods to society by land managers. It is not surprising that most land 
managers think they should be reimbursed for their explicit activities to deliver these public 
goods. 
 
4.5 CONCLUSION  
 
Land managers are different with regards to their objectives and views and these 
differences could represent a barrier; however, existing cases of cooperation and propensity 
to cooperate offer opportunities for the provision of ecosystem services.  
 
The potential for the delivery of ecosystem services via existing AES is limited. 
These operate at the holding scale rather than at the landscape scale and only achieve limited 
additionality. The complicated nature of the application process represents a capacity barrier 
to those land managers who are restricted in terms of time or other means (computers, 
money to pay consultants).    
 
Despite these barriers, there are opportunities to engage each of the three groups of 
land managers in the delivery of ecosystem services through AES support. If AES were 
delivered at the landscape scale, according to my results, smallholding owners who have an 
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interest in conservation per se appear as a promising potential target group: they could be 
seen as ‘core social actors’. Moreover, their land parcels could be the most easily achievable 
‘starting points’ from which to develop conservation practices at the landscape scale.  
 
Ecosystem services at the landscape scale call for coordination and, as land managers 
have mentioned, there is a need for coordination to actually be made to happen (see also 
results from chapter 3). They mentioned the need for a third party to act as a coordinator in 
implementing collaboration rather than them taking the initiative.  
 
Delivery of ecosystem services implies cooperation between land managers of 
different (land tenure) groups. In this regard, the results showed that land managers have a 
propensity to cooperate. Existing cases of cooperation show that each group of land 
managers have strong social and cultural capital within their groups but very little across 
groups.  
 
Finally, the majority of land managers could benefit from information about 
landscape scale issues and ecosystem services, in order to achieve the delivery of ecosystem 
services though AES at the landscape scale. It is necessary to involve land managers in the 
early stages of policy, allowing them to actively participate in the design for  delivery. In 
order to achieve maximum policy effectiveness, it is imperative that those who can supply 
ecosystem services are part of the development process. This will make the development of 
‘socio-ecological systems’ possible – by which I mean systems that ensure land managers’ 
adaptive capacity to changes in ecosystems. 
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The greater role of land managers in the policy process could be embedded in local 
community initiatives to deliver the necessary degree of cohesion and coordination for 
environmental outcomes of AES. For example, Eggers et al. (2008), highlight the possibility 
of an agri-environmental forum or an environmental cooperative as part of Local Action 
Groups (LAGs); this could be funded through mechanisms such as LEADER, under the EU 
Rural Development Regulation, or other partnership arrangements. However, they also 
acknowledge some of the practical capacity difficulties - a point echoed by more general 
literature on community initiatives and the need to develop human and social capital (e.g. 
Quirk, 2007).  
While a number of studies have highlighted the importance of addressing issues of 
governance and information provision to promote cooperative rather than individualistic 
behaviour (Pascual and Perrings, 2007; Goldman et al., 2007), the question of coordination 
is underexplored in the literature and merits further research.                      
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
‘EVERYTHING HAS TO BE PAID FOR’  
RESULTS FROM AN EXPERIMENT 
TO TEST ‘1-2-1 COORDINATION BONUS’ 
 
 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION   
 
As discussed in chapter 1 regarding the ‘Payments for Environmental Services’ 
framework, in the UK conservation biodiversity at farm and holding scale takes place, in 
most cases, as a direct consequence of payments or as a by-product of existing activities 
(Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). In other words, these conservation benefits are external 
benefits. External benefits are often seen as public goods, especially if this involves large-
scale benefits (FAO, 2007). Property rights could exclude people from benefiting from 
certain aspects of biodiversity, or biodiversity management could reduce the possible benefit 
by others (e.g. the case of fishing rights). However, biodiversity can be considered a public 
good, as my definition in the introductory chapter explained. Public goods are often under-
provided by markets, therefore they are known as ‘market failure’.  
There are a number of mechanisms to correct this: top-down approaches such as 
environmental law or public policy, or bottom-up economic incentives and other market-
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based instruments (Brauer et al., 2006). Having focused the previous chapters on other 
mechanisms, such as top-down, bottom-up coordination and existing cases of cooperation, 
this chapter will present the results of testing a bottom-up voluntary ‘coordination bonus’ 
incentive to stimulate cooperation. I found it useful to call the incentive a ‘one-to-one 
coordination bonus’ (or ‘1-2-1’), since it reflects the design of the experiment which rewards 
players when they coordinate their actions on a one-to-one basis with neighbouring parcels. 
The methods section explains the experiment in depth.   
 
Cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour in economics and environmental 
economics has been studied through behavioural economics and game theory (Ostrom, 1990; 
1998; Camerer, 2003; Zizzo and Tan, 2007; Bayer et al., 2009; Banerjee et al., n.d.; 
Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007). In addition to mathematical models, 
behavioural economics in relation to public goods have been well addressed by experimental 
economists since the 1970s (Smith, 1991; Ostrom, 1994; Cherry et al., 2008). Experimental 
methods have been proved to be a useful tool to inform public policy (Friedman and Sunder, 
1994; Ferraro, 2005). They have been used to test different aspects of theory (see for 
instance the large volume of literature on experimental research in public goods). Amongst 
other applications, laboratory experimental methods have been used to investigate patterns 
of behaviour, to study how people coordinate actions, and to test economic incentives for 
conservation, biodiversity and emissions trading (Segerson, 1988; Vossler et al., 2002; 
Cason and Plott, 1996; Zelmer, 2003; Warziniack et al., 2007; Parkhurst et al., 2002).  
 
The discussion in relation to these subjects is vibrant and has become more important 
in the light of ecosystem services delivery at the landscape scale, climate change (and 
therefore carbon sequestration) and the use of market-based instruments (see for instance 
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TEEB, 2010). Inspired by game theory and the literature on agglomeration ‘bonuses’, I 
present the results of a lab experiment played with land managers that aimed at testing a ‘1-
2-1 coordination bonus’ incentive that aimed to stimulate cooperation across adjacent parcels 
for the implementation of ecological networks.  
The chapter answers the following research question: ‘How efficient will an 
economic incentive be in encouraging cooperation between adjacent holdings in order 
to influence changes in land use patterns for conservation practices (the 
implementation of ecological networks)?’ 
I follow two research aims:  
1. To assess factors which stimulate or constrain cooperation practices to deliver 
environmental services. 
2. To evaluate what the appropriate economic incentives are for stimulating 
cooperation at the landscape scale.  
 
This chapter will 1) present the literature on PES that have landscape scale 
applications, 2) present and discuss the results of the experiments that tested a ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’ incentive to stimulate cooperation, 3) analyse the results in the light of 
behavioural game theory, 4) highlight how the results suggest opportunities for public 
policy, and 5) reflect on the method and consider the opportunities it offers for future 
research. 
 
 
There is a lack of data and experience regarding the performance of economic 
incentives to stimulate cooperation across adjacent habitats. As a result of this lack of data in 
Europe, and the very few cases around the world (see for instance Oregon’s Conservation 
  
 169 
Reserve Enhancement Program, see Oregon Department of Agriculture, 2005), the use of 
experimental economics is particularly relevant. Experimental methods offer an opportunity 
to collect new data, test theories and policy tools and report back on their scope (Friedman 
and Sunder, 1994).  
 
This research addresses three central problems that most research in experimental 
economics tends to overlook (Cherry et al., 2008):  a) One recurring critique (Cherry et al., 
2008) to the use of this method is that the lab experiments are carried out ‘context-free’, 
which sometimes makes the results irrelevant for real-life situations and of little interest to 
environmental policy. In contrast, the results of the experiments I carried out come from a 
specific context, informed by the qualitative data explored in previous chapters; b) the ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’ incentive was specifically designed to test landscape scale conservation 
and cooperation rather than generic ‘public goods’; c) our pool of participants were land 
managers: those who own and manage the land where the desired corridors were mapped by 
landscape ecologists (Kling, 2008).  
 
The chapter is organised into six sections. The first section presents the literature 
review on public goods, externalities and Payment for Environmental Services (PES), with 
particular focus on existing cases of PES that address landscape scale management. The 
second section presents behavioural game theory and related experimental methods. The 
third section describes the methods I used (experimental design and procedures), with the 
results recorded in section four. Sections five and six constitute the discussion and 
conclusion respectively.  
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5.1 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
5.1.1 Public Goods   
 
Classic authors had already recognised the need of state intervention for goods that are 
not profitable, and which the market is therefore unable to provide. Adam Smith (1723-
1790) identified three roles for the state in the provision of public goods: 1) to administer 
justice; 2) the national defence; 3) other enterprises of public interest that could never be 
profitable if undertaken privately. Along the same lines, many other authors assigned a role 
to the state in different degrees for the provision of public goods (e.g. John Stuart Mill and 
Jules Dupuit). However, it is Paul Samuelson who is best known for establishing the 
foundations and characteristics of public goods (see 1954 and 1955).  
 
Samuelson (1954 and 1955) explicitly identified two types of goods: private 
consumption goods and collective or public consumption goods. Private and collective 
goods are fundamentally different. For the former, the amount of consumption by one person 
reduces the availability for a second person and so on. The assumption behind collective 
goods is that consumption by one person does not subtract from any other individual’s 
consumption of that good (Samuelson, 1954). Samuelson used the polarised model of two 
extreme public and private goods and addressed only one characteristic of public goods: 
non-excludability. However, the literature on public goods recognised pure public goods and 
impure public goods; both with characteristics of non-excludable and non-rivalry.  
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Pure public goods are characterised as non-excludable and non-rivalry. A classic 
example of a pure public good is national defence or clean air because it is non-excludable 
and non-rivalry.  
Non-excludable refers to the consumption of a good by one person that does not 
exclude another person from consuming exactly the same amount. In other words, there is no 
zero-sum effect whereby the more one persons consumes the less there is left for others. 
Consequently, it is not possible to price the good and charge people for their consumption. In 
economic theory, common good resources such as fish-stocks are considered non-
excludable, but this is based on the assumption that stocks can constantly be renewed which, 
of course, is not the case.  
 
Non-rivalry refers to the consumption of the good by one person, which does not 
reduce the possibility of others consuming or enjoying it simultaneously independently of 
the any quantification of the consumption (as is the case of watching a movie in the cinema 
for instance, or admiring a landscape). In other words there is no competition for use of the 
good. 
 
That biodiversity should be considered a pure public good is a contested idea. It can 
be argued that biodiversity excludes people in some places, as access to resources is 
delimited by property rights (for instance, bird watching on private land). Furthermore, it can 
be suggested that biodiversity creates excludability between present and future generations, 
because the amount of biodiversity available to future generations depends on how we 
consume and manage it today. In other words, biodiversity can be seen as an excludable and 
rivalry good.  
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However, if we accept the following definition of biodiversity, then we can consider 
it a pure public good: ‘the variability among living organisms from all sources including, 
terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems’ (CBD, 
1992). With this definition, provision of biodiversity at the landscape scale does not exclude 
people from benefiting from it at the local or global scale. Neither does the benefit taken by 
one person create competition with others to take the same benefits. These two 
characteristics of non-exclusion and non-rivalry make biodiversity a pure public good. From 
the standpoint of social optimal biodiversity, as with other public goods, is under-provided 
(Hodge and Reader, 2007). This common problem of under provision of public goods is 
known for being a ‘market failure’.  
 
All other possible combinations across the spectrum of private-public goods 
characteristics are identified as impure public goods. The rationale of most types of impure 
public goods is that the units consumed by one person will affect positively or negatively the 
units consumed by another person. In other words, changes in welfare for each unit 
consumed equals the difference between the values attached to the resource by person 1 and 
the costs incurred by person 2 because the resource is crowded (Randall, 1983; Olson, 1971; 
Buchanan, 1965). Some of these impure public goods are called ‘open access resources’, 
‘club goods’ and ‘common-pool resources’.  
 
Landscape scale biodiversity management highlights an old common problem when 
correcting market failure for provision of public goods: free-riding and social dilemmas. 
These occur when ‘individuals in interdependent situations face choices on which the 
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maximisation of short-term self-interest yields outcomes leaving all participants worse off 
than feasible alternatives’ (Ostrom, 1998:1).  
In public goods dilemmas, all people who would benefit from the provision of public 
goods find it costly to contribute and would prefer others to pay for the good. In principle, 
because biodiversity is non-excludable and creates no rivalry between individuals, there is a 
risk that every person will try to free-ride in the hope that others will pay for the provision of 
the service (although this can be arguable at the local scale where, for instance, property 
rights exclude people from enjoying the view of scenery or species). If everyone follows this 
behaviour then biodiversity is underprovided or not provided at all, despite the fact that 
every person would be better off if they contributed to the provision. This is illustrated by 
ecological networks. If a group of people are paid for the implementation of ecological 
networks but only a small number of them are willing to participate, and there are others 
within the ecological network who do not want to put in their share of the effort or work, 
then there is a problem of free-riding. The behaviour of those who do not participate affects 
the welfare of those who do, and society in general, because biodiversity is not achieved. At 
the same time, people unwilling to participate in the network are free-riding the benefits 
created by those participating. This social dilemma is created because there is a need for 
cooperative behaviour amongst those who own or manage the land where the ecological 
network is planned. 
 
5.1.2 Externalities 
Public goods and externalities are a market failure and recurrently lead to inefficient 
allocation of resources. For the purposes of this research, externalities are understood as 
external economies: ‘external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers an 
appreciable benefit (or inflict[s] an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who 
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were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or 
indirectly to the event in question’ (Meade 1973, in Cornes and Sandler, 1986: 29). This 
definition refers to the lack of appropriate institutions (markets) to allocate resources. There 
is a lack of information on the actual outcome of these external economies and, therefore, 
there is a problem with no use or inappropriate use of institutions (Cornes and Sandler, 1986: 
29-47).  
 
This definition leaves aside the question of the ‘intentionality’ of producing these 
side-effects or externalities. It is, however, important to note that when these are 
intentionally produced there may be an opportunity cost attached. External economies and 
diseconomies are often underpaid services or impose a cost on other parties, creating a 
Pareto suboptimal allocation.  
 
Different institutions are needed in this context to ‘internalise these externalities’, 
that is, to control pollution and compensate for the cost of producing social benefits. Crucial 
to this is the type of institution. There are two main views: those who advocate governmental 
intervention following Cecil Pigou (1920), and those who criticise it, inspired by Ronald 
Coase’s (1960) school of thought. Existing economic incentives for conservation are based 
on both views and use a combination of both schools of thought. In the following section, I 
present existing economic incentives for conservation with regard to landscape scale. 
 
5.1.3 Economic incentives  
Economic incentives are payments to land managers who voluntarily commit to 
participate in conservation practices or who receive a payment for conservation outcomes 
(OECD, 2008). In environmental economics, researchers dealing with spatial economics 
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have focused on spatial interconnections and, more recently, on adjacent cross-boundary 
management (Vokoun et al., 2010; Koskela and Ollikainen, 2001; Swallow and Wear, 1993; 
Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007). Some of the obvious issues related to spatial problems are 
diffuse pollution (non-point source pollution), for which Segerson (1988) and other authors 
(Vossler et al., 2002; Segerson and Wu, 2006 amongst others) have proposed ambient-based 
mechanisms (tax/subsidy, fixed penalty and tax/subsidy combined with fixed penalty used 
depending on ambient pollution levels).  
Cross-boundary management has also been studied, and in recent years the 
‘agglomeration bonus’ literature has grown (Smith and Shogren, 2001 and 2002; Parkhurst 
et al., 2002; Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2009). Despite the growing 
literature on spatial matters, there are but few existing examples of economic incentives (as I 
present in the following sections).  
 
I will now present incentives that are designed or have an effect on landscape scale 
and that pay for positive externalities rather than impose penalties for negative externalities 
(for example, taxes for pollution). I present the principle of Payment for Environmental 
Services or PES (others call this Payments for Ecosystem Services or PES)28 and, within 
this, the modalities of Payment by Result (PBR) and Agri-Environmental Schemes (AES). 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
28 The difference between these terms is that ‘ecosystem’ here refers to the four services identified by the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) of provisioning (e.g. food and fibre), regulating (e.g. water regulation), cultural (e.g. 
aesthetic values) and supporting (e.g. soil formation). In contrast, environmental services are identified as the ecosystem 
providing services (e.g. forest, coral reef). It is also used to denote ‘emission-reduction technologies’ or ‘environmental 
impact assessments’ (McAfee and Shapiro, 2010). 
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i) Payment for Environmental Services (PES) 
PES are defined as the ‘voluntary transaction in which a well-defined environmental 
service (ES), or a form of land use likely to secure that service, is bought by at least one ES 
buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if the provider continues to supply 
that service (conditionality)’ (Wunder, 2005, see Chapter 1).  
 
Although none of the PES are specifically orientated to achieve landscape-scale 
management, some of them are de facto being implemented at scales larger than the holding 
because the payment is made to communities rather than individuals. Such is the case of the 
‘PES-like scheme’29 for carbon-sequestration paid by the Dutch Face the Future Foundation 
for reforestation in Ecuador and different parts of Africa,30 or the Scolel Te project in 
Mexico (Tipper, 2002). Other examples are the Mexican payments made to community land 
holdings - called ‘ejidos’31 (Muñoz-Piña et al., 2008; Brechin et al., 2002), and the Costa-
Rican, Colombian and Nicaraguayan projects on regional integrated silvopastoral 
Ecosystems Management (Pagiola et al., 2007). Other PES-like examples are the watershed-
scale payments, see for instance: Asquith & Wunder (2008); Southgate & Wunder (in press); 
and also the ‘watershed markets’ initiative.32   
 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 There are many examples of public policy on conservation in the world that use the PES approach, but most of them are 
‘PES-like schemes’ that do not fulfil exactly the definition presented above (Wunder, 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Munoz-Piña 
et al., 2008; Barton et al., 2008; Kalacskaa et al., 2008; Lipper et al., 2009). 
30 http://www.face-thefuture.com/projects/community-reforestation-projects, (accessed on 25/Nov/2011). 
31 Ejidos are a type of common property rights. The PES-like payments are made to the Ejido in which a committee makes 
the decision on how to spend the money for the whole area under the scheme. 
32 See the website at: http://www.watershedmarkets.org/casestudies/Colombia_Fuquene_E.html. 
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ii) Payment by Result (PBR) 
Payment-by-result (PBR) schemes are an approach to target PES towards outcome-
based payments which are adjusted according to the quantities and qualities of the 
environmental outcome (Schwarz et al., 2008). PBR can be made in money or in kind to 
individuals or groups (Albers and Ferraro, 2006).  
PBR stimulates farmers to be more proactive by using their ecological knowledge to 
provide the environmental outcome. It is more cost-efficient because it could attract high 
cost farms, rather than low cost farms where AES represent a significant income (Schwarz et 
al., 2008; Matzdorf and Lorenz, 2010; Groth, 2009). One of the problems with this method is 
the high uncertainty because environmental outcomes are difficult to measure (Schwarz et 
al., 2008; Hanley et al., 2012).  
There are few existing practices of PBR around the world and most of those in place 
occur at the holding scale (Mishra et al., 2003; Flintan, 2002; Ferraro and Gjertsen, 2009; 
Pagiola et al., 2007; Morton et al., 2006), although some authors, such as Casey and Boody 
(2007), discuss issues of indicators at the national, regional and farm scale (Schwarz et al., 
2008 also discuss landscape scale needs). 
Exceptions of PBR at larger scale are: Auction for Landscape Recovery in Australia 
which encourages joint applications across adjacent holdings (Reeson et al, 2011); and 
Conservation Performance Payments in Sweden for wolves and Iynx conservation (Zabel 
and Holm-Müller, 2008). In the latter case, payments are made to Sami individuals or village 
administrators and the decision about how to pay is made collectively or by an elected 
committee (Zabel and Holm-Müller, 2008).  
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iii) Agri-environmental Schemes (AES)  
AES are a ‘PES-like scheme’ (OECD, 2010). They are ‘action-based’ schemes that 
pay farmers who follow a prescribed set of action and management practices and are 
independent of the outcome of those actions. 
 
Chapter 2 presented the rationale behind AES. Therefore, here I refer only to the few 
exceptions of AES that are at a scale larger than the holding, notably the Meadow Birds 
Agreements in the Netherlands (Verhulst et al., 2007) and the Hedgerows Planting scheme in 
Denmark (Kristensen, 2001; Busck et al., 2007).  
 
As I noted in chapter 2, since 1994 in the Netherlands ‘agri-environment collectives’ have 
become an important channel for AES implementation (Verhulst et al., 2007). The 
Hedgerows Planting scheme requires application for a surface of 100 ha. per application and 
the collectives are crucial for application.  
 
The Hedgerows scheme began in Denmark in the 1800s and has continued to the 
present day (Kristensen, 2001; Busck et al., 2007). The scheme aims to prevent soil erosion 
and to increase biotopes and ecological networks on agricultural lands. According to 
Schwarz et al. (2008), individuals as well as collectives can apply for the schemes and in 
2005, 78% of applicants were collectives.  
 
Other AES which have characteristics for the landscape scale are, Rural priorities in 
Scotland (see chapter 2); the Higher Level Stewardship in the UK, which requires the entry 
of three farms; common land in England; the Top-Tier AES in Wales (Mills et al., 2006). 
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iv) Existing ‘Bonus’ schemes 
The key exception regarding landscape scale schemes is Oregon’s Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program. The payment is made by a partnership created between the 
State of Oregon and the US Department of Agriculture Farm Service Agency. This action-
based scheme for riparian areas offers, in addition to the standard costs calculation, a ‘bonus’ 
when land managers enrol ‘over 50% of the streambank in a 5-mile segment of a stream into 
the scheme’ (Oregon Department of Agriculture, 2005: 4).    
 
Apart from this exception, all other existing schemes present limitations regarding 
landscape scale conservation payments. Questions about how to create cooperative 
behaviour between land managers at low transaction costs are very much of interest, not only 
for biodiversity but also in the light of ecosystem services delivery and climate change. The 
‘agglomeration bonus’ literature proposes to pay land managers a ‘bonus’ for contiguous 
management practices, similar to that found in Oregon’s program (mentioned above). I 
develop the discussion on the possibilities of an ‘agglomeration bonus’ in the following 
sections. This is based on my prospective experimental data as, to the best of my knowledge, 
there is no other scheme similar to the Oregon case existing in practice. 
 
I address cooperation from an economic perspective. In economics, cooperation 
amongst individuals has been studied through behavioural game theory: I discuss this in the 
next section. 
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5.2  BEHAVIOURAL GAME THEORY WITH EXPERIMENTAL METHODS 
The first rare, sporadic applications of experimental methods in economics started in 
the 1940s and continued to the 1960s (Chamberlin, 1948; Hoggatt, 1959; Siegel and 
Fouraker, 1961; Smith 1962). Major developments in this method took place during the 
1970s and 1980s, when experimentalists started to test market institutions and provide 
evidence for economic theory. Vernon Smith (1976), Bohm (1972), Scherr and Babb (1975), 
have used lab and field experimental studies to provide evidence to solve the free rider 
problem in public goods, as well as to test incentive-compatible mechanisms for the 
provision of public goods proposed by Thompson (1965) and Clarke (1971), amongst others.  
Classic subjects tested in these studies are the Pigouvian taxes and Coasean bargaining; these 
are used to provide evidence on how to solve problems of externalities, to test new 
incentives and market institutions, and other social dilemmas such as common-pool 
resources (Smith, 1991; Ostrom et al., 1994; Ostrom et al., 1992).33  
 
I do not aim to present an exhaustive account of the extensive literature on 
experimental environmental economics, but rather to present the general ideas underlying 
my own design and to discuss this within the ‘agglomeration bonus’ literature that was my 
model (Albers et al., 2008; Smith and Shogren, 2001, 2002; Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst 
and Shogren, 2007; Grout, 2009; Michael, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2009). Work in 
experimental economics very often addresses pragmatic environmental problems. This is the 
case for this research; as such, it was important to carry out the research with land managers 
playing the games and to contrast this information with the qualitative information presented 
in previous chapters. Therefore, I used descriptive statistics, decision trees and utilised the 
                                                        
33 See also the experimental work on emission trading programs and international GHG (for instance: Mestelman, 1998; 
Bohm and Carlen, 1999; Soberg, 2000; Cason, 2003). 
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ideas of game theory to design the experiments. I did not use any mathematical modelling to 
describe the experiments. Precisely because this is the first exercise of this type within the 
agglomeration literature, it presents limitations and strengths which I highlight in the 
conclusion.  
 
5.2.1 Behavioural Game theory  
Game theory is a mathematical tool used to describe and analyse situations of 
conflict, cooperation and coordination (Gächter, 2004: 486).34  
 
On the other hand, games [not game theory] ‘are a taxonomy of strategic situations’ 
(Camerer, 2003: 3).  
Furthermore, behavioural game theory is a branch of behavioural economics and 
searches for empirical information about how humans behave in strategic situations: in other 
words it studies what players actually do in games (Gächter , 2004; Camerer, 2003: 3).  
 
Games and experiments are a rich methodology applicable to thousands of different 
phenomena. Here I only discuss experiments that use game theory on non-cooperation (that 
require coordination) and cooperation games with multiple equilibria. Non-cooperation 
games are when players cannot ‘collude’; therefore, they cannot bind agreements and they 
have to take decisions independently. In cooperation games, players can make agreements 
with each other to coordinate their preferences through ‘cheap talk’. Within the experimental 
                                                        
34 In rational player models, as the name suggests, it is common to assume that players are rational, that they understand the 
strategic situation, and will always maximise their preferences given their rational beliefs about the behaviour of other 
players (Gächter, 2004). Carmerer notes, ‘Analytical game theory is based on a highly mathematical derivation of what 
players with different cognitive capabilities are likely to do in games’ (Carmerer, 2003, p. 3). It is based in introspection 
and guesses rather than careful observation of how people actually play the game (Camerer, 2003, p.3).  
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literature ‘cheap talk’ refers to when players can make (costless) announcements and talk 
with others (they may or may not respect their agreements).  
 
Classic examples of non-cooperation games are, ‘battle of the sexes’, ‘market entry 
games’ and ‘payoff-asymmetric order-statistic games’, amongst many others. In all these 
examples a degree of coordination is needed in order to increase returns to players. The 
battle of the sexes is a game with asymmetric equilibria, where a couple will benefit from 
coordinating their choices (different preferences) to see a movie/show (Gibbons, 1992). In 
market entry games, coordination is needed because entrants’ returns decline with the 
number of entrants and is negative if the capacity of the market is exceeded (Sundali et al., 
1995; Duffy and Hopkins, 2005).  
In order to put this type of non-cooperation game with need of coordination into 
context, I present an example. Consider a farmer’s decision about extending his farmland or 
business. Imagine that farmer ‘A’ will normally expand, improve or change his business 
once every 10 years, and that he is in a position to do this, but his decision will depend on 
what the neighbouring farmer will do. The neighbouring farmer ‘B’ will retire soon and sell 
his land which represents a unique opportunity for farmer ‘A’. However, farmer ‘B’ may 
retire this year or in two or three more years. Farmer ‘A’ has to decide whether to keep the 
business as it is and wait for the neighbour to retire, or to improve and change other parts of 
the business and forget about the possibility of extending his farm land.  
 
Payoff-asymmetric order-statistic games were my inspiration in designing and 
running the experiment I present in this research. A classic example of this type of game is 
the ‘Wolf’s Dilemma’ or the ‘Stag hunt’ (Rydval and Ortmann, 2005; Camerer, 2003). 
These games follow the same idea presented above. Players have two choices: they may hunt 
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rabbits or stag. If they choose to hunt rabbit they earn ‘1’. If they choose to hunt stag they 
earn ‘2’; however, as the player cannot hunt stag alone, they earn ‘0’ if the other player does 
not choose to hunt stag (Camerer, 2003: 375). Similarly, in the game I present here players 
earn a ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ if they cooperate in adjacent holdings and earn less if they 
do not cooperate. The objective is that players coordinate their preferences and create the 
ecological corridor by aggregating adjacent holdings. This coordination is achieved through 
the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’, which gives extra earning when two players chose the same 
and only the same choice for two neighbouring parcels.  
 
The ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ game I tested is a coordination game which considers 
a social dilemma and treats public goods in a similar way to the prisoner’s dilemma. In 
public-goods social dilemmas, ‘individuals in mutually dependent situations face choices in 
which the maximisation of short-term self-interest yields outcomes which leave every 
individual worse off than if they all cooperate or coordinate their actions’ (Ostrom, 1998: 1). 
Social dilemmas are about trusting others. There are many examples of social dilemmas 
ranging from daily experiences to strategic international relations (Sandler, 1992), collective 
action (Olson, 1965), and many other examples (Smith, 1991; Ostrom, 1997). Biodiversity, 
as suggested previously, is an underprovided public good. The provision represents a social 
dilemma since people will be better off if everyone cooperates in the provision, but 
individuals prefer not to pay the associated costs. 
 
Following the similarity of the games described above and the requirements for the 
implementation of ecological networks, I used the ‘agglomeration bonus’ literature to design 
my own experimental game. The ‘agglomeration bonus’ literature refers concretely to 
landscape scale provision of biodiversity, or how to solve problems of fragmented 
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landscapes (Albers et al., 2008; Smith and Shogren, 2001, 2002; Parkhurst et al., 2002; 
Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; Grout, 2009; Michael, 2003; Banerjee et al., 2009; Shogren et 
al., 2003). 
Several authors (Smith and Shogren, 2001 and 2002; Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst 
and Shogren, 2007) have designed non-cooperative games with students as players, testing 
the effectiveness of an agglomeration ‘bonus’ for equilibrium behaviour in simultaneous 
move games. In their experimental session they presented players with a set of strategy 
combinations from which they were able to choose. The idea is that players received an 
agglomeration ‘bonus’ when contiguous neighbouring parcels were managed to create 
habitat connectivity. Parkhurst et al. (2002), found that voluntary mechanisms with no 
agglomeration ‘bonus’ created fragmented landscapes. With the agglomeration ‘bonus’, 
players found the first-best outcome, creating the habitat reserve. Many players preferred the 
lower risk option without coordination and created fragmented landscapes. When cheap talk 
(costless action) was introduced players chose the first-best habitat reserve (Parkhurst et al., 
2002; Warziniack et al., 2007).   
 
Albers et al. (2008) developed a spatially explicit game model to investigate land 
conservation patterns that arise under private and public agents. The authors argue that 
although socially-preferred low levels of fragmentation happen when all agents want 
agglomerated conservation, problems with coordination can still produce fragmented 
landscapes. They also found that very small ‘bonuses’ for conserving parcels next to 
conserved land also improved the conservation outcome in the model; however, this was not 
tested in an experiment (Albers et al., 2008). 
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5.3 METHODS (EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES) 
My experiments were based on a classic coordination game and aimed at testing an 
economic incentive, which I shall call ‘one-to-one (or 1-2-1) coordination bonus’, that 
stimulates cooperation for landscape configuration (ecological networks). I called the 
incentive ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ because the ‘bonus’ is given to players when they 
coordinate their actions from one neighbouring parcel to another, and therefore the 
coordination between land managers is on a ‘one-to-one’ basis (‘1-2-1’). That is when one 
player chooses to have the same choice in one of his parcels as his neighbour’s parcel. There 
were two types of ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ incentives: Agri-environmental Schemes 
(AES) + ‘bonus’ and Environmental Services (ES) + ‘bonus’. As in the real world, in the 
experiments AES schemes rewarded land managers for environmentally sensitive land 
management (for example, field margins). Consequently, land managers continue with 
commodity production in addition to these schemes. ES rewarded land managers for 
conversion of the entire parcel into the production of environmental services (for example, 
conversion into forestry or restoration of pond habitat).  
 
The experiments were run with land managers and, therefore, they played their real 
life role in a scenario situation. By inviting land managers to the experimental sessions, the 
aim was to achieve results which were a closer reflection of land managers’ real-life 
decisions: land managers played as if it was their business. With the experiments I tried to 
reproduce the real-life set of choices of economic incentives, business and conservation 
preferences. I let players (land managers) take decisions and balance these choices as they 
wished.  
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In the games there were different Nash equilibriums and players coordinated their 
actions by choosing the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’. The game was based on the standard 
model of non-cooperative games, therefore, contribution to the network by one player costs 
‘c< 1’. The contribution by one player to the ecological network gives K, and contributions 
by two players gives K + u and allows the creation of ecological networks. No contributing 
players gives ‘1 − e’ of the ecological network. In this game a Nash equilibrium is: 
 
K + u − c > K (1 − e) only if u and e are large enough.  
 
Cooperation gives the Nash equilibrium as presented in figure 5.1 (adapted from 
Camerer, 2003: 377).  
 
 
 
 (AES or ES) ‘bonus’ 
 
NO ‘bonus’ 
 
(AES or ES) ‘bonus’ 
 
K + u − c, K + u − c 
 
K − c, K (1 − e) 
 
NO ‘bonus’ 
 
K (1 − e), K – c 
 
0, 0 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Payoff with synergy and exclusion adapted from Camerer (2003: 377). 
 
This type of game is also known as ‘strategic complementarities’, in which the 
marginal productivity of one player’s strategy choice rises with the level of another’s 
strategy choice. An individual player benefits and the marginal productivity increases 
(earning more points) if another player coordinates with their actions, that is if another 
player’s strategy choice is the same.      
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A social optimum in these experiments was assumed to be reached when the 
networks were produced.  In other words, this was achieved when the ‘1-2-1 coordination 
bonus’ coordinated land managers’ private choices and stimulated land managers to uptake 
the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’. The ideal spatial configuration was identified as a 
combination of AES + ‘bonus’ and ES + ‘bonus’ and, therefore, the social optimum was 
reached when land managers chose to cooperate for both AES and ES. However, it was not 
desirable to have all parcels under ES and, in fact, it would not be possible for all the parcels 
to be under AES because of budget constraints. 
The experimental design and the experimental sessions were conceived so as to 
answer the research question defined earlier: How efficient will an economic incentive be 
in encouraging cooperation between adjacent holdings in order to influence changes in 
land use patterns for conservation practices (the implementation of ecological 
networks)? 
The experiments follow the standard procedural aspects of the methods of 
experimental economics. The general structure of the experiments was as follows: there were 
3 experimental sessions with 6 different players each. These were held on different dates. All 
players received instructions and an introduction to the experiments. The instructions were 
both spoken and written. Each player received an envelope with instructions, pen, paper, 
calculators, sheets to register their choices and count their points for each round, post-its of 
different colours corresponding to land-use choices and four ‘parcels’, two high quality land 
(in yellow) and two low quality land (in brown). Each experimental session consisted of 12 
rounds (see figure 5.2). The first 3 rounds were the control rounds; then the ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’ was introduced but players were not allowed to talk from rounds 4 to 8. 
From rounds 9 to 12, players were allowed to collude and coordinate their choices (cheap 
talk). In each round, players were asked to allocate each of their parcels against one of the 
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choices. All experiments were run with low technology (pen and paper), which allowed me 
to move around the study area to hold the separate sessions and have more different land 
managers participating.  
 
The 3 experimental sessions were each conducted with a different group of land 
managers as subjects (all participants manage land in the study area). First a letter of 
invitation was sent to 30 land managers with whom I had previously carried out an interview 
(see previous chapters). I asked them if they were willing to participate in the experimental 
sessions and offered them different options of dates, times and locations to carry out the 
experiments. I gave the participants limited information about the experiments to avoid 
influencing them before the experimental sessions. After two weeks I called the 30 land 
managers and started to form groups of 6 players. 15 land managers and 3 students (one per 
session) participated in 3 experimental sessions. I had to ask 3 students to play the 
experiment (one in each session) because a land manager cancelled immediately before the 
session and the design of the game required 6 players.  
 
Before I carried out the games with land managers, I also carried out three practice trials 
with students and staff of The James Hutton Institute.  
  
All participants in the experimental session were paid according to their decisions. 
Players were told at the beginning of the experiment that the number of points they earned 
during the sessions would be exchanged for money. At the end of each session I added the 
total number of money points and exchanged every 100 money points for £10. In addition, 
conservation points were calculated and the person with the most conservation points won a 
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natural history book at the end of each experimental session. I paid all participants travel 
expenses of £24 and offered them refreshments.  
 
Each experimental session lasted 3 hours with 20 minutes taken up with the 
introduction, presentation of the experiment and instructions. Each session consisted of a 
total of 12 rounds of 3 minutes.  Two experimental sessions with land managers were 
conducted at the Victory Community Hall in Aboyne, and one session with land managers 
was conducted at the James Hutton Institute (see figure 5.2 below).     
Figure 5.2 Experimental sessions showing rounds, number of players and location. 
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Control rounds (1 to 3). For the control rounds the ‘landscape’ was represented 
through a grid of 24 ‘parcels’ of irregular sizes (each parcel had a different number of 
adjacent parcels but each player had the same total number of adjacent parcels and the same 
chances for cooperating). These 24 parcels were subdivided into sets of four parcels, with 
each set allowing owners an equal chance to cooperate with the owners of neighbouring 
parcels. Each player was randomly allocated a set of four parcels. 
The four parcels allocated could be in one block of adjacent parcels or distributed in 
different subsets across the grid/landscape.  This reflected the reality on the ground in  
Deeside, where the operations of any given land manager could be carried out on holdings 
(either in direct ownership or as tenanted land) which were grouped in a single area or 
scattered across different areas. 
 
All participants were allocated two high quality parcels of land (HQP) and two low 
quality parcels of land (LQP) for production of food or fibres. They all had access to the 
same payoffs, which were based on ‘earning’ points (see table 5.1). In order to allow the 
experimental session to indicate what players’ (land managers) preferences were, I decided 
to give players the chance to earn ‘money points’ and/or ‘conservation points’. As such, I did 
not constrain their answers to maximising only money if this was not their preference (thus 
avoiding biasing the results).  
 
After each round, land managers counted the total of their earned payoff points. 
However, since the games simulated running a ‘business’ (participants played their real life 
role, that is land managers running a business) players had to show a certain ‘economic’ 
performance, which I established at earning ‘≥ 30’ money points in each round. A Player 
needed to reach ‘≥ 30’ to continue in business. When players had ‘< 30’ they were declared 
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bankrupt and the round was annulled. However, players were allowed to continue to play the 
following rounds.  In other words, the round was cancelled for them in terms of gaining 
points, but the results of these rounds were included in the data produced for analysis. At the 
end of the game, I aggregated the number of points players earned in each round, but did not 
take into account the rounds with less than 30 points. In this sense the game does not reflect 
a real-time progression as there is no path-dependency from one round to another. 
 
In table 5.1, I present the payoff that players received. The numbers were calculated 
as a proportion of what land managers would have earned by producing only commodity on 
high quality land. In other words, I assumed ‘1’ as the total maximum number of money 
points for one choice (i.e. commodity production in HQP) and proportions of this for all 
other choices, therefore: 
 
If HQP = 1 then   LQP = 0.6  for commodity production  
and HQP = 0.8 and LQP = 0.7  for AES  
and HQP/LQP = 0.5     for ES 
 
I assumed that players maximised their short-term self-interest and, therefore, would not 
contribute and pay the cost of providing biodiversity services when they chose commodity 
production only. Players willing to maximise their returns, and who did not have any interest 
in the provision of public goods, would choose commodity production in HQP. Players who 
were conservation-oriented would choose ES in either high or low quality parcels, because it 
implied complete conversion of the parcel (for instance, into forest or into a pond) for 
biodiversity services. Based on this information, in this game players received more points 
by applying for AES in LQP than by choosing commodity production, as table 5.1 shows.  
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Players earned conservation points according to their choices and level of 
commitment to biodiversity delivery. Therefore, when players chose commodity they did not 
earn conservation points; however, with ES players earned the maximum number of 
conservation points (3 points). With AES players earned 1 conservation point. I assumed that 
conservation services were the same in high quality and low quality land, as table 1 shows. 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Payoff for control rounds (1 to 3).  
 
Treatment rounds (4 to 8) had the same number of parcels and the same payoffs (a grid of 
24 parcels of irregular sizes), so players continued with the same resources. These rounds 
differed from the control rounds in the introduction of the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ for 
AES and PES options.  
 
It is important to note that between rounds players could see the aggregate results of their 
choices, thus allowing them to compare their outcomes between rounds. As such, although 
there was no real-time progression with a path-dependency from one round to another, an 
adaptive learning process was allowed to take place throughout the game (choices from the 
previous round could condition players’ choices in subsequent rounds). 
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Table 5.2 Payoffs for treatment rounds (4 to 12) 
 
In table 5.2, I present the treatment rounds (4 to 12). In these rounds players had the 
same options as the control rounds, plus 2 additional options. The new options gave players 
the option to earn extra points when they chose ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ and other players 
chose the same in two adjacent parcels: AES + ‘bonus’ or ES + ‘bonus’. For instance, if two 
players (X and Y) with adjacent parcels chose AES + ‘bonus’, ‘player X’ in high quality 
land and ‘player Y’ in low quality land, then they both earned the ‘bonus’ according to land 
quality: ‘player X’ gets 12 money points and 3 conservation points and ‘player Y’ gets 9 
money points with 3 conservation points. However, if one of the players defects their 
utilities are altered accordingly. If, for example, player Y defects then the points earned are 
as follows: ‘player X’ earns 8 money points and 1 conservation point (rather than the 10 
money points he could earn by choosing commodity, or 12 money points by coordinating 
choices with another player); ‘player Y’ earns 5 money points and 3 conservation points 
(rather than 6 by choosing commodity or 9 by coordinating choices).  
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In rounds 4 to 8, players were not allowed to talk to each other and they made 
simultaneous decisions. Therefore, players had to decide if they were ready to cooperate by 
choosing the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ incentive without knowing about their neighbour’s 
choices.  
 
In rational decision-making the assumption is that players will maximise their 
expected utilities (money points). In this game, allocating commodity, commodity for HQP 
and AES, AES for LQP were the dominance solutions because players were better off by 
choosing commodity and AES regardless of what other players chose. It is also payoff-
dominant and is the secure highest minimum set of values that a player can have. In other 
words, this represents the set of strategies that maximises the smaller earning that can be 
made with full trust and confidence from a player.  
 
The equilibrium AES + ‘bonus’, AES + ‘bonus’ is Pareto dominant because it is 
better than any other choice  (ES + ‘bonus’, ES + ‘bonus’ or commodity, commodity) and is 
the best choice for all players (in terms of money points). However, this choice requires trust 
in others, and although cooperation pays it is risky. In this assurance game players will only 
choose ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ if there is a high probability that others will choose the 
same (ES + ‘bonus’, ES + ‘bonus’ or AES + ‘bonus’, AES + ‘bonus’).  Strategic uncertainty 
arises from the conflict between the players’ common motives: players want to coordinate 
(on ‘1-2-1 bonus’, ‘1-2-1 bonus’) but also want to avoid the risk of getting a lower return (8 
or 5 rather than 10 or 12 points) if the other player does not choose to cooperate (see figure 
5.3). Choosing AES + ‘bonus’, AES + ‘bonus’ or ES + ‘bonus’, ES + ‘bonus’ is a ‘risk-
dominant’ strategy. 
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Other player A’s parcel 1 (high quality) 
 
 
AES + ‘bonus’ 
 
ES + ‘bonus’ Commodity 
 
AES + ‘bonus’ 
 
12, 12 
 
8, 5 
 
8, 10 
 
ES + ‘bonus’ 
 
5, 8 
 
10, 10 
 
 
5, 10 
 
 
Player’s 
B’s parcel 1 
(high 
quality) 
  
Commodity 
 
10, 8 
 
10, 5 
 
10, 10 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Normal-form game. The matrix shows the return for land managers for high quality parcels for the 
‘bonus’ and commodity production and Nash equilibriums (underlined).  
 
 
In figure 5.3, players can allocate ‘bonus’,‘bonus’, which is a pure-strategy Nash 
equilibrium. The choice commodity,commodity is also a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In 
Nash equilibriums players do not benefit from changing their strategies if other players do 
not change their own strategies. As the table shows, the best strategy for players is to 
coordinate their choices.  
 
Finally, in treatment rounds 4 to 8, once players had allocated their parcels, I 
revealed the choices made by all other players. Players were then able to see what their 
neighbours had chosen and count the number of points they earned. 
 
Treatment rounds with cheap talk (9 to 12). After round 8, I allowed players to 
collude and bind agreements (through ‘cheap talk’ which is a costless action). I revealed 
information about all parcel ‘owners’. Players found out who their neighbours were and 
agreed if, and with whom, they wanted to cooperate, and for which parcels. In addition, I 
restricted their choices by asking players to have at least one parcel under commodity.  
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5.3.1 DATA  
Players registered their choices on a sheet designed for the experiment: this was 
included in the envelope of materials I gave to participants at the beginning of the 
experimental session. Players used the same sheet to note the sum of their points per round. I 
entered all the information in an Excel spreadsheet in CSV (Comma delimited) format, 
which allowed me to use the files with ‘R’ software. I entered the following variables: 
experimental session, round number, test game (control, ‘bonus’ and ‘bonus’ with cheap 
talk), player number, type of tenure of the player (in real life), land capability (land quality), 
parcel number, parcel choice and money and conservation points (this information for each 
of the four parcels) and total number of money and conservation points earned (in Appendix 
F I present an extract of this information). With this information I carried out descriptive 
statistics and decision trees using classification and Regression Trees (CART) (Breiman et 
al., 1984).  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Extract of data entered from the experimental sessions for decision trees. 
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The descriptive statistics allowed me to see what players’ choices were and what the 
consequences of these choices were at the landscape scale. In other words, they indicated 
how efficient the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ was to encourage cooperation and allowed me 
to see the patterns created at the landscape scale. This information enabled me to answer my 
research question, indicated above. For the decision trees I used ‘land capability’ and ‘type 
of tenure’ as predictors and ‘test game’ as a dependent variable.  
 
I also wanted to understand players’ behaviour and establish what the patterns of 
cooperation were. I therefore carried out decision trees using Classification and Regression 
Trees (CART) (Breiman et al., 1984). For this component of the analysis I entered the 
following variables: experimental session, round number, parcel number, present and 
previous choice of the player in question, and the previous choice of all neighbouring parcels 
(how many parcels under the different choices) and land quality, as figure 6 shows. Previous 
choices by neighbouring parcels were used as predictors, while ‘present choices’ were used 
as the dependent variable. 
 
5.4. RESULTS  
 
This section comprises three aspects: 1) the results of the landscape patterns given 
the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ from a landscape ecology stand point; 2) how land managers 
behave as individuals and as a group from a behavioural game theory standpoint; 3) the 
consequences of the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ for public policy. 
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5.4.1. ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ and landscape patterns (landscape ecology 
perspective)  
The results showed that landscape scale patterns changed depending on rounds. 
Control rounds showed more parcels under commodity production. However, it was 
interesting to see that in all control rounds there were some parcels under AES and ES in the 
3 experimental sessions.  
 
Figure 5.5 Grids of control rounds in experimental Session 1. It shows the choices made by players in the first 
three rounds (Control rounds: no ‘bonus’ or cheap talk).  
 
In figures 5.5 to 5.7, I present the 24 parcel grid resulting from the experimental sessions 
with players’ choices and land capability. The choices are differentiated by colours: brown 
for commodity, green for AES and blue for ES. The land capability is differentiated by 
letters: ‘H’ for high quality and ‘L’ for low quality.  
  
 199 
  
Figure 5.6 Grids of control rounds in experimental session 2. It shows the choices made by players in the first 
three rounds (Control rounds: no ‘bonus’ or cheap talk). 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Grids of control rounds in experimental session 3. It shows the choices made by players in the first 
3 rounds (Control rounds: no ‘bonus’ or cheap talk).  
 
As the figures show, a large proportion of the high quality land was allocated to 
commodity production and low quality land was allocated to agri-environmental schemes or 
environmental services.  As we can see in the figures, players in experimental sessions 1 
(Fig. 5.5) and 3 (Fig. 5.7) changed their choices in each round, except for some of the high 
Grids of Control Rounds 1 to 3 (Exp. Session 2) 
Grids of Control Rounds 1 to 3 (Exp. Session 3) 
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quality land, which was constantly allocated to commodity production. In experimental 
session 2 (Fig. 5.6), players did not alter their choices greatly.  
 
The results show that land managers allocate low quality land to AES. Therefore, 
rather than a coherent spatial allocation of incentives to achieve biodiversity at the landscape 
scale, it is an allocation based on land quality (although low and high quality land are both 
equally valuable from an ecological point of view). In these conditions landscapes are 
fragmented.                            
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This fragmentation is exacerbated if land managers change their choices in each 
round and keep high quality land for commodity and low quality for whatever choice is more 
convenient (here AES or ES). It is, however, important to mention that players, here land 
managers (and 3 students), applied for AES or ES. In control rounds players made their 
decisions individually and information was kept private (i.e. no players were informed about 
other players’ choices).     
 
In rounds 4 to 8, I introduced the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’. Comparing these treatment 
rounds with the previous control rounds, most players gradually switched to AES + bonus 
regardless of land capability. In figure 5.8, I present players’ choices and land capabilty. 
Choices are in colours as follows: brown for commodity, green for AES + ‘bonus’ and blue 
for ES + ‘bonus’. Land capability is identified by letters: ‘H’ for high quality and ‘L’ for low 
quality.  In sessions 1 and 2 players gradually changed their allocation of land into green, 
which designates AES + ‘bonus’ for both low and high quality land. This is due to other 
players’ choices and the associated payoffs. The brown areas denote parcels allocated to 
commodity production. Experimental session 3 demonstrated no clear pattern.  
 
As we can see in figure 5.8, no network is formed, rather AES + ‘bonus’ (green parcels) 
dominate the landscape. Parcels in white represent AES or ES without ‘bonus’. As figures 
5.8 and 5.9 show, in experimental session 3 there is no clear pattern: the results of the 
experiments are very variable and therefore no clear pattern can be derived.  
 
This landscape, dominated by AES + ‘bonus’, could potentially be beneficial for the 
environment, for example by creating field margins or hedgerows across the landscape, 
which would benefit some (small) species such as bumble bees for pollination. 
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However, these areas do not offer enough robustness for bigger species (such as, say, 
capercaillie) as no ecological network is formed. Moreover, it is necessary to investigate 
whether doing this in the real world leads land mangers to intensify other parts of the parcel 
to compensate for the loss from the areas under the scheme (green ‘parcels’ are under AES 
and therefore commodity is still part of the production. Blue parcels are for services 
production only). The ideal ecological network, in this context, would be ES + ‘bonus’ 
(blue) creating the network and embedded in the AES + ‘bonus’ (green) scheme that 
dominated the landscape. In other words, we would ideally have commodity production 
framed in networks of hedgerows for small species and parcels under forest or other 
substantial habitat networks for bigger species.  
 
This pattern was clear in experimental session 2 (rounds 6 and 7) and apparent but 
less visible in experimental session 1. It was interesting to see that in experimental sessions 1 
and 3 ES + ‘bonus’ (blue) was always present, while in session 2 these parcels almost 
vanished. This is perhaps because the most profitable choice was AES + ‘bonus’, suggesting 
players in this session were more ‘rational’ regarding their choices.  
 
In rounds 9 to 12, when players were allowed to collude and forced to retain at least 
one parcel under commodity production, the landscape pattern changed again with more 
parcels under ES + ‘bonus’ (blue). This is because cheap talk was introduced. ‘Cheap talk’ is 
a costless action – in other words players could follow deception strategies – but it appears 
to have enhanced cooperation between players by coordinating their choices. This was 
particularly the case for sessions 1 and 3. Only in experimental session 2 was there no 
change; this group was more profit-oriented and the green parcels represented a higher 
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financial return. In experimental session 2 players followed the same strategies as they had 
in rounds 4 to 8.    
 
5.4.2. How land managers behave as individuals and as a group (behavioural 
economics perspective) 
The ways in which players, in this case land managers, made decisions and followed 
strategies is relevant to the understanding of landscape scale patterns and to the policy 
implications of the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ tested in the experiments.  
As noted earlier, all players were offered the same payoffs, therefore, they had equal 
chances of maximising their money or conservation points. Following the assumption of 
rationality, a player will maximise their expected utilities. Rationality in this experiment is 
reached by the allocation of parcels to a set of choices. I present below the allocation of a set 
of parcels, assuming rational behaviour, when: a) a player aims at maximising their utilities 
expressed in money points; b) a player aims at maximising their utilities expressed in 
conservation points.  
 
Allocation of parcels in control rounds (dominance solutions): 
 Money points maximisation. High quality land to commodity and low 
quality parcels to AES. Total: 34 money points and 2 conservation points. 
 Conservation points maximisation. High quality land to commodity 
production and low quality land to ES. Total: 30 money points and 6 conservation 
points. 
Allocation of parcels in treatment rounds 4 to 8 (with ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’, 
assuming there is coordination of choices of players. Pareto dominant): 
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 Money points maximisation. All parcels into AES + ‘bonus’. Total: 42 
money points and 12 conservation points. 
 Conservation points maximisation. All parcels into ES + ‘bonus’. Total: 36 
money points and 20 conservation points. 
Allocation of parcels for treatment rounds 9 to 12 (with ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’, cheap 
talk and at least one parcel under commodity, assuming there is coordination of choices of 
all players. Pareto dominant): 
 Money points maximisation. 3 parcels into AES + ‘bonus’ and 1 into 
commodity. Total: 40 money points and 9 conservation points. 
 Conservation points maximisation. 3 parcels into ES + ‘bonus’ and 1 into 
commodity. Total: 36 money points and 15 conservation points. 
The results show that players’ actions were close to  ‘rational behaviour’ only in session 2.  
 
Figure 5.10 Control rounds (1 to 3) of experimental session 2. Choices made by each player for money points 
(blue) and conservation (green). Each circle represents the total sum of money and conservation points that 
players had, and the choices they made for each parcel, for each round. The vertical grey lines denote the 
rounds (3 rounds). The red line marks the maximisation of utilities in money points, and the purple line 
represents the minimum conservation points that a player earned when they maximised utilities expressed in 
money points. The vertical axis shows the points. The horizontal axis shows the 6 players per round. For 
instance, player 1 in round 1 earned 30 money points with 4 conservation points; player 2 in round 2 earned 30 
money points with 6 conservation points; and player 6 in round 3 demonstrated ‘rational behaviour’ earning 34 
money points (the maximum) and 2 conservation points (the same as player 4 in round 1).  
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In the control rounds players’ choices were made individually, their choices were 
kept private and there was no strategic interaction. Therefore, the utilities were entirely the 
result of their individual choices: if they wanted to maximise utilities (money or 
conservation) they could do so. As figure 5.10 shows, there were only two players who 
maximised their money points’ utilities (as indicated on the red line). In other rounds, 2 
players in one round and 3 players in another round decided to maximise their conservation 
points demonstrating ‘rational behaviour’ and gaining 30 money points and 6 conservation 
points (as figure 13 shows). Graph 5.10 shows the general tendency in the 3 experimental 
sessions, where a few players ‘behave rationally’ by maximising their money or 
conservation utilities. I present these results in Appendix G for the control groups. In all 
sessions, a player was bankrupt on only one occasion (< 30 money points).  
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Control rounds (1 to 3) of experimental session 2. Choices made by each player for money points 
(blue) and conservation (green). Each circle represents the total sum of money and conservation points that 
players had and the choices they made for each parcel, for each round. The vertical grey lines denote the rounds 
(3 rounds). The red line shows the minimum number of money points that players earned when they tried to 
maximise conservation points. The purple line represents the maximum number of conservation points that a 
player earned. The vertical axis shows the points. The horizontal axis shows the 6 players per round. For 
instance, player 3 in round 1 earned 30 money points with 6 conservation points (the rational behaviour for 
maximisation of utilities expressed in conservation points); player 5 in round 2 earned 33 money points with 4 
conservation points. 
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Figure 5.11 shows that 2 players in one round and 3 players in the other two rounds 
maximised their conservation points (green circles on the purple line); they achieved 30 
money points which allowed them to ‘stay in business’ and followed a ‘rational behaviour’ 
of maximising their conservation utilities.  
 
In rounds 4 to 8, the ‘bonus’ was introduced. In these rounds of strategic interaction, 
players had the opportunity to coordinate their choices and increase their productivity when 
their strategy choice was the same as another player’s strategy choice. The dominance 
solution in these rounds was AES + ‘bonus’ if other players coordinated their choices. 
However, players would have secured the highest minimum set of values by choosing 
commodity and AES without the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’.   
 
The results show that for the case of maximising their money utilities, 4 players in 
experimental session 2 showed rational behaviour and reached their dominance solution 
from rounds 4 and 5 to 8 (figure 5.12). In experimental session 1, 2 players reached this 
point in round 8. In session 3, 2 players in rounds 1 and 3 maximised their money utilities 
(Appendix H).  
 
The results showed that no single player tried to coordinate their choices to maximise 
their conservation points, as figure 5.12 indicates and Appendix H shows for sessions 1 and 
3.   
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Figure 5.12 Treatment rounds 4 to 8 of experimental session 2. Choices made by each player for money points (blue) and 
conservation (green). Each circle represents the total sum of money and conservation points that players had and the choices 
they made for each parcel, for each round. The vertical grey lines denote the rounds (5 rounds). The red line marks the 
minimum number of money points that players earned when they tried to maximise money points. The purple line 
represents the maximum number of conservation points that a player earned. The vertical axis shows the points. The 
horizontal axis shows the 6 players per round. For instance, player 2 in round 1 earned 33 money points with 8 conservation 
points (the rational behaviour for maximisation of utilities expressed in money points); player 3 in round 1 earned 40 money 
points with 16 conservation points.  
 
 
Figure 5.13 Treatment rounds 4 to 8 of experimental session 2. Choices made by each player for money points (blue) and 
conservation (green). Each circle represents the total sum of money and conservation points that players had and the choices 
they made for each parcel, for each round. The vertical grey lines denote the rounds (5 rounds). The red line marks the 
minimum number of money points that players earned when they tried to maximise conservation points. The purple line 
represents the maximum number of conservation points that a player earned. The vertical axis shows the points. The 
horizontal axis shows the 6 players per round. For instance, player 2 in round 1 earned 33 money points with 8 conservation 
points (the rational behaviour for maximisation of utilities expressed in money points); player 3 in round 1 earned 40 money 
points with 16 conservation points.  
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Figures 5.12 and 5.13 clearly show that most players in session 2 showed rational 
behaviour where they maximised their money points. These results contrast with other 
sessions where players did not coordinate their strategic choices and some preferred to 
secure their earnings and/or diversify their choices. Figure 5.14 and Appendix H show the 
results of experimental session 1.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 Treatment rounds 4 to 8 of experimental session 1. Choices made by each player for money points 
(blue) and conservation (green). Each circle represents the total sum of money and conservation points that 
players had and the choices they made for each parcel, for each round. The vertical grey lines denote the rounds 
(5 rounds). The red line marks the minimum number of money points that players earned when they tried to 
maximise money points. The purple line represents the maximum number of conservation points that a player 
earned. The vertical axis shows the points. The horizontal axis shows the 6 players per round. For instance, 
player 1 in round 1 earned 36 money points with 12 conservation points. 
 
The outcome of the experimental sessions showed that no single round demonstrated 
Pareto dominance, despite the fact that a number of players behaved rationally (especially in 
session 2).   
 
For all 3 sessions, in rounds 4 to 8 only 7 players out of 18 progressively reached 
their dominance solution and maximised their utilities in money points. Some of them 
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reached this point in round 4, others in round 7, but all of them gradually found the 
maximisation point and once there maintained same strategy over the remaining rounds. 
These results suggest that those players were willing to coordinate their strategies with their 
neighbours (and actively looked to do so) and, consequently, were willing to risk a loss if 
their neighbours did not want to cooperate.  
These players trusted other players and took more risks. Other players did not 
maximise utilities and did not demonstrate a ‘rational behaviour’ of maximisation, they did 
not trust others or were not willing to take risks. However, since their earnings depended on 
other players’ strategic choices, in some cases even if they wanted to maximise their 
earnings it was not possible as they were affected by their neighbours. In Appendix J, I 
present the figures showing individual choices for the 18 players.        
 
In the last 4 rounds (9 to 12) of the experimental session players were allowed to 
collude, but their choices were constrained as at least one parcel had to be allocated to 
commodity production. Players decided whether or not to cooperate, and identified which 
neighbours they wanted to cooperate with. 
 
The results are very different from one experimental session to another. However, 
again in experimental session 2, players behaved more ‘rationally’ than in the other sessions. 
This session clearly showed a strategy of maximisation (money points). It was interesting to 
observe that, when players were able to collude, once they had reached an agreement they 
kept the same strategy for the rest of the rounds (as figure 5.15 shows). This result suggests 
that once ‘uncertainty’ is removed and players are able to trust others, cooperation becomes 
easier. This is confirmed by the results I presented in previous chapters where I considered 
collaboration practices. Land managers tend towards cooperation if they have a common 
  
 212 
interest. In this case, the interest in common would be to earn the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ 
(in money and/or conservation points).  
 
 
Figure 5.15 Treatment rounds 9 to 12 of experimental session 2. Choices made by each player for money 
points (blue) and conservation (green). Each circle represents the total sum of money and conservation points 
that players had and the choices they made for each parcel, for each round. The vertical grey lines denote the 
rounds (5 rounds). The red line marks the minimum number of money points that players earned when they 
tried to maximise money points. The purple line represents the maximum number of conservation points that a 
player earned. The vertical axis shows the points. The horizontal axis shows the 6 players per round. For 
instance, players 4, 5 and 6 in round 1 earned 40 money points with 9 conservation points (maximisation of 
utilities in money points) and they kept the same strategic choices over the remaining 4 rounds.  
 
In sessions 1 and 3, players changed their strategies in each round, suggesting that 
they chose to cooperate with different neighbours in each round or decided to change the 
allocation of their parcels every time. In sessions 1 and 3, players were closer to maximising 
their conservation utilities. I present the figures in Appendix I.  
 
I analysed the data to interpret what individuals chose to do and how they allocated 
their parcels. As noted earlier, some players took more risks than others and some players 
behaved rationally by maximising their utilities in money points or, more rarely, in 
conservation points. I also analysed the results of the behaviour of the group and considered 
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how players influenced other players’ choices. I ran decision-trees (see section 5.3.1), for 
rounds 4 to 8.  
 
The results show two meaningful groups of players: a) self-reliant and b) other-
dependent. The self-reliant group were those who chose AES or ES + ‘bonus’ predicting 
that others would do the same (assurance game) and, therefore, aimed at maximising their 
utilities. These players trusted their neighbours by choosing a ‘risk-dominant’ strategy of 
AES or ES + ‘bonus’. They could have chosen instead to secure the highest minimum set of 
values that a player can achieve.  
 
The other-dependent group, were those players who made their decisions based on 
what others had chosen.  According to the results, other-dependent players will change their 
decision if, and only if, there are more than 2.5 neighbours that have chosen differently from 
them (i.e. when other players choose AES + ‘bonus’, then they will adopt the same strategy 
as their neighbours). I present the results in figure 5.16. 
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Figure 5.16 Decision tree for rounds 4 to 8 for all experimental sessions. Looking at the decision tree, the self-reliant group 
includes those players who chose AES + ‘bonus’ (red circle, to the right as we see the figure); all other players are at the left 
of the figure. Within this subgroup, players that are more other-dependent are the subgroup at the left of the figure (green 
circle) and all other players are at the right. The last subgroup on the right shows all those players who have chosen option 
‘A’ (commodity production) from the beginning: these players would not change their choices, regardless of what other 
players have chosen. Behaving along similar lines are those who have chosen option ‘E’ (environmental services + ‘bonus’) 
from the beginning and will not change their choice no matter what others chose.  
 
 
5.4.3. The ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ and its consequences for public policy 
The results show interesting information that could inform public policy on decisions 
about conservation and improve existing economic incentives. Information about players’ 
choices and their consequences for policy are presented below.  
 
In order to establish what players’ choices were, I ran a decision tree for decision-
making at individual levels, taking into account the following variables (as indicated in 
section 5.3.1): type of game, land tenure and land quality as predictors; players and their 
choices as the dependent variable. I present the decision tree in figure 5.17 for all players in 
rounds 1 to 8 (control and treatment groups with ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’).  
 
Decision Trees (Rounds 4 to 8, ES 1, 2 
& 3) 
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Figure 5.17 Decision-tree for all rounds for the 3 experimental sessions. The figure shows that a group of players chose ‘D’ 
AES-’bonus’ scheme (red circle). A subgroup based their decisions on the land quality of their parcels: high quality land 
was allocated to ‘A’ commodity production (green circle). For all other players, and for all other land qualities, players 
changed their decisions based on the type of tenancy they had: owners of small properties tended to choose AES without 
the ‘bonus’ (blue circle) and all other players chose ES without the ‘bonus’ (grey circle).  
 
The decision trees showed that a group of players chose ‘D’, the AES + ‘bonus’ 
scheme, as the scheme offered a good reward. Players from another subgroup were found to 
base their decisions on the land quality of their parcels:  in the majority of cases, the high 
quality land was allocated to ‘A’ which represented commodity production. Finally, for all 
other players, and for all other land qualities, players changed their decisions depending on 
the type of tenancy they had: in the majority of cases, owners of smallholdings chose AES 
without the ‘bonus’ and all other players chose ES without the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’.  
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Figure 5.18 Allocation of parcels by experimental session. The vertical axis shows the experimental session (ES1 starting 
at the bottom of axes) and the rounds (R1) for control rounds in sessions 1 to 3 (e.g. ES1-R1 reads: Experimental Session 1 
– Round 1; ES2-R2: Experimental Session 2- Round 2, etc.). The horizontal axis shows the percentages of land allocated to 
each of the three choices players had in control rounds. Red indicates parcels allocated to commodity, green shows parcels 
allocated to AES and blue indicates parcels allocated to ES. 
 
When examining how players allocated their parcels, the results show that in all 
experimental sessions and all rounds players chose all options available to them: commodity, 
AES and ES, with or without the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ scheme. In the control groups 
(rounds 1 to 3), only five high quality parcels were allocated to areas other than commodity 
production. Almost all low quality land parcels were allocated to AES or ES. In 
experimental session 1, parcels allocated to commodity production represented between 25% 
and 35% of the total allocation of parcels to all choices; in experimental session 2, 35% and 
42% of the total allocation was to commodity production; and in session 3, between 38% 
and 50% of the total allocation of parcels was to commodity production, as figure 5.18 
shows.  
Allocation of parcels to commodity production changed dramatically when the ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’ was introduced. As figure 5.19 shows, players allocated high quality 
and low quality parcels to AES or ES + ‘bonus’, reducing the commodity production in 
some cases to 0% of the total allocations or to 25% in other cases. This suggests that if there 
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was a ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ incentive, land managers would be willing to change their 
production practices by taking up the scheme AES or ES + ‘bonus’.  
 
 
Figure 5.19 Allocation of parcels by experimental session. The vertical axis shows the experimental session (ES1) and the 
rounds (R4) for treatment rounds 4 to 8. The horizontal axis shows the percentages of land allocated to each of the five 
options players were given. Red indicates parcels allocated to commodity, green shows parcels allocated to AES + ‘bonus’ 
and blue indicates parcels allocated to ES + ‘bonus’; grey shows parcels allocated to AES or ES without the ‘bonus’.  For 
instance, in experimental session 2 (ES2) rounds 6 and 7 (R6 and R7), players allocated 93% and 95% of the parcels to 
AES + ‘bonus’, 13% and 5% to ES + ‘bonus’ and 0% to commodity. It is important to note that AES + ‘bonus’ allows 
commodity production.  
 
More generally, the figures presented in this section suggest that public policy and 
AES could potentially be targeted towards low quality parcels of land in a coherent manner 
in order to achieve ecological networks development.  Alternatively, this could be achieved 
by an AES scheme, which pays land managers the usual payment (costs of implementation, 
restore or convert habitats) plus a cooperation ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’. In both cases, 
AES would have to be targeted.  
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5.5 DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter has drawn attention to a number of points that were raised by addressing 
the research question (to test an economic incentive for cooperation) and related research 
aims. These points relate to 1) behavioural game theory, 2) cooperation through a ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’ for landscape scale management, 3) challenges in the design of a ‘1-2-1 
coordination bonus’, 4) opportunities for public policy and 5) the method design used in this 
research. I discuss these below. 
  
5.5.1 Behavioural Game Theory 
 
When the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ was introduced, land managers played a Pareto-
dominant strategy, particularly in experimental session 2. According to the literature, these 
players were more rational than others who did not play the ‘bonus’ in the first instance. In 
session 2 it was clear that players maximised their money utility by choosing the ‘bonus’ 
scheme. This tendency is confirmed by looking at the results presented where no player tried 
to maximise their conservation utilities per se. This corresponds to what Wightman 
(1996:15) was referring to when he used the phrase ‘corporate investors’ to describe 
landowners who are interested in the profit and capital gains that can be made through 
financial support, rather than being interested in the purpose of the support (for instance 
farming, forest AES or other).  
 
Players reached an agreement faster when ‘cheap talk’ was introduced (although this 
is a costless action), but even in these rounds an ecological network was not achieved. This 
suggests that once ‘uncertainty’ is removed and players are able to trust others by talking, 
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cooperation becomes easier. However, I argue that targeting or coordination by third parties 
is still needed depending on the type of ecological networks to be implemented (I will come 
back to this point in the general discussion in chapter 6). Again, this differs from what other 
researchers have found (Parkhurst et al., 2002) as they questioned the coordination reached 
when cheap talk was allowed. By contrast, Ostrom et al., (1994) found that face-to-face 
communication helps to solve the problem of the tragedy of the commons. I found that face-
to-face communication reduced the time players needed to reach an agreement, making 
cooperation easier. Furthermore, because players had different neighbours they had more 
chances of reaching an agreement with whomever they wanted (as is likely to happen in the 
real world).   
 
5.5.2 Cooperation through ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ for landscape scale 
management 
 
The ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ has potential for achieving landscape scale 
management. I found that players were influenced by the actions of other players, as may be 
the case in the real world. The results showed that there were two groups of players: those 
who were ‘self-reliant’ and those who were ‘other-dependent’. In other words, I could 
observe two different types of behaviour: players who chose the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ 
in the first instance; and players who waited to see what the strategies of others were before 
making a decision. If more than 2 neighbours chose the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ then 
other-dependent players did the same.  
 
Regarding the spatial configuration, Parkhurst et al., (2002) and Parkhurst and 
Shogren (2007) found that the ecological network would be achieved through the 
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‘agglomeration bonus’. However, the authors designed their experiment in such a way that 
the network was created when players had an accumulative ‘bonus’; that is, players earned 
higher utilities if they had more neighbours with whom to coordinate their choices. The 
proposals with the greatest number of contiguous parcels were more profitable if reserved 
for conservation, regardless of land quality. In contrast to these authors, in the experiment 
presented here the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ was fixed to one neighbour only. In addition, 
the only condition was that both neighbours had to have ES + ‘bonus’ or AES + ‘bonus’, 
regardless of land quality. My results showed that land managers first allocated parcels of 
low quality land to AES and ES and then, with the implementation of the ‘bonus’, allocated 
both high and low quality land to these. Allocation of low quality land to AES is known in 
the literature (Hodge and Reader, 2007); this is because AES’s payments represent a better 
opportunity cost (Schwarz et al., 2008; Hanley et al., 2012). 
 
The results of the experimental sessions and the land use patterns presented here 
suggested that although land managers are participating in AES and ES, the implementation 
of ecological networks calls for coordination by agencies or for other forms of governance. 
If, and only if, the ‘bonus’ is targeted to a specific area, it could be sufficient to create a 
targeted spatial configuration. This is because the results showed that the ‘1-2-1 coordination 
bonus’ is able to stimulate cooperation between different neighbours, or to change their 
behaviour when their neighbours cooperate. 
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5.5.3 Challenges in the design of ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’  
 
Many ‘PES-like’ schemes recognised the need for landscape scale  but none of them 
addressed this explicitly. AES are action-based payments (including the action of ‘doing 
nothing’) and the calculations are based on income forgone and additional costs.  
 
There a number of issues that have to be addressed before AES payments can 
compensate for the costs of cooperation:  
1. Payments at the regional or community level can be challenging, given that collective 
action potentially creates social traps and prisoners’ dilemma. In contrast, individual 
payments solve this problem by clearly identifying individual actors and actions (Schwarz et 
al., 2008).  
 
2.   The ‘Green Box’ criteria of the World Trade Organisation (WTO)35 established the 
modalities for calculating payments. This represents an important restriction for the design 
of the schemes and their ability to deliver environmental services (Blandford, 2001; Brunner 
and Huyton, 2009; OECD, 2001). These payments are based on income forgone or costs 
incurred, additional costs and up to 20% for transaction costs. Since payments are limited to 
income forgone there are various barriers: 
a) Income forgone is normally calculated at the holding or farm scale, 
per hectare and based on opportunity costs (Schwarz et al., 2008; Hanley et al., 
2012). AES payments are calculated on the basis of standard cost approaches,                                                         
35 As a result of negotiations with the WTO, (amongst other drivers) CAP was reformed in 2003 and significantly changed 
environmental standards and payment subsidies. Cross-compliance was introduced, which is a minimum environmental 
standard condition for farmers to fulfil in order to receive EU subsidies. In addition, direct payments to support traditional 
markets and products were considerably changed to subsidies that are identified as non-trade distorting i.e. in tune with the 
Green Box compliant schemes. ‘Green Box’ is the terminology used in WTO to identify subsidies that are permitted under 
the agricultural agreements. Other subsidies are part of the ‘Amber Box’ which are forbidden subsidies and the ‘Blue Box’ 
for subsidies that are tied to programmes that cap production. 
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using ‘typical’ or average figures for costs incurred and income forgone, and do 
not allow for the differences in costs and opportunity costs across farms (Schwarz 
et al., 2008). The most common method to upscale the payment is aggregation (as 
is the case of Sweden and PES in the ejidos). However, there is a mismatch 
between the farm scale and the landscape scale needed to provide biodiversity. 
This creates a barrier for the appropriate design of a ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ 
for two reasons: firstly, because of standard approaches in the calculation, low 
cost farms enter into the scheme, rather than the parcels needed for habitat 
connectivity or farms that can offer higher additional biodiversity benefits 
(Schwarz et al., 2008; Hanley et al., 2012). Therefore, payments do not always 
reflect the real costs of delivering biodiversity at the landscape scale. Secondly, 
because other costs, such as cooperation costs, cannot be justified or taken into 
account at all.  
 
b) Value of the services. Environmental services are valued differently 
and if their value is higher than ‘income forgone’ the service is likely not to be 
provided at all or to be underprovided. In this case, the payment is, again, not 
reflecting the value of the service. However, the ‘value’ of environmental and 
ecosystem services represents a fundamental problem, because there are no 
markets for most of them (values are estimates and indicatives). 
 
c) There is no link between biodiversity and payments. Payments are not 
a direct consequence of environmental actions and provision. 
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d) Limitations on payments. ‘Bonuses’ or ‘premiums’ are not allowed 
(by the WTO criteria) and, therefore, compensation for costs of cooperation, the 
risks of defection of other farmers, or the costs of trust, cannot be included in the 
economic incentives payment, thus limiting the possibilities of landscape scale 
delivery.  
 
 
According to some authors (Ferraro, 2000), payments-by-result (PBR) are easier to 
apply at the landscape scale than other interventions, because they can be targeted and have 
more effects on the selected target areas, such as ecological networks. This is especially the 
case if there is a base payment and an additional variable payment that could include a 
premium when management is beyond the farm scale. However, PBR schemes must address 
issues of an environmental baseline of conservation benefits at the landscape scale, which 
could make the design more challenging (Schwarz et al., 2008). 
 
5.5.4 Opportunities for public policy 
 
These results are relevant to all policy makers that aim at landscape scale ecosystem 
services delivery. An incentive aimed at the landscape scale is needed for the delivery of 
ecosystem services, and the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ I have tested offers a viable option.  
 
From a public policy standpoint, this suggests that costs of coordination could 
potentially be reduced, but a degree of third party coordination would still be needed for two 
reasons. Firstly, without it a large proportion of land would be covered under AES or ES: 
this is an unrealistic scenario since there are budget constraints and not all land managers 
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would be able to get the scheme. Secondly, in a hypothetical case of no budget constraints, a 
degree of coordination would still be needed for the creation of the desired ecological 
networks. Since, at present, there are no top-down nor bottom-up tools to develop landscape 
scale conservation management, these results showed both the potential and weaknesses of a 
‘bonus’ incentive. 
 
It is impossible to encompass and simplify the complexity of the real world (without 
making the analysis meaningless) in the experimental session and, therefore, there is a need 
for more research to test these methods and the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ scheme. For 
instance, it would be beneficial to conduct experiments which introduced dynamic payoffs 
where players’ utilities changed with rounds to reflect changes in commodity production 
prices, rather than a static payoff in which players earned the same and maximised their 
utilities with the ‘bonus’ scheme. It is necessary to question whether the AES + ‘bonus’ 
could really be competitive with commodity production, and if so under what circumstances. 
It is important to note that budget constraints were not calculated in these experiments. 
 
Furthermore, because my results suggested that land managers would take the 
‘bonus’ scheme if it were available, it should be asked if, by applying to AES or ES + 
‘bonus’, land managers intensify other parts of their land in order to compensate for the 
‘loss’ under the schemes. In principle, the scope for intensification should be limited for 
holdings that receive direct payment (Single Farm Payment), and some AES, due to cross-
compliance of Statutory Management Requirements and Good Agricultural and 
Environmental Conditions. In this sense, a ‘bonus’ scheme should not be a problem in terms 
of intensification of land uses for commodity production.   
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
 
I have presented the results of a lab experiment with land managers. The experiment 
tested a ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ to stimulate coordination amongst land managers for the 
implementation of ecological networks. The incentive was a ‘bonus’ paid when two 
neighbouring players chose the same option.  
In this conclusion I would like to highlight three major points: 
 
1. The ‘bonus’. The ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ has potential for 
achieving landscape scale management. However, there are barriers to the 
possible design of payments which need to be overcome (for instance WTO 
limitations). Furthermore, the ‘bonus’ should be targeted to specific areas or used 
with some type of coordination.  
 
2. Effects of rationality versus trust. ‘Cheap talk’ (costless action) 
improved cooperation. Without ‘cheap talk’ players: a) did not want to maximise 
utilities; b) did not find the maximisation strategy; c) did not understand the 
game; d) did not trust their neighbours. When ‘cheap talk’ was allowed players 
promptly agreed with whom they wanted to cooperate.  
 
3. Self-reliant versus other-dependent. I could observe two different 
types of behaviour: 1) players chose the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ showing their 
willingness to cooperate; 2) players waited to see what the strategies of other 
players were before making a decision: if more than 2 neighbours chose ‘bonus’, 
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‘other-dependent’ players would change their strategy and choose ‘bonus’ as 
well.  
 
These results are relevant to all policy makers that aim at landscape scale ecosystem 
services delivery. An incentive aimed at the landscape scale is needed for the delivery of 
ecosystem services, and the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ I have tested offers a viable option.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
OVERALL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
Landscape scale studies are becoming ever more important in the light of policy 
demand for Ecosystem Services (Millennium Assessment, 2005). There is an increasing 
amount of research regarding landscape management in relation to environmental issues 
from different angles such as planning and social perspectives (respectively Groot et al., 
2010 and Brown and Reed, 2012; Bryan at al., 2011; Nielsen-Pincus 2011). I suspect this 
trend will continue.  
 
There is also an important volume of literature on landscape scale modelling with 
some authors calling for more integration of the socio-political context in modelling and 
landscape scale analysis (Ryan, 2011). A new field of study on organisation of farming 
practices at the landscape scale is also emerging, called ‘landscape agronomy’ (e.g Schaller 
et al., 2010). Landscape ecology is the most established discipline studying landscape scale 
dynamics (e.g. Turner et al., 2001) and has for long time highlighted the importance of 
management at landscape scale.  
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Within this body of literature, ecological networks are one of the proposed tools to 
deliver a number of environmental services which require a landscape scale approach, 
including conservation (e.g. Ellis et al., 2011; Batary et al., 2012; Dallimer et al., 2010), 
recreation (e.g Gimona and van der Horst, 2007) and pollination (e.g Carvalheiro et al., 
2010; Devoto et al., 2012). To the best of my knowledge, the present work is one of the first 
studies to offer a view on landscape scale management for the implementation of ecological 
networks (EN) using a combination of perspectives from social sciences (qualitative 
interview analysis and experimental economics) while engaging with the literature in 
landscape and conservation ecology.   
Its main contribution is to show that landscape scale management for conservation 
through the implementation of ecological networks in the Dee catchment: 
 1) depends strongly on land managers’ views and attitudes which are conditioned by 
property rights;  
2) cannot rely only on the type of collaboration promoted by the ACM approach and 
requires coordination by third parties (public agencies or others) and  
3) would be facilitated by the introduction of an economic incentive for neighbouring 
land managers to cooperate for their implementation.  
This research contributes to filling the gap in landscape scale studies from a social 
science perspective, using a combination of three approaches. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in this 
thesis focused each on one of these perspectives: a) Adaptive Co-Management (ACM), b) 
attitudes to conservation, AES, and cooperation and c) testing economic incentives for cross-
boundary cooperation.  
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  The aim of this chapter is to bring these three subjects together, to go beyond each of 
the approaches mentioned and highlight the contribution this study makes to push to new 
boundaries the questions addressed in the existing literature on landscape scale management 
for conservation. 
 
6.1 ECOLOGICAL NETWORKS (EN) 
 
The literature on ecological networks has mainly focused on research by landscape 
ecologists using GIS and other methods to identify where ENs could best be implemented 
(e.g Gimona and van der Horst, 2007, Willis et al., 2012; Vannier et al., 2011; Gurrutxaga et 
al., 2010). A number of publications have also discussed how to implement ecological 
networks (Jongman and Pungetti, 2004; Bennett and Mulongoy, 2006; Jongman and Bogers, 
2008; Barreto et al., 2010; Leibenath et al., 2010; Vimal et al., 2012). Leibenath et al. 
(2010), for instance, carried out an analysis of trans-boundary cooperation for EN 
implementation between Germany and other countries and found 34 existing projects. The 
authors mentioned the need for more knowledge and information exchange and transfer 
amongst practitioners in order to achieve coordination for ecological networks 
implementation. This coincides with the results of chapter 3 in this work, in which the 
review of existing collaborative initiatives and the analysis of the views expressed in land 
managers’ interviews highlighted a lack of shared knowledge as a barrier to the development 
of Adaptive Co-Management practices for the implementation of EN in the Dee catchment. 
 
Vimal et al. (2012) discuss a collective learning system whereby stakeholders’ input 
should be clearly identified in the process of EN implementation; they indicate that spatial 
landscape planning would benefit from this process. However, Jongman and Bogers (2008) 
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rightly call for more attention on professional planning (expertise) as part of the process, and 
indicate the need to move beyond simple identification of stakeholders for the sake of 
‘stakeholder engagement’, a catch phrase which some times doesn’t translate into much else 
than tokenism. This is interesting for me because, as I mentioned in chapter 2, in Scotland 
planning has little influence on rural land use; therefore, it requires extra effort and expertise 
from planners to develop ecological networks in this area – and conversely, in the interviews 
land managers have indicated that they would welcome action by public agencies as a third-
party to coordinate conservation actions between neighbouring landholdings. 
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the implementation of ecological corridors is difficult in 
any country. Many of the existing cases of ecological networks are at different stages of 
implementation and very few of them are in an advanced stage as is also the case in the UK. 
Lawton et al. (2010), strongly highlighted the need to include land managers in the 
implementation of ecological networks. This research responds to this call by contributing to 
the discussion on drivers and barriers to the inclusion of land managers in this process.  
 
6.2 LANDSCAPE SCALE COOPERATION, COLLABORATION AND COORDINATION. 
 
The case of ecological networks implementation is analogous to other natural resource 
management issues for which Adaptive Co-Management (ACM) has been developed (e.g 
Colfer, 2005; Sabatier et al., 2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Berkes et al., 2008; Norberg and 
Cumming, 2008). ACM has been used in a number of cases where resources are common-
pool such as natural reserves and water management (e.g Nadasdy, 2003; Norberg and 
Cumming, 2008; Schultz et al., 2011; Sabatier et al., 2005; Akamani and Wilson, 2011).  
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The ACM approach has also been used in conflict resolution on natural resource 
management (e.g Butler et al., 2011). Although common pool forest resources are not 
present in my study area (except to a limited degree in the case of the Birse Community), I 
chose to use ACM because it is one of the only frameworks that explicitly address natural 
resource management at the landscape scale. Indeed, despite the private nature of land tenure 
in the study area, the problem of cross-property and landscape-scale protection of 
biodiversity (as a public good) makes the analogy illuminating despite its limitations. This 
framework made it possible to simultaneously study collaboration and coordination 
horizontally and vertically, as I presented in chapter 3.  
 
Other existing frameworks that I considered using for this research included actor-
network theory (ANT). ANT maps relations that are both material and semiotic and has been 
used to understand stakeholders’ micro-dynamic collaborations, for instance for rural 
tourism. Some authors have proposed to use ANT as a ‘practical technique’ for landscape 
studies (Allen, 2011). I also considered using the framework proposed by Hagedorn (2002) 
on cooperation and institutional change (cooperation and coordination for provision of 
public goods especially from the farming communities). Eventually, I decided to use ACM 
because the other approaches did not offer the integration of horizontal (across different 
stakeholders) and vertical (across policies and individual interests) collaboration and 
cooperation while also taking into account the adaptive cycles of learning-by-doing as ACM 
does.  
 
For this research ACM as a concept has proved to be useful to analyse the potential 
of cooperation for conservation and appears to be a promising approach if developed 
as a skeleton for practice to be used as a process to deliver other Ecosystem Services. 
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Nowadays, most natural resources are delivered through stakeholders’ participation 
and ACM offers a framework to develop this process.   
  
In this research I have analysed three of the components that are central for the 
development of ACM: local knowledge, sharing power and evaluation as part of the process 
of learning-adapting cycles (Sabatier et al., 2005; Armitage et al., 2007; Berkes et al., 2008; 
Roth, 2004; Becker and Ghimire, 2003; Armitage et al., 2011; Leys and Vanclay, 2011). I 
used these components as benchmarks to assess the potential of ACM to be developed 
within a private property context. It is to be noted however that in such a context of property 
rights and market based agri-environmental payments, ACM contributes to the ‘institutional 
blending’ characteristic of the ‘neoliberalisation’ of rural land conservation arrangements as 
discussed by Hodge and Adams (2012). 
 
The literature on ACM suggests that local ecological knowledge that is related to cultural 
aspects makes conservation easier. For instance, Garibaldi and Turner (2004) refer us to the 
‘cultural keystone species’, which may have a material use (food, medicine etc.) but also 
have a sociocultural use, and therefore have an important role in social dynamics and 
ceremonies and are often mentioned in narratives. An example of a ‘cultural keystone 
species’ is the case of the corn (or maize) in Mexico, especially amongst indigenous groups 
(Lozada, 2008 and Lozada-Ellison, in press), or reindeer among the Sami in Finland (e.g 
Ingold, 1980). In the case of ‘cultural keystone species’, not only is an economic meaning 
attached to species and ecological systems, but also skills, knowledge, social-cultural 
interests and meanings are derived from them as they give cohesion to social and cultural 
communities through a specific worldview. This makes it easy to protect such species.  
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 In contrast with these notions, in the Dee catchment my results showed that local 
ecological knowledge is mainly pertinent to commodity production. Although there are no 
‘cultural keystone species’ as such in Scotland today, more research is needed on the cultural 
value of the following species: salmon (Salmo salar); red deer (Cervus elaphus, for cultural 
aspects associated to this species see Fiorini et al. (2011); red and black grouse (Tetrao 
tetrix, Lagopus lagopus scotica); and capercaillie (Tetrao urogallus).  
 
The results presented in this work show that there is often a rupture between cultural-
social systems and ecological systems, for example in the management of land mainly as a 
commodity. I therefore argue that when this is the case, the relationship with natural 
resources is merely utilitarian and, moreover, value is equated with monetary value. This is 
because it is stripped of any further cultural or ethical attributes; although such attributes do 
exist at the level of personal opinions and perceptions, these only have a limited impact on 
the social and economic structuring of society-environment relations. In this context it is 
always necessary to pay from the public purse for every service produced because land 
managers incur the costs of implementing conservation activities, hence the need for 
economic incentives to pay them to deliver biodiversity. This is in stark contrast with 
contexts were there are cultural keystone species.  
 
A further difficult barrier to overcome is the lack of ‘power sharing’ across the 
catchment (i.e. different parties to the management of a resource being equally interested and 
proactive in the management, including sharing a similar degree of power in the decision 
making over resources). Equity of power is an important component for ACM (Kruse et al., 
1998) but the literature on the subject has not yet given enough attention to power relations 
as such (Nadasdy, 2003; Doubleday, 2007). As I have illustrated in chapters 2, 3 and 4, there 
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are differences in property rights and relations between different groups of land managers. 
The lack of power sharing is deeply rooted in Scottish history. In the study area, property 
rights shield land managers from the need for common decision-making because these rights 
are held individually and land managers can decide what they want to do with their land 
within the rules set by the Scottish Agricultural Law. 
 
Cases of power sharing that echo ACM were found in some instances of management, 
most notably the Dee River Trust and the Birse Community Trust, (for other cases see 
chapter 3). In most cases, however, I found asymmetric collaborations, vertical and 
horizontal power relations, distrust and divergent interests in the same place. To better 
understand and to compensate for the gap regarding sharing power in the ACM literature 
(Nadasdy, 2003; Doubleday, 2007; Kruse et al., 1998), I offered a classification of the type 
of power relations based on interest, power balance and trust. The classification was based 
on information from the study area and, therefore, it is representative only of the Dee 
catchment but it could be used for further research. I identified a series of collaborations as 
being either symmetric or asymmetric – generally depending on whether land managers are 
from the same land tenure group (symmetric) or not (asymmetric).  
This analysis leads me to argue that ACM cannot guarantee the dissolution of asymmetric 
power relations in the short run. In order to implement ecological networks through ACM it 
will be necessary to stimulate processes where land managers are more actively involved in 
environmental cycles of learning-evaluating-adapting management (perhaps in the way 
Lawrence, 2006 and 2007 suggests). The obvious consequence is that to compensate for this 
institutional barrier to ACM and ecological networks development, there is a need for other 
tools such as regulation (e.g. designated ecological network areas) and/ or economic 
incentives. The creation of institutions that build trust and facilitate voluntary cooperation is 
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also necessary. Often a mixture of the three factors above might be needed: the simple 
availability of incentives does not seem to be sufficient to achieve public policy objectives as 
they are currently designed and implemented. 
 
ACM is useful as a theoretical framework to disentangle elements of landscape scale 
management (horizontal and vertical; ecological and social; also policy relevance); however, 
as mentioned above, it has limitations in the understanding of power relations. One 
resolution to this problem became apparent from my interviews. The results from the 
analysis of these, presented in chapter 3, showed that land managers desired coordination 
through third parties. In this sense public agencies could play a role to ‘bridge’ top-down and 
bottom-up interests, knowledge and balance sharing power relations amongst actors. The 
role of public agencies is crucial to allow information flows linking local-level land 
managers and other stakeholders on the ground with high-level national and international 
institutional policies and laws. Among the cases reviewed in chapter 3 it appears the Scottish 
Natural Heritage (SNH) is an example of a public agency fulfilling such a role (see Chapter 
3). 
 
However in most cases mentioned in this study a limited mutual knowledge of each 
other’s objectives resulted in a lack of trust and asymmetrical relations of collaboration 
between land managers and public agencies. Land managers tend to have a negative view of 
public agencies, especially of government institutions in relation with applications to 
subsidies such as agri-environmental schemes due to the threatening language and possible 
sanctions imposed to them when missing to comply to the letter of conditions for public 
funding. 
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 However, land managers and representatives of public agencies all highlighted the 
need for trusting each other. To reduce the mistrust and the asymmetrical power relationships 
through adaptive co-management could take significant time and resources. Both of these are 
scarce for land managers and public agencies. Adaptive co-management cannot guarantee 
the dissolution of these relations in the short run. 
To overcome problems of trust between public agencies and land managers, I 
propose that some agencies (public or private – for instance consultants already helping with 
AES applications as mentioned in some interviews) or local governance (as was the case of 
Birse Community Trust) should take the coordination role.  
 
Processes of common learning through collaborative initiatives and partnerships 
could also represent a powerful tool to improve asymmetric collaboration between land 
managers and public agencies, and could in due course result in relations of trust. 
I argue that existing collaborative initiatives and cases that resonate with ACM should be 
taken as a starting point from where to expand ACM to the whole study area for ecological 
networks implementation. Similar results have been highlighted by other authors who stress 
the need for partnerships for landscape management of ecosystem services (e.g Goldman et 
al., 2010; Groot et al., 2010; Leibenath et al., 2010; Vimal et al., 2012; Jongman and Bogers, 
2008).  
 
In the process of analysis of ACM, I decided to carry out a parallel analysis focussed on 
land managers’ attitudes which gave me a better understanding of their preferences. The 
parallel analysis offered a more in-depth insight into land managers’ attitudes to 
conservation, their uptake of AES and the existing cases of cooperation amongst land 
managers.  
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As I presented in the results of chapter 4, my findings regarding these views and 
attitudes were similar to what other authors have observed in terms of motivations and 
reservations to the uptake of AES (Bishop, 1992; Sandys, 1994; Morris and Potter, 1995; 
Watkins et al., 1996; Wilson 1996; Brouwer and van Berkum, 1997; Brouwer and Lowe, 
1998; Buller et al., 2000; Wilson and Hart, 2001; Walford, 2002). An important difference 
however, was that land tenure explained, in part, land managers’ attitudes to conservation, 
cooperation patterns and AES uptake. These results came to light perhaps because my 
interest was on landscape scale management so an obvious consequence was the inclusion of 
a more varied range of land managers and management activities, beyond the more common 
focus on generic farmers as is the case of many studies on AES uptake.  
 
However, based on my results I argue that even within the AES literature (e.g Morris and 
Potter, 1995; Wilson and Hart, 2001) and its inherent farming community focus, farmers 
should now be identified as land managers in a broader sense, because farming activities are 
less and less the main, let alone the only, economic activity on the farms. Moreover, current 
AES involve a range of options some of which are completely disconnected from farming 
(without minimizing the value of agriculture). My results showed that even when farming 
plays the most important role in their business, farmers/land managers may see themselves 
as more than producers of food and fibres and this influences their decision-making 
regarding conservation. This was clearly the case of some of the owners of smallholdings 
interviewed.  
 
Indeed, the clusters of answers of land managers based on land tenure showed 
substantial differences across the three groups of tenants, estates and smallholding owners. 
The results of the experimental sessions confirmed this.  
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This shows that the distinctions and labels applied to land managers for research (and 
for policy) are important as they help to uncover how different attitudes and behaviours are 
associated with different identities. For instance, the idea of being a ‘good productivist 
farmer’ (Burton et al., 2008), which in this study applied mainly to tenants, is reinforced 
within the group by the affirmation that individuals are ‘not interested in conservation’ per 
se, but apply to AES for financial reasons. In contrast, smallholding owners see land more as 
a place to live rather than as the means to make a living. This is similar to what other authors 
found (Schramek et al., 1999; Drake et al., 1999; Primdahl, 1999). Consequently, work for 
conservation on their land is perceived by owners of small holdings as increasing the value 
of the property both in terms of aesthetic value and also as a potential family asset to be 
inherited (with the idea that future generations might benefit more of the land management 
changes for conservation introduced by the current generation).  In some cases owners of 
smallholdings will therefore even prefer to pay for the conservation work from their own 
pocket rather then go through all the paper work required to obtain a subsidy (AES or FS). 
This corroborates the findings of other authors such as Siebert et al. (2006) and Kaijonen 
(2006) and clearly shows that their motivation is not an immediate financial one. 
 
Regarding existing cases of cooperation, the results showed that this was more frequent 
within, rather than across, each of the land tenure groups. Collaborative practices were 
frequent among estate managers, especially for habitat management for sporting activities, 
and among tenants based on mutual help for technical tasks (this perhaps is rooted in earlier 
forms of exchange of labour found in traditional farming practices). 
These results regarding land managers’ experience and views of existing cooperation 
practices corroborate the initial analysis in chapter 3 based on the ACM framework: one 
limitation to landscape scale cooperation is the prevalence of vertical power relationships 
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and the lack of cooperation across different groups of land tenure. However, most land 
managers expressed willingness for cross-boundary cooperation and those involved in 
collaborative practices saw a need for landscape scale coordination for conservation but on 
the condition that appropriate incentives were in place. 
 
Based on these results, I argue that existing collaborative practices could be used by 
public policy as channels to develop a long-term process of building capacity for 
landscape scale conservation. As other authors have noted (e.g. Sabatier et al., 2005), 
collaborative initiatives are an alternative to top-down approaches and are more 
effective in delivering objectives through negotiation, coordination and consensus 
amongst stakeholders.  
 
Based on these results I hypothesised that landscape-scale conservation could be 
achieved through ACM-like cooperation, given the existence of appropriate incentives since 
the latter often appeared as a necessary condition. I therefore decided to test a ‘one-to-one 
(1-2-1) coordination bonus’ aimed at stimulating cooperation at the landscape scale. This ‘1-
2-1 coordination bonus’ is based on the ‘agglomeration bonuses’ literature (Smith and 
Shogren, 2001 and 2002; Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst and Shogren, 2007; Banerjee et 
al., 2009).  
 
6.3 EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS: ‘1-2-1 COORDINATION BONUS’ INCENTIVE TO STIMULATE 
COOPERATION  
 
The results of the experiments were very informative in that they somewhat mitigated the 
utilitarian view of managers’ attitudes that was deduced from the interviews. First the results 
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showed that without the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ most players will allocate low quality 
land to AES and ES and high quality land to commodity production. These results are in 
tune with what the literature has assumed regarding the behaviour of land managers who will 
allocate low quality parcels to AES or ES based on an ‘economically rational’ model of 
behaviour (Hanley et al., 2012). If we consider these results in the context of what some 
authors have found on changes in land capability for Scotland due to climate variation 
(Brown et al., 2011), where low quality could become high quality, my results suggest that 
any change in land capability could cause a conversion of AES and ES land into intensive 
farmland.   
 
This was not the case, however, when the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ was offered to 
players. They were willing to allocate land parcels in both low and high quality land to AES 
and ES even when they did not earn the higher utilities offered with the ‘1-2-1 coordination 
bonus’. This suggests that the ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ would work if it was available to 
land managers. As I presented in chapter 5, land managers would uptake the scheme even 
when this was not their first choice. If more than 2 neighbours took the ‘1-2-1 coordination 
bonus’ up this was sufficient to motivate others to do the same. Therefore, it is likely that an 
ecological network could be implemented through a ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’.  
 
My findings also indicate that some types of ecological networks would be relatively easy to 
implement, namely those for invertebrates such as bumble bees and /or butterflies important 
for pollination. In this case, connected field margins (represented by AES in the 
experiments) at the landscape scale could be relatively easy to achieve with a bonus. The 
caveat is that further measures, such as avoidance of contamination through insecticides, 
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would have to be implemented very strictly to avoid such margins becoming ecological 
traps, i.e. ‘killer zones’ with a counter-productive effect.  
 
A second problem would arise if land managers changed their strategies yearly by 
choosing different parcels for different types of schemes, as if they were experimenting with 
the schemes. This is something that seemed to happen in some of the sessions of the 
incentive experiment. However, this might reflect more on the lack of consequences of such 
changes in a non path-dependant game scenario compared to a real life situation. Given the 
results of the interview analysis in chapters 3 and 4, I would hypothesise that this tactic of 
changing from one scheme to another is less likely to be applied in real life by land 
managers whose surface of farming operations is smaller and who are more dependant on 
subsidies for their total income (this is more often the case of tenants than owners of small 
holdings). The analysis of the players’ choices in the experimental session and their “real-
life” identity confirms this. On the other end of the spectrum, managers of estates can afford 
to experiment and spread the risks over different parcels. In this sense, unsurprisingly, in two 
out of three experimental sessions it was an estate manager/owner who won the most 
conservation points. 
 
  A situation of inconsistency in land managers’ choices of schemes would be likely to 
create population disturbance and localised extinctions through loss of habitat. Many agri-
environmental measures must be in place for a number of years in order to maximise the 
improvements in biodiversity, and this would have to be mirrored in the design of incentive 
schemes through minimum duration clauses.  
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Whether this is feasible has not been tested by the experiments in this study and 
could be the object of further work. Ecological networks require time to be established and, 
therefore, need long-term management practices. Regarding woodland plantations, other 
authors (Sandys, 1994; Bishop, 1992; Watkins et al., 1996) found that land managers were 
unwilling to take these up, in part because of the long-term commitments implied. Whether 
similar issues would arise regarding features that are easier to implement (such as field 
margins) and whether long-term contracts would be required needs further investigation 
through both experiments and interviews. 
 
These results, however, are very relevant in light of the need to up-scale AES to 
create field margin habitat networks as has constantly been underlined in different studies 
(Gimona and van der Horst, 2007; Merckx et al., 2009; Dallimer et al., 2010; Gabriel et al., 
2010 and Batary et al., 2012). In addition to up-scaling, this responds to the need for 
targeting AES.  
  Furthermore, such an incentive scheme could be an excellent companion for other 
tools such as third party coordination if, for instance, a larger ecological network is needed. 
The ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ scheme serves to stimulate cooperation, but in order to 
create robust ecological networks the results showed that this should be synchronized by 
third parties. The ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ would certainly reduce costs of coordination by 
public agencies but it would not create an ecological network without more targeting or a 
minimum of top-down coordination and persuasion, thus raising again the issue of trust 
between land managers and public agencies (or non-governmental organisations for that 
matter) already discussed above. 
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In any case, an inescapable restriction in the current international framework is that 
to implement a ‘1-2-1 coordination bonus’ the design has to take into account the limitations 
imposed by the WTO criteria for such incentives (see chapter 5).    
 
6.4 CONCLUDING REMARKS: WEAKNESSES, STRENGTH AND IMPROVEMENTS FOR FUTURE 
WORK 
 This research presents limitations and strengths regarding the methods and the 
approaches taken to carry out the analysis, which I partly highlighted earlier in this chapter.   
The interviews were carried out with as many different types of stakeholders as 
possible; however, the results would have been stronger if more interviews could have been 
carried out to represent the area more exhaustively. Furthermore, some participants to the 
experiments found the fact that I used the hypothetical case of the implementation of 
ecological networks very abstract. A number of interviewees asked me for clarification of 
the idea. Nonetheless, there was a significant methodological advantage in referring to 
generic ecological networks rather than specific examples of landscape-scale conservation. It 
allowed for more ‘neutral’ responses than if I had used examples such as ‘deer management’ 
or ‘river management’, about which some respondents may have strong and possibly 
divergent views (for instance between estates and tenants about deer management). This 
would have created a distraction from the issues of cooperation for landscape-scale 
management at the centre of my interest.  
 
 A case is to be made as well for the combination of sociological qualitative data and 
experimental economics methods. The analysis of the interviews helped me acquire a good 
understanding of the study area and of the social dynamics at the landscape scale. This 
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allowed me to incorporate as much of the specific context as possible into my experimental 
design when testing the incentive.  
 
Because of time constraints I only ran three experimental sessions, but more sessions 
are needed in order to represent a larger area and carry out a systematic quantitative analysis 
of land managers’ responses to the introduction of economic incentives for cooperation. 
Moreover, although I used table games as my inspiration in order to make the sessions 
accessible to participants, the simulation games were still abstract for players. Furthermore, 
the fact that they had limited time to play the game created confusion for some participants, 
hinting that more repeat-sessions would enhance the reliability of results. The methodology 
of these experiments, however, is innovative in the sense that the ‘players’ were mainly land 
managers playing their own role (incidentally, in trial runs students were proven to behave 
very differently in their land allocation choices, with an unrealistic pro-conservation 
attitude).  
 
I was not interested in testing ‘game theory’ per se, because the majority of people in 
everyday life make decisions based on many factors that do not correspond to the predicted 
‘rational behaviour’. Therefore, for me it was important to carry out the experiments with 
land managers rather than students. I argue that experimenters should make the effort of 
running the session with the relevant stakeholders (when appropriate). The mapping exercise 
and short interviews carried out at the end of each experimental session were an 
improvement in the methodology because they have the potential for crossing qualitative and 
quantitative information to give more explanatory elements about players’ behaviour and 
choices. In fact, the interviews show that some times the motivations for a choice that 
  
 245 
appears as “rational” within a game theory framework can be very different from the 
theoretical motivations attributed to “rational actors”.  
 
Variations on this methodology could be applied to a range of policy makers, 
communities and many other stakeholders. The experiment was only a ‘pilot’ project, with a 
rather limited sample size (18 players). Nonetheless, it offered a valuable insight into land 
managers’ strategic spatial behaviour and the potential for public policy in this area. 
However, further experiments might be needed to make policy recommendations. 
 
Following from this, I would say that a lesson to be taken from this methodology (of 
combined qualitative interview-based data and experimental economics) is that there is a 
need for better understanding of the social and political context of natural resource 
management. Authors have highlighted these needs for developing countries (Wilshusen et 
al., 2002; Caruso, 2011) but I argue that this understanding is also needed in developed 
countries. I advocate that a combination of ACM, economic incentives and better 
understanding of the social and economic dynamics of an area are essential elements 
for public policy to be implemented more effectively. ‘Context-free’ broad national 
policies for land use have reduced chances of success. 
 
This research is one of the first studies to offer a view on landscape management for 
EN implementation using a combination of ACM-framework and interviews about attitudes 
to conservation, which reviews existing cases of cooperation and also tests the use of 
economic incentives. It is the first to use the methodology of experimental economics 
combined with qualitative and quantitative information from the field, and one of the first 
cases where the experiment is applied to the ‘real world’ actors who would be involved in 
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the incentive tested (here land managers). I consider this to be very important. Indeed, while 
abstract policies and network designs proposed on maps are useful as guides for suggesting 
the general course of action required to achieve policy goals, in the present institutional 
framework land managers have the power to implement these policies or to ignore them: 
they have the last say. Understanding the complexity of how to involve them 
constructively in decision-making regarding public goods and natural resources, is 
therefore crucial to the success of public policy. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A. LISTS OF HABITATS AND SPECIES THAT ARE PRIMARY REASON FOR DESIGNATED AREAS. 
  
 
River Dee Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
n/a Freshwater pearl mussel  
Margaritifera margaritifera 
n/a 
 Alantic salmon Salmo salar  
 Otter Lutra lutra  
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
 
Cairngorms Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Oligotrophic to mesotrophic standing waters with vegetation of the Littorelletea 
uniflorae and/or of the Isoëto-Nanojuncetea 
Green shield-moss  
Buxbaumia viridis 
Otter  Lutra lutra 
Northern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix   
European dry heaths   
Alpine and Boreal heaths   
Juniperus communis formations on heaths or calcareous grasslands   
Siliceous alpine and boreal grasslands   
Species-rich Nardus grassland, on siliceous substrates in mountain areas (and 
submountain areas in continental Europe)  * Priority feature 
  
Blanket bogs  * Priority feature   
Petrifying springs with tufa formation (Cratoneurion)  * Priority feature   
Alpine pioneer formations of the Caricion bicoloris-atrofuscae  * Priority feature   
Siliceous scree of the montane to snow levels (Androsacetalia alpinae and 
Galeopsietalia ladani) 
  
Siliceous rocky slopes with chasmophytic vegetation   
Caledonian forest  * Priority feature   
Bog woodland  * Priority feature   
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
Ballochbuie Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
European dry heaths n/a Otter  Lutra lutra 
Calcareous rocky slopes with chasmophytic vegetation   
Siliceous rocky slopes with chasmophytic vegetation   
Caledonian forest  * Priority feature   
Bog woodland * Priority feature    
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
 
 
Coyles of Muick  Special Area of Conservation (SAC)  
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Calaminarian grasslands of the Violetalia calaminariae 
 
n/a n/a 
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
 
Dinnet Oakwood Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Old sessile oak woods with Ilex and Blechnum in the British Isles n/a n/a 
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
Glen Tanar Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
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Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Northern Atlantic wet heaths with Erica tetralix n/a Otter  Lutra lutra 
European dry heaths   
Caledonian forest  * Priority feature   
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
 
 
Morrone Birkwood Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Juniperus communis formations on heaths or calcareous grasslands n/a Geyer`s whorl snail Vertigo geyeri 
Alpine pioneer formations of the Caricion bicoloris-atrofuscae  * Priority feature   
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
 
 
Morven and Mullachdubh Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Juniperus communis formations on heaths or calcareous grasslands n/a  
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
 
 
 
Muir of Dinnet Special Area of Conservation (SAC) 
Habitats that are a primary reason for selection of this site* Species Other Species/Habitats 
Oligotrophic to mesotrophic standing waters with vegetation of the 
Littorelletea uniflorae and/or of the lsoëto-Nanojuncetea 
n/a Otter  Lutra lutra 
European dry heaths   
* There are other habitats listed which present a qualifying feature, but not a primary reason for selection of the site.  
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APPENDIX B. NAME AND CODE OF PARISHES IN THE DEE CATCHMENT. 
 
Table:  Parishes that are part of the Dee Catchment, by parish code, name and number of inhabitants. 
 
Code Parish Name Parish 
1 Aberdeen 
11 Peterculter 
8 Newhills 
7 Kinellar 
12 Skene 
5 Echt 
44 Kincardine O’Neil 
46 Lumphanan 
41 Coull 
45 (part of) Logie Coldstone 
42 Crathie and Breamar 
43 Glen Muick Tullich and Glen Gaim 
38 Aboyne and Glentanar 
39 Birse 
484 Strachan 
482 Bachory-Ternan 
483 Durris 
3 Drumoak 
472 Maryculter 
471 Bachory-Denenick 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF LANDOWNERSHIP IN THE DEE CATCHMENT.  
 
Table: List of Landownership with holding sizes and location of holdings according to Wightman, (1996). 
 
 
No. Proprietor (Aberdeenshire) Property Principal 
Interest 
Acreage Grid Ref 
1 Capitan A.A.C Farquharson’s 
invercauld trusts* 
Invercauld Capitan A.A.C 
Farquharson 
87500 NO1792 
2 National trust Scotland Mar Lodge and others  73582 NO0989 
3 Viscount  Cowdray & Trust* Dunecht & others  65600 Nj7507 
4 The Queen and Trustees of 
Balmoral 
Balmoral & Delnadamph  50370 NO2594 
5 Glen Tanar Trusts Glen Tanar Michael A. Bruce 29150 NO4795 
6 Captain A.A.A.D.M Ramsay Mar  25143 NO0984 
7 Edward Humphrey & the 
Wester Coull Trust 
Dinnet & Wester Coull  23800 Nj4400 
10 Sir Ian Okeover-Walker Bt. Glenmuick  13000 NO3690 
12 John Howard Seton Gordon of 
Abergeldie 
Abergeldie  10200 NO2992 
15 Donald H.M. & Andrew M.L. 
Farquharson 
Finzean  7900 NO5993 
21 Nicol Brothers Ballogie  6500 NO5795 
22 The MacRobert Trust Estate MacRobert Trust Estate  6500 Nj4905 
24 Thomas Innes of Learney Learney  5900 Nj6304 
25 Monymusk land Co. & 
Monymusk Estate 
Monymusk (Small part is 
within the catchment) 
Sir Archibald 
Grant 
5486 Nj6815 
28 Trustees of the Cluny Estates Cluny Estates  5000 Nj6912 
30 Andrew Salvesen Findrack & Tillyfour (part 
within the Dee Catchment) 
 4600 Nj6005 
42 Cullerlie Trust Cullerlie  3000 Nj7602 
46 R.L.O. Fyffe Corsindae  2500 Nj6808 
49  Midmar  2250 Nj7005 
50 William A.j. Davie, Lumphanan  2200 Nj5703 
58 Aboyne Castle Estate trustees Aboyne Marquis of 
Huntly 
2000 Nj5299 
59 Andrew E.H. Bradford Kincardine  2000 Nj6000 
60 Trustees of Lt.Col> Forbes Corse  2000 Nj5407 
63 C.R Ratcliffe & Family Courtcairn & Kinnernie  1800 Nj7211 
64 Craigmyle Estate 
Ltd. 
Craigmyle  1800 Nj6301 
66 Trustees of James Allan Midbeltie  1700 Nj6200 
67 Sluie Estate Trust Sluie R. Strang-Steel 1700 NO6296 
70 James C.A. & Alexander J.A 
Burnett 
Cathes & Leys (Part)  1500 Nj7500 
73 Craigie Farm Estate Park  1500 NO7898 
81 Crannach Woodland 
Partnership 
Crannach Robin Callander 
and others 
1261 Nj3899 
82 Alistair J. Lilburn Coull  1250 Nj5102 
83 M. Calvert Dessmuir & Dess  1250 Nj5700 
84  Tillydrine  1250 NO6098 
105  Camphill  1000 Nj5706 
No. Proprietor (Kincardine) Property Principal 
Interest 
Acreage Grid Ref 
1 C.A. Gladstone & Gladstone 
1987 Settlement 
Fasque Estate Sir William 
Galdstone 
47700 NO6475 
2 Viscount Cowdray & Trusts* Dunecht & others (part)  11000 Nj6802 
5 James C.A. & Alexander J.A. 
Burnett 
Crathes & Leys (Part see 
No.70 in Aberdeenshire) 
 5200 NO7398 
7 Mary C. Rodwell Tilquhillie  2700 NO7193 
14  Ashentilly  1700 NO8297 
16 Capt Kenneth l.H. Lumsden Banchory & Leggart  1565 Nj9102 
19 ON MARKET Shillofad Forest  1055 NO7389 
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APPENDIX D. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR LAND MANAGERS (example of estates) 
 
    
Interview guide for …………… 
 No…/…  
  
Date ………………………………… 
Place (Name of the town/village and If possible identify the area on the map before the 
interview) …………………………………………….. 
Name (if they want to give it)…………………………………………………. 
Land extension 
 
A. General information 
1. Could you explain your role within the estate?  
2. Could you tell me about the land uses within the estate for in hand land?  
3. Could you tell me about the history of the estate regarding land management?  
4. Which types of tenancies are there in the estate?  
5. Do you rent land from neighbouring estates or other owners?  
6. What other economic activities does the estate have (e.g tourism) 
7.  Which of the activities represents the first income of the business?  
8. Do you receive SFP? 
9. Could you tell me the percentage that subsidies represent in the business?  
10. What are the business plans for the next 10, 20 or 30 years? 
 
B. conservation attitudes and knowledge 
1. What is ‘conservation’ for you? Can you define conservation? 
2. Is the management of your land contributing to conservation? 
3. Is land a commodity or has it other values to you? 
4. What type of woods do you have? (Type of trees?) What percentage of the land is 
under woods? Is it all commercial forestry? 
5. Could you tell me about the history of the woodlands in the estate? Since when have 
the woodlands been there and what are the motives to have them, to keep them?  
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Interview guide 
Fieldwork in the Dee Catchment, March and April 2009. 
All interviews will be recorded (ask for permission) 
This format will be filled in as a safe notes of the interview and the transcription 
will be annexed to this format. 
In each interview I will present my project and the objectives of doing the 
interviews. If interviewees ask, I will give a short explanation about how I will use 
the information from the interviews. 
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6. Could you tell me more about the history of the shooting?  
7. (For cases where there is a town nearby such as the case of Torphins) Are there 
woodlands for the community that the estate has provided?  
8. Have you participated in inventories, wildlife censuses e.g. bird watching or other 
forms of surveying? What was your motivation in participating? 
9. What are the main issues about environmental protection in the Dee Catchment? Is 
there a need for protection? 
 
C. Schemes 
1. Does the estate participate in woodland schemes?  
2. Why did the estate become involved in those schemes?  
3. What are the estate’s motivations for NOT becoming involved in woodland 
Schemes? 
4. In which AES is the estate committed at the present? 
5. Are they in tune with the estate’s management plans?  
6. Could you give and example of where you have seen changes within your land as a 
result of the application of one or more of those schemes?  
7. (In cases where the land is under Special Areas of Conservation (SAC's), Special 
Protected Areas (SPA), Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI)  
How do you integrate (designation name) with your management plans?  
8. What is the role, If any, of BAPs in your management plans? 
9. What do you think about the SRDP, its Rural Priorities and LMOs? 
 
 
D. Ecological networks. 
1.  Have you heard about ecological networks? What do you think about them?  
2. Does the estate’s land include corridors? Could you give an example and the results 
of having them?  
3. Connectivity and networks (EXPLAIN) are increasingly valuable e.g. connectivity for 
forestry - what do you think about it? Connectivity implies management at cross-
boundaries; management at landscape scale; a need for collaboration between 
neighbours. Are you willing to co-ordinate your management with neighbours? Have 
you done so in the past? Why yes? Why not? Do you think that is feasible? If there 
are good incentives? If there is regulation? Are you willing to work with your 
neighbours?  
4. Are you aware that the estate’s land lies within a potential forestry woodland 
corridor? Are you willing to collaborate with your neighbours to this respect?  How do 
you think forestry corridors in this part of Scotland could be achieved? 
5.  (For land businesses in the Davan project), What is your experience of the Davan 
project? 
 
E. Power sharing 
1. What do you think about sharing knowledge?  
2. With whom are the farming and forestry issues in the estate discussed? Could you 
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mention some of the agencies with which discussion is carried out? Do you have 
close friends with whom you discuss those issues?  
3. In your opinion, what is or should be the role of scientific knowledge? In your 
opinion, is there sufficient scientific knowledge available on the type of management 
that could enhance environmental issues? 
4.  On environmental issues, have you experienced processes where you and other 
estates work together? Or experimented with new forms of management used on 
other estates? What are the observed results of this collaboration? Have you shared 
the results? if yes, how and with whom?  
5. What are your motives to collaborate? (Incentives? by principle? Business or 
environment motivation?) 
6. Have you done the same with tenants? Have you applied to ‘joint applications’ for 
AES? Have tenants asked you for it?  
7. If you have experience of partnership with other estates or tenants, there could be 
differences or tensions. If that is the case, how do you solve differences? (reinforce 
the confidentiality in reporting the results) Can you give an example? 
 
F. Evaluation  
1. As part of your management, do you have an evaluation process in place? Do you 
self-evaluate your management? If yes how; if not, why?  
2. When unforeseen environmental problems come up as a result of your actions in the 
estate, how do you address this? Could you give an example to illustrate the 
process of solving such problems? 
 
G. Other comments 
1. How do you feel about payment for environmental services? What are the barriers? 
And the advantages? 
 
"SNOWBALL" Do you now someone else to whom I can do the Interview?  
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APPENDIX E. TABLE WITH LAND MANAGERS CHARACTERISTICS AND PSEUDONYMS.  
Table shows the characteristics of land managers: type of tenancy, holding sizes, farming system, awareness about designation areas and BAPs and participation to AES 
and/or FS. We also present in the table what land managers said about conservation (extracts from the interviews) and how we scored them.   
 
Pseud. Type of tenancy 
Holding size 
(ha. approx) 
Multi-functional Land 
uses 
Awareness 
about 
BAP,SAC, 
SSSI 
Attitudes to ‘conservation’. 
 
[and conservation practices] A
E
S 
&
 F
S 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
Resp 
IN 
Stewart Estate 2500 
Arable land and grazing are 
in hand. There are a 
number of tenants. Farming 
is Mixed. Housing for 
letting, woodlands, 
shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
Yes 
“ Oh yes. 25% of our forestry is regarded as conservation or amenity and yes, 
we do, but the interface between what’s commercial, what’s environmental and 
what’s amenity is difficult to define” 
“well, (…) we don’t say we do this for conservation reasons but the 
management of the river bank ties in the management of the fishing. I put quite a 
bit of effort into riparian management because yes, that’s part of our general 
ethos but also it’s a benefit to the fishing  
AES & FS 36 
Douglas Estate 3300 
Agricultural land and 
grazing are leased to a 
number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing and 
woodlands are managed by 
the estate. 
 
Yes for: 
SAC, SSSI. 
No for: 
BAPs 
“It’s spiritual thing for me to some extent. It’s a…I mean, I haven’t read a lot 
but interested in deep ecology and those sorts of things so yup, it’s pretty 
fundamental to life in a way. (…) in very simple terms, if we don’t look after the 
world, we’re just going to kill it off eventually so yes.” 
“… the vision for the estate (is) trying to improve the ecological and landscape 
from the estate. (…) I think to have a healthy estate, to have a healthy ecology is 
fundamental to the way the whole system works and fundamental sustainability 
and in the absence of looking after, then the whole estate would suffer in the 
long term. (…) it’s important to get a better balance between the agriculture 
and forestry. (...) certainly there is a desire to play our part and contribute to 
the ecological interest on the estate and in the area.” 
No directly, 
because they 
do not have in 
hand land, but 
asking tenants 
to apply to 
specific AES. 
17 
Graig Estate 3500 
Arable land and grazing are 
in hand. There are a 
number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing for 
letting, woodlands, 
shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
 
Yes 
“We’ve been in the business a long time doing it anyway and trying to farm and 
do forestry in a conservation way. We’ve been doing it without all the hoo-ha 
that goes on. 
“We do it in our own. We produce the timber, we produce the farm goods and 
all the rest of it and we’ve always done it in a way that no-one’s given us any 
serious complaints about it” 
“We just do what we do and as environmental as we can, complying with 
regulations such as prohibition to have a bonfire and things like that”. 
 
 
FS 11 
Graig Estate 3500 
Arable land and grazing are 
in hand. There are a 
number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing for 
letting, woodlands, 
shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
 
Yes 
“We’ve been in the business a long time doing it anyway and trying to farm and 
do forestry in a conservation way. We’ve been doing it without all the hoo-ha 
that goes on. 
“We do it in our own. We produce the timber, we produce the farm goods and 
all the rest of it and we’ve always done it in a way that no-one’s given us any 
serious complaints about it” 
“We just do what we do and as environmental as we can, complying with 
regulations such as prohibition to have a bonfire and things like that”. 
 
FS 11 
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Grant Estate 3000 
Arable land and grazing are 
in hand. There are a 
number of tenants. Farming 
is mixed. Housing for 
letting, woodlands, 
shooting and fishing are 
managed by the estate. 
 
Yes 
“ […] we’re very pro-active in conservation really. We have always been very 
supporting of conservation on the estate. By doing what we are doing at the 
moment plus other areas” 
(Within the estate there is important part of the Feugh flow that joins the Dee 
river at Banchory. In the last years there has been work carried out to protect the 
Feugh’s water through excluding livestock off it by fencing the area). 
 
FS and RSS 
and RDC-RP 
18 
Matthew Estate 50000 
Arable land and grazing are 
tenanted. Farming is mixed. 
Housing for letting, 
woodlands, shooting and 
fishing, skiing and other 
recreation activities are 
managed by the estate. 
 
Yes 
[Referring to the most important work that the estate does for conservation] 
 
“I would say the catch and release on the river is very important and I would 
say getting a balance grazing regime is important, controlling the deer numbers 
or fencing the deer numbers and basically making certain that we understand 
all the designations. And we are using native species whenever possible” 
WGS, 
RSPB schemes 
34 
Paul Estate 20000 
In hand arable land and 
grazing. There are a number 
of tenants. Mixed farming, 
woodland, housing shooting 
and fishing are managed by 
the estate. 
Yes 
[Referring to the work that the estate does for conservation] 
“…if we’re managing 7000 acres (3000 ha.) of heather moor land for red 
grouse then I’d like to think its pretty well documented what conservation 
benefits come form that type of management in terms of wildlife and managing 
areas of semi natural woodland. Hopefully that has spin off. If we are employing 
gamekeepers on low ground area that are controlling foxes and crows then 
hopefully there is benefit (…) if we are controlling grey squirrels so predator 
control, I suppose it is. Predator control and habitat management that’s really 
the answer to it in substantial effects, in sort of faming operations in 
environmental schemes” Unsubsidized land use –sporting upland- management 
delivers significant benefits, not only in conservation terms but social economic 
terms.” 
AES & FS 37 
Ian Estate 15000 
Arable land and grazing are 
tenanted. Farming is mixed.  
Forest, shooting, fishing, 
recreation, housing are 
managed by the estate. 
Yes 
“Survival –conservation now is helping what does exist now to survive given the 
threats. That’s a pity because I’m not all that comfortable with word 
conservation because that implies that the status quo is fine. And I know 
historically and technically we live in a degraded landscape with degraded 
habitats, degraded by biodiversity, I know that. But our detriment –it’s costing 
us physically, spiritually, emotionally and technically. So ‘conservation’ does 
not mean a huge amount to me nowadays. It would be wonderful to see an 
improved developed and more diverse biodiversity”. 
 
 
 
 
 
FS 41 
Ian Estate 15000 
Arable land and grazing are 
tenanted. Farming is mixed.  
Forest, shooting, fishing, 
recreation, housing are 
managed by the estate. 
Yes 
“Survival –conservation now is helping what does exist now to survive given the 
threats. That’s a pity because I’m not all that comfortable with word 
conservation because that implies that the status quo is fine. And I know 
historically and technically we live in a degraded landscape with degraded 
habitats, degraded by biodiversity, I know that. But our detriment –it’s costing 
us physically, spiritually, emotionally and technically. So ‘conservation’ does 
not mean a huge amount to me nowadays. It would be wonderful to see an 
improved developed and more diverse biodiversity”. 
 
 
FS 41 
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Margaret 
and 
Roland 
Tenant 50 
Arable land and grassland 
Mixed farm system. 
No 
“it does not affect us, does it? not here.” 
“I’ve just never thought about it” 
No 
 
3 
Allan Tenant 50 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed Farm system. 
No 
“My wee bit of ground – I need it for farming” 
“I’d never thought of that” 
No 
 
4 
Richard Tenant 50 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed Farm system. 
No 
“Nature looks after itself if it is it interfered with” 
“No interest in conservation” 
No 
 
9 
Neil Tenant 130 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Yes 
“It’s not something that I am really into to. But I see the point and I am happy 
to participate in something that helps it” 
“Unfortunately that’s where the money comes from for these schemes. But we 
do a little bit of conservation. We only do it for the money” 
AES. 31 
Doland Tenant 130 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed Farm system. 
 
Yes for 
SAC. 
No for BAPs 
“ I’d like to think that I can produce food, whether its animals or cereal and to 
me, we’re gifted with land and should be producing the food. The people that’s 
in the RSS they’ve no interest in wildlife. They are in it for pennies. Don’t get me 
wrong there are some people in it who are interest un wildlife and 
everything…” 
No 15 
Russell Tenant 250 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
No 
“ I haven’t a huge interest in conservation. I think the best for the countryside to 
look after itself is well farmed land, well managed land. I don’t like to see paths 
being left just for conservation and not used for anything. I prefer they were 
used for faming production as long as it helps the environment. I don’t want 
farming to hinder conservation but they have to go together. I don’t like seeing 
paths or land being just left to helps wildlife if it’s not production anything”. 
No 22 
Macvean Tenant 200 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Yes for SAC 
and SSSI. 
No for BAPs 
“ (…) I’m quite keen to conserve the wildlife. But I don’t see the land 
disappearing. That is the one constant. Although you think by some that was…. I 
have a neighbour that s a very green man and accused me of raping the soil and 
poising all my livestock. Farmers won’t do that because that’s once thing they 
try to look after as much as they can- specially the livestock” He’s an organic 
farmer but says that he lives in a little cottage and never works. I’ve never seen 
him working. I couldn’t live like he does. I’ve got people to support and rent to 
pay and make a living”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes 20 
Macvean Tenant 200 
Arable land and grassland. Yes for SAC and SSSI. 
“ (…) I’m quite keen to conserve the wildlife. But I don’t see the land 
disappearing. That is the one constant. Although you think by some that was…. I 
have a neighbour that s a very green man and accused me of raping the soil and 
poising all my livestock. Farmers won’t do that because that’s once thing they 
try to look after as much as they can- specially the livestock” He’s an organic 
farmer but says that he lives in a little cottage and never works. I’ve never seen 
him working. I couldn’t live like he does. I’ve got people to support and rent to 
pay and make a living”. 
 
Yes 20 
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Keith Tenant 300 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Yes for 
SAC. 
No for BAPs 
“I’m not totally against it. It’s a good enough thing, some aspects of it”. “Well 
the simple reason is they were taking over this modulation and I was trying to 
get some money back. That was why I got into that. To see if I’d get money back 
because they’d gone away with it in the first place so I thought I might get some 
back”. 
 
LMC 
RDC-RP 
 
26 
 Duncan Tenant 90 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
No 
“ I’m in favour of it but I’ve never been involved in it directly and never really 
been approached by anybody but like to see a bit of diversity wildlife. One of the 
things that we have a kit of which visiting farmers tend to comment on is hares. 
We are quite proud of that. I like to see the hares and we do seem to have a 
healthy population, which is probably one thing. There are not many rabbits, 
which is probably a good thing. There was a while when lots came out of the hill 
and they would eat everything up there [but not now]. Probably fewer ground 
nest and birds that when I came here, lapwings and oystercatchers and things 
like that, They seem to be fewer recently. I do not know why” 
 
 
LMC 16 
Caitriona 
Tenant-
small 
owner 
70 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system and 
other sport livestock 
production. 
No “if we had been a bad farmers as everybody assumes we have always been there wouldn’t be anything to conserve. Its here because we looked after it” 
No 
(in the past 
CSS) 
6 
Jean 
Tenant- 
Small 
Owner 
100 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
No 
“ Is farming no natural conservation anyway?. I mean you feed the crows, you 
feed the craggy herons, you feed the geese which I do not like doing but you’ve 
no option when thousands of them descend on you” 
“ I am not awful favour of this leaving areas around about fields…” 
 
 
 
23 
Rachel 
Tenant -
Small 
owner 
400 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Yes for 
SAC, SSSI. 
No for BAPs 
“ We got a pond for that too because it was areas that were of limited value for 
other uses so it was a case of we might as well be doing something from the 
environmental side”. (…but the reason was)…probably mainly financial but 
also using some of the areas where it was a good reason to do” 
 
 
Yes 
RSS 
 
39 
Callum 
Tenant –
Small 
owner 
130 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Woods for bird hunting. 
Other: shop. 
No 
“All the field are cultivated, fence. With the woods we have and the pheasant, 
we try to manage them. We try and keep the undergrowth in there for the birds 
to nest and it isn’t a polished garden we are keeping there is it a wildlife 
habitat” 
Yes 
RSS 
14 
Trevor 
Tenant-
small 
owner 
400 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Yes for 
SAC. No for 
BAPs 
“If it wasn’t for farmers you wouldn’t have the biodiversity in the landscape.” 
But gov rnment [has] latched o to the idea of c nservation which is fin , but.... 
Look out here, you know, we’ve got a nice view to see and things are pretty ti y 
more or less. Conserv ti n is great but th y are going to have to draw the line 
somewhere. They can’t go on and on spending public funds on conservation. 
They is going to have to come a time when the conservation area has come to its 
limit, where they have to refocus on producing food, you know, the world 
population is multiplying”. 
“And okay we get money back through environmental payments but it goes 
against my ethos that you have to have this rough bit to get the money”. 
No now. 
He tried. 
21 
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AES: Agri-environmental Schemes; FS: Forestry Schemes; RSS: Rural Stewardship Scheme; RDC-RP: Rural Development Contracts-Rural Priorities; WGS: Woodland Grants Scheme (now closed); SFS: Scottish 
Forestry Schemes (now closed); RSPB schemes: Royal Society for the Protection of Birds Schemes; LMC: Land Management Contracts (now closed); CPS: Countryside Premium Scheme (now closed).
William Small Owner 100 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed Farm system. 
No “ I think there has to be a balance between conservation and food production” AES 33 
James Small owner 150 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Other: Shop. 
Yes 
“ I am very much in favour of it. I have done quite a lot in that aspect really” 
“We’ve got quite a variety of conservation here with all the ponds, trees, woods, 
birds, there is a lot of wildlife”. 
“I am always interested in the nature and environment and it enhance the look 
of the place too”. 
 
Yes 
RSS 
LMC 
25 
Hendry 
Small 
owner 250 
Let land for crops and 
livestock. 
Recreation and 
environmental activities. 
Yes. No for 
BAPs 
“It is all amenity. Its all for conservation and environment really, and beauty”. 
“Well I think it’s all excellent in essence but I think there’s so much to talk 
about and so much information about it but there’s not enough done in 
practices. I think that’s the problem. People are often confused and maybe there 
should be a model farm somewhere which everyone can go and see it”. 
Yes. 
CSPS 
LMC 
RP 
19 
Arran 
Small 
owner 350 
Arable land and grassland. 
Mixed farm system. 
Other: Shop. 
Yes. 
No for BAPs 
“But because we are interested in the scheme, Wild Birds and that, then it 
was….we would have been doing it anyway. So because we are doing it, we 
might as well claim and get the money for it.” I think the environment has to be 
protected. I think there’s far better ways of protecting the environment than just 
putting it down on a piece of paper. I’m not greatly enthused by the thing”. 
AES. For FS he 
prefers to pay 
rather than go 
through the 
paper work. 
8 
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APPENDIX F. EXTRACT OF DATA ANALYSIS FROM EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS.  
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APPENDIX G. RESULTS OF CONTROL GROUPS (ROUNDS 1 TO 3) SESSIONS 1 AND 3.  
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APPENDIX H. RESULTS OF TREATMENT GROUPS (ROUNDS 4 TO 8) SESSIONS 1 AND 3. 
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APPENDIX I.  RESULTS OF TREATMENT GROUPS (ROUNDS 9 TO 12) SESSIONS 1 AND 3. 
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APPENDIX J. INDIVIDUAL PLAYERS’ STRATEGIES FOR ROUND 4 TO 8.   
Each graphic represent one players and the strategy he or she followed in each round of the treatment 
groups (rounds 4 to 8). The panels enclose graphics for players of the three experimental sessions.  
 
 
 
                
Panel 1. Individual choices made by players per sequential rounds in the 3 experimental sessions. Panel 1 show how many 
rounds players needed to find out the equilibrium point where they maximized money point. Some players took 3 or 4 rounds, 
others only in the last round reached this equilibrium point. Only in one case in all experimental sessions, player no. 5 (ES2), 
experimental session 2 in panel 1 reached this point from round one and kept the same strategy over the rest of the rounds.  
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Panel 2. Individual choices made by players per sequential rounds in the 3 experimental sessions. In this panel, the output of 
their decision depended on other players choices and therefore in some cases even if they wanted to maximize money or 
conservation points they would have to assume their neighbours cooperation. Coordination of strategic choices did happen in 
some cases and therefore players pay the price of cooperation by getting less than what they would have had with no cooperation. 
In Panel 2, the graphic for player 2 (ES2) shows the costs of cooperation: the neighbouring player did not choose the same option 
as player 2 producing a decline in player’s 2 productivity 2 in ES2. The results show that in other cases players reached this 
equilibrium point but in consequent round they changed their strategies suggesting that players were ‘experimenting’ with the 
choices they had by trying different options. This panel shows the results of players maximized their money points and changed 
their allocation in subsequent rounds.  
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Panel 3. Individual choices made by players per sequential rounds in the 3 experimental sessions. This panel shows that there 
were three players who did not show a pattern suggesting that did not wanted, did not look or did not find the equilibrium point 
of maximization of money points. The other explanation is that they did not understand the experiment.  
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